HOW THE SOUTH WAS WON - TALLYING UP ELECTION DAY FRAUD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000124

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PROP IZ
SUBJECT: HOW THE SOUTH WAS WON - TALLYING UP ELECTION DAY FRAUD

REF: HILLAH 0121

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al
Hillah, US Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: For perspective on potential problems in
upcoming provincial council elections, REO Staff spoke to
representatives of the South Central Iraqi National Accord
(INA),Communist Party, Iraqi Election Commission (IECI),and
other contacts about ballot tampering and other forms of voter
manipulation that were alleged to occur during last year's
January 2 provincial council elections, October constitutional
referendum, and December 15 Council of Representatives CoR)
elections. Contacts claimed that while the provincial IECI heads
and professional staff were in general trustworthy, temporary
election workers engaged in widespread vote tampering. Moderate
party officials detailed the alleged methods in which the "555"
(aka "candle") United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) religious party slate
applied social coercion, allegedly violated election campaigning
regulations, and changed vote tallies. END SUMMARY

Background: Secure Elections and Robust Participation
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The three national elections held since the fall of
Saddam Hussein were undoubtedly a significant accomplishment,
given a daunting security challenge and the difficulties in
organizing free and fair elections in a war torn country without
proper infrastructure. Elections were further complicated by
the challenges of training staff outside the country and the
lack of international observers during the election themselves.


3. (C) Despite the obstacles, the January, 2005 Transitional
National Assembly (TNA) and Provincial Council elections, the
October, 2005 constitutional referendum, and the December, 2005
Council of Representatives (CoR) elections were generally judged
to be successful by two important criteria; overall turnout (58%
- 72%) and a moderate incidence of election day violence.
However, REO contacts in the moderate and secular parties
continue to insist that January and December majority victories
in the South Central region for the "555" Shi'a religious party
slate were turned into landslide victories by UIA dirty tricks
and ballot fraud. To this day, Iraqi National Accord (INA) and
Communist Party contacts insist that this fraud occurred
throughout the region and was pervasive enough to serve as
grounds for determining that the TNA/PC and CoR elections were
not free and fair.


4. (C) While REO staff lack the data to rigorously evaluate the
scale and frequency of voter fraud by UIA partisans, we do
believe that the descriptions of how fraud was committed are
credible. As a reference for upcoming provincial elections, REO
staff spoke with representatives from moderate parties,
journalists, Iraqi Election Commission provincial heads, and
other contacts to compile a partial listing of the many types of
voter fraud that are alleged to have been used.

Pre-Election: Violence, Red Tape, and Social Coercion
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5. (C) Moderate party complaints about an unequal playing field
in the weeks leading up to elections fell into two categories;
assassination and intimidation, and restrictions on
disseminating campaign materials.


6. (C) Specifics were lacking on allegations of assassination.
Overall, the INA slate reportedly had thirteen party workers
killed during voting for the CoR. Allawi supporters and
Communist Party contacts stated that they were unable to recruit
candidates and field election observers because of widespread
intimidation. Communist Party contacts in Babil Province stated
that the night before CoR elections, the campaign posters on
their Hillah headquarters were torn off the walls by a mob. A
Karbala INA politician claimed that on two occasions, his poster
hangers and militia members exchanged gunfire. He also reported
that party offices had been attacked and trashed by mobs. A
Communist Party member related how in the important Mahmoumdiya
district in Babil Province, leaflets were distributed
door-to-door that warned people to vote "Iraqiya," (the "555"
slate). The leaflets were ominously signed by the "Fair
Punishment Committee."


7. (C) Our contacts noted that they frequently had difficulty
receiving permission to post campaign materials. The Karbala
INA politician noted that some municipalities would encourage
the religious parties to hang banners and posters, but refused
to grant permission to secular parties.


8. (C) Moderate parties complained about the pervasive
integration of church and state that created an atmosphere of

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social coercion. For example, during the final week, mosques
throughout the South Central region frequently used their
loudspeakers to broadcast the message that if you vote for the
"555" slate, under Islamic law, you would not be able to sleep
with your wife. Another commonly broadcast message, "If you do
not vote UIA, you are a Baathist." INA and Communist Party
contacts noted that UIA campaign materials commonly used
religious imagery.


9. (C) While not an illegal advantage, many moderate contacts in
the South Central region have complained about the proliferation
of religious satellite television channels that allow religious
parties to target families within the home. Satellite
broadcasting and mosques loudspeakers create a sizable media
advantage, they complain. They also noted that UIA media outlets
broke a mandatory 24-hour period of silence before the election
to spread news about the famous Al-Jazeera television program
that was said to be insulting to Ayatollah Sistani.


10. (C) Perhaps the most serious allegation made about
pre-election day tampering concerned IECI voter registration
rolls. "Tamper-proof" voter lists were compiled and printed in
secure facilities outside of Iraq. Our contacts claim that the
lists were never secure and had been seriously compromised
before printing. Over and over again, books contained the same
mocking phrase in Arabic inserted into voter lists, "Die
American dogs." COMMENT: REO has digital photos of this Arabic
phrase appearing in registration books. END COMMENT

Election Day: Multiple Voting, Ballot Tampering
-------------- --


11. (C) Social coercion intensified on election day, according
to our contacts. Loudspeakers broadcast, "Sistani calls you to
vote." "Fake sheikhs" or clerics stood in the approaches to
polling stations, stamping people's hands with the slogan "From
Sistani" (a reference to Shi'a Ayatollah Ali Sistani). A
mid-ranking Babil Province police officer, himself from a rural
village, who had been in charge of security in Babil rural
districts during the December 15 election, recalled how rural
voters in village after village seemed to believe that the
marjaya'iya (Shi'a clerics) had directed them to vote for a
religious party. COMMENT: Ayatollah Sistani did not endorse
specific candidates or parties before the CoR elections.
However, his fatwas urging Shi'a to vote were often taken as an
admonition to vote for a religious party. The religious
parties, particularly the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) frequently invoked Sistani's name.
END COMMENT


12. (C) Municipalities also seemed to selectively restrain
movement. Communist Party representatives related how one field
worker had called in, saying that the religious parties were
shuttling voters to the polls in ten buses, but he was not
allowed to drive down the street in his car. A Mayor of a
southern Babil Province town allegedly issued an order
forbidding the issuance of gas to secular party vehicles. Other
contacts noted that the religious parties were allowed to hang
posters inside polling stations, a privilege not granted to
secular parties.


13. (C) Provincial Council members and high-ranking provincial
officials appeared to frequently cross the line between
campaigning and inappropriate influence. A Communist Party
contact noted how in the sixteen districts he supervised, civil
service provincial department heads fanned out with their
bodyguards to direct voters to vote for the UIA. Allegedly,
several PC members sat in larger polling stations all day,
reminding people standing in line to vote for the "555" slate.


14. (C) All contacts, including two IECI provincial directors
(reftel),agreed that while provincial heads and UN-trained
staff were generally reliable, temporary election workers were
either religious party operatives or highly susceptible to
outside pressure. This seemed to be a serious problem in rural
villages.


15. (C) Contacts outlined many types of balloting infractions
and fraud allegedly carried out or facilitated by local polling
station workers. These include:

-- Multiple voting at larger polling stations that had put
voting booths into several separate rooms. Electoral workers
would stand by and do nothing while religious party
representatives took voters who had just completed voting and
put them into a line for a ballot station in another room so
they could vote again.

-- Voting for illiterate elderly (a significant chunk of the
electorate, particularly in rural areas) and often for their
family members as well.


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-- Using removable ink to mark fingers. (Contacts also
complained that the official, supposedly indelible, ink was also
easily removable).

-- Closing polling places early in urban districts despite a
last-minute IECI order of a one-hour extension. Some polling
places closed at 1730, 30 minutes before the scheduled closing
time.

-- Closing the doors and asking voters who they intended to vote
for. If the answer was the UIA, the voters were let in. If the
answer was for a moderate party, the voter was told that the
polling place was closed.

-- Taking a single vote by a member of a household and marking
additional ballots for all other members of that household.

-- Forcing moderate or secular party observers to leave polling
stations or asking the police to remove them.

-- Overruling observers' objections and allowing out-of-district
voters to vote.

Post-Election: Ballot Stuffing and Rejecting Valid Ballots
-------------- --------------


16. (C) The most significant form of ballot tampering seemed to
be "double-checking" of ballots. Contacts complained that
throughout the region, it was common for electoral workers to
open ballot boxes and mark those ballots cast for moderate
parties twice, rendering that ballot invalid. The Karbala
Allawi party head stated with frustration that his observers had
called in 93,000 votes in the province. After the ballots were
counted, the official count was only 36,000. A Babil contact
noted that the IECI initial tally of moderate party votes in his
Babil district was 1400. The final count announced in Baghdad
was only 800.


17. (C) There appears to have been some ballot-stuffing. A
Communist Party representative accused the UIA of importing
ballot boxes pre-stuffed with ballots from Iran. They also
noted accusations that Iranian Shi'a were issued Iraqi ration
cards and told to cross the border into Basra and vote. More
reliably, there were some rural villages in the South Central
region where the final number of ballots cast significantly
exceeded the number of voters registered in the electorate
rolls. The Communist Party in Babil plausibly claims that
left-over ballots in some areas were marked with "555" votes by
IECI workers and put into ballot boxes before transfer to
Baghdad.


18. (C) REO local staff recall telephone calls from moderate and
secular party observers who had been tossed out of polling
stations just after voting ended, but before ballot tallying.
Journalists here relate stories about how boxes of ballots were
taken away for two hours and then brought back to the polling
place. During elections, the national media reported some cases
of discarded ballots, largely in Baghdad and northern Iraq.

Conclusion: Lessons Learned, Lessons for the Future
-------------- --------------


19. (C) Different set of contacts draw different conclusions
from anecdotal evidence outlining the above patterns of fraud.
All concur that even if the IECI and international community had
concluded that election fraud was widespread enough to warrant
discounting the results, ultimately, only the margin of victory
by the "555" slate would have changed in South Central. However,
they charge that if fraud had been restrained, moderate parties
today would have a much more active voice on both the national
and local levels.


20. (C) Moderate party officials here conclude that the fraud
they saw during the elections points out the need to push for
international observers in the next election. An INA contact
told us that the ratio of "555"-affiliated observers to moderate
party poll workers was roughly 20:1. Intimidation makes it
difficult to recruit poll watchers, he commented, adding that
the presence of international observers would encourage ordinary
Iraqis to participate. COMMENT: No one has an answer as to how
security could be put in place for international observers. END
COMMENT


21. (C) The IECI provincial heads in Diwaniyah and Wasit agreed
with political party contacts that temporary workers were a
serious problem in the 2005 elections. They argue that the IECI
should retain its UN-trained core staff, and the CoR should
refrain from replacing commissioners and line staff with
political party operatives (reftel). On the provincial level,
they see more training for temporary workers as a useful
investment in raising consciousness about what poll workers can
and cannot do. They also suggest that training and orientation

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for Iraqi observers be expanded prior to the next election.


22. (C) Our moderate political contacts are more inclined to
throw out the existing IECI altogether, instead tasking the
judiciary sector to oversee elections. They agree with IECI
professional staff that the current attempt by the CoR to revamp
the IECI is a charade aimed at bringing the institution under
direct political party control.


23. (C) All of our moderate and secular contacts would prefer to
see more, not less UN involvement with the next set of national
elections. They warn that SCIRI provincial leaders are
increasingly insecure about holding onto majority control of
provincial councils and governorships, given their acute lack of
tangible success in providing basic services in their
communities. They also (optimistically) believe that the
marjaya'iya will likely clearly annunciate that they stand aside
from the religious parties, and hope that regardless of where
Sistani stands, voters will be more willing to consider the
moderate/secular party alternative. This, they conclude, may
provoke an even-higher probability of fraud and violence in the
elections to come.


24. (C) COMMENT: With serious CoR debate beginning about the
shape of elections to come, this may be an opportune time to
consider modifications to the by-laws that could strengthen
security and diversity in voting. For example: 1) "rolling"
elections that would occur sequentially by province(s),making
the most of limited international observers and helping to
concentrate security; 2) electronic voting; 3) stepping up, not
diminishing UN involvement; 4) more programs to combat what one
contact here termed "pervasive civic illiteracy." END COMMENT
FONTENEAU