GENERAL QAIS DISMISSED AS BABIL PROVINCE POLICE CHIEF

S E C R E T HILLAH 000117 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/16/2016 TAGS: PTER MARR PGOV ASEC IZ SUBJECT: GENERAL QAIS DISMISSED AS BABIL PROVINCE POLICE CHIEF REF: HILLAH 86 CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al Hillah, US Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) This is an action request. Please see paragraph six. ¶1. (S) SUMMARY General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri told RC that on July 13, Minister of Interior Jayad al-Bulani signed an order removing Qais as Chief of Police in Babil Province, transferring Qais to an unspecified desk job in Baghdad. Qais said Ministry contacts told him that al-Bulani bowed to pressure from Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) head Abd Al-Azia Al-Hakim and an unspecified Deputy to the Prime Minister. General Qais intends to wait for receipt of a written order, but is certain that this time the dismissal is for real. As per reftel, he and several of his senior officers are already asking about asylum options. Embassy and Washington are urged to work at the highest level to countermand the order. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) After months of weathering repeated attempts by Babil Province Governor Al-Musalamawi to have Qais removed, Qais felt that this time the axe had fallen and it was unlikely that the decision could be reversed. He told REO RC on July 15 that he was directly informed of the transfer by the national head of police, General Abdul Garten. Garten told Qais that Minister al-Bulani had signed a dismissal order two days ago. Qais asked RC and military representatives if the Embassy and MNFI could work at the highest levels to countermand the decision. ¶3. (C) Qais said that his interim successor would be the current "Head of Special Communications" for the Babil Police, General Adad. Adad, two of Qais senior staff commented, was best known for losing his police vehicle to Mahdi Militia members who beat him and drove off with his official car. He had served as Babil Police Chief for three months in 2004 and was quickly demoted due to overall incompetence. ¶4. (S) Qais and several of his senior commanders asked again if they and their families would be welcomed onto the REO compound or other US facilities in Hillah in the event of an immediate threat to their lives (reftel). Qais stated that he hoped to take his family abroad, but expressed willingness to return alone and continue working in Babil. COMMENT: U.S. military representatives present at the meeting noted with shock that the head of Hillah SWAT, Colonel Salah, the "hard man" behind Qais, had for the first time in their memory, spoken up and stated his family has gone into hiding in Egypt. END COMMENT ¶5. (S) COMMENT: Moderate politicians and contacts in all five South Central provinces have repeatedly told us that General Qais has always been viewed by SCIRI as the final obstacle to SCIRI infiltration and control of regional security units. General Qais continues to be highly popular with both Sunni and Shi'a provincial residents, based on his strong record as an independent, non-partisan police chief, willing to protect both Shi'a and Sunni communities. When asked, most residents here attribute Hillah's relative calmness and lack of terrorist incidents to Qais' strong presence. Hillah Mayor Lafta recently noted that the province is again receiving displaced families, both Sunni and Shi'a, who are drawn to Hillah because of its reputation as an oasis from intersectarian violence. If General Qais is removed, many here fear that Badr and Sadr militia groups will quickly launch an assassination campaign against potential secular candidates for the coming election, ex-Baathists, and other "subversive" elements that do not fit into SCIRI's plans for the region as a whole. ¶6. (S) REO staff and military representatives in Babil continue to believe that General Qais is the key to not just provincial security, but to a successful security transition in the region as a whole during the months ahead. Given local voter dissatisfaction with SCIRI provincial leaders and growing support for Sadrists, SCIRI control of security forces could prove to be a destabilizing factor when serious electoral campaigning begins. REO contacts throughout South Central believe that the positive example of General Qais in Babil Province acts as a restraint on assassinations, intimidation, and other acts of terror in the region as a whole. REO Hillah requests that Embassy and Washington raise this issue at the highest levels and urge Minister al-Bulani not to issue the order. FONTENEAU