WASIT BADR ORG. DEPUTY ON THE SADRIST CHALLENGE

S E C R E T HILLAH 000013 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV MOPS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: WASIT BADR ORG. DEPUTY ON THE SADRIST CHALLENGE CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) 1.(S) SUMMARY. In a January 22 meeting with Regional Embassy Office staff, Wasit Badr Organization Deputy Qasim al-Aerajay indicated that he continues to see the followers of Moqtada al-Sadr as a growing threat to the primacy of his organization and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in Wasit. Al-Aerajay was extremely pleased at the official announcement of the December election results and confident that the Wasit contingent of the United Iraqi Alliance/555 slate would be responsive to the requests of SCIRI and Badr leadership in the province. However, as provincial elections approach, he predicted increased tension with Sadrists in the province, as he felt Wasit Sadrists insufficiently support the goal of a nine-province "super-region" across all of South Central and Southern Iraq. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Al-Aerajay, the Deputy Chairman of the Badr Organization in Wasit, pronounced himself extremely pleased with the official announcement of the December election results, in which the UIA/555 slate took seven of eight seats allotted to the province. When asked how, exactly, SCIRI and Badr Org. decided on the candidates to stand for election, Al-Aerajay said that formal SCIRI or Badr Organization party affiliation was less important, rather, "that they were loyal and would do what we wanted." -------------- SADRIST CHALLENGE TO SCIRI/BADR DOMINANCE -------------- ¶3. (S) The Sadrist presence, in Al-Aerajay's opinion, continues to strengthen throughout the province and become more visible and better organized. He pointed to the establishment of a large Sadrist office in the town of Badra, the increasingly militant attitude of Sadrist provincial council members, and "many" more armed Sadrist militiamen in public areas. ¶4. (S) Al-Aerajay also related a recent conversation he had with the Wasit Iraqi Police Chief Hussein Abid al-Hadi Mohammed Mahbooda (aka Abo Ali Al-Wasity),a "former" Badr Organization commander. Wasity believes, according to Al-Aerajay, that at least thirty percent of his police force are outright Sadrists. ¶5. (S) Going beyond the threat of violent clashes between Sadrists and Badr organization followers, Al-Aerajay said he views organized Sadrists as a threat to the SCIRI/Badr domination of political life in the province. He predicted an extremely strong showing for Sadrist candidates in eventual provincial and local elections. Nearly as important, Al-Aerajay asserted, was the potential ability of Sadrists, in Wasit province and across South Central Iraq, to hinder the formation of federal entities, in particular the creation of a nine-province "super-region" covering all of South Central and Southern Iraq. Without this region, Al-Aerajay believes, the diverse Shia groupings would continually argue about resource distribution and power, leaving them susceptible to challenges from Iraq's other ethnic groups. ¶6. (S) COMMENT. Al-Aerajay, as a high-ranking Badr Organization official, is clearly not an impartial judge of the Sadrist presence in the province. However, his views are an accurate indicator of the perceptions of Badr Organization and SCIRI leadership in the region. Tension between his organization and Sadrists in the province has on occasion led to violence and unrest across the entire South Central region. He clearly believes a better-organized Sadirst presence is a threat to SCIRI/Badr power. What remains unclear, at this point, is what he intends to do about it. END COMMENT. FONTENEAU