BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000109 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR NCT E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL PARTIES REF: HILLAH 0106 HILLAH 00000109 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. During a recent meeting Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraqi (SCIRI) Babil party boss, and also Provincial Council (PC) member, Ali Al Qasser presented Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) staff with an insider's view of the party's aspirations in the region. Qasser also noted that Coalition Forces (CF),the Regional Embassy Office (REO),the PRT and the Babil provincial government must intimately coordinate political and security efforts to stabilize the province and embolden emergent democratic institutions. While the meeting was highly cordial, it was obvious from the beginning that Qasser's primary mission was to advocate increased U.S. political support of SCIRI and to underscore a positive image of the party as a whole. END SUMMARY. -------------- BABIL PROVINCE AND SECURITY -------------- ¶3. (C) Qasser started the meeting by reiterating a commonly expressed theme amongst local and provincial politicians that CF need to pay greater attention to strategically important Babil Province. The "political process" and "democratic development," he added, are moving forward with the encouragement of the United States and CF, but he cautioned that "democracy is still new to the Iraqi people." If "the people get a wrong understanding of democracy [e.g. the U.S. not overtly supporting decisions of local and provincial governmental bodies] the security situation in the province will almost certainly deteriorate." ¶4. (C) Qasser also suggested that the REO, the PRT and the PC need to harmonize security efforts. As previously expressed by the SCIRI governor, (reftel) Qasser seemed to insinuate that security issues should be debated and evaluated outside of currently existing structures, such as the weekly briefs held at the REO. (COMMENT. This suggestion appears to be an attempt to marginalize Babil Police Chief General Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri Qais who regularly attends the weekly REO security meeting. END COMMENT). PRT staff countered that the REO always welcomes the participation of PC members in security meetings despite the fact that the past record of attendance of the PC invitees has been far from stellar. Qasser answered, "We cannot continue cooperation if your support is hidden. We need Coalition Forces to make security plans open for all and we should jointly agree upon them." -------------- THE PC AND GENERAL QAIS -------------- ¶4. (C) When asked about SCIRI's position on the current controversy surrounding General Qais, Qasser stated that the PC decision to fire the popular general is unalterable. Moreover, as the PC retains the highest legal authority in Babil, the United States has a moral obligation to support the decision in order to hearten the nascent democratic institutions in the province. In line with declarations made by other PC members, Qasser added that Qais' termination rested upon his inability to compromise with the council. Such insubordination, Qasser stated, is the basis of the PC's decision to remove the general, "but don't worry," he concluded, "Qais will find another job." ¶5. (C) Qasser stated bluntly that it is commonly known that General Qais enjoys unfettered U.S. support. This backing, he maintained, only weakens the rapport between the PC and Coalition Forces and also might confuse the people of Babil. He admonished that the public will no longer trust U.S. actions and statements because the United States, while overtly advocating the development of democracy in the province, is seemingly subverting the legal authority of the PC. Moreover, he said that the United States should not view the verdict to fire Qais as politically motivated considering that only twelve of the forty-one PC members actually belong to a political organization. (COMMENT. All information received by the REO and PRT concerning party loyalties of the Babil PC indicates that this contention is incorrect. END COMMENT). -------------- SCIRI, BADR, AND POLITICAL PARTIES -------------- ¶6. (C) Qasser stated that SCIRI in Babil is not so much of a political party, but "an arbiter of political cooperation that looks to enable every Iraqi to join the [democratic] process," HILLAH 00000109 002.2 OF 002 including supporting weaker, likeminded political entities to compete in local and national elections. "We also advocate cultural activities," Qasser added, "and ask for very little in return." Qasser failed to mention that the Islamic Da'wa party and many Sadrists have been deeply critical of the current SCIRI-dominated provincial administration. ¶7. (C) When asked to describe the relationship between the Badr Corps and SCIRI, Qasser stated that while Badr was previously the military arm of SCIRI before the 2003 U.S.-led liberation, such militias are no longer needed. Badr, he maintained, has essentially transformed into a sister political organization of SCIRI, but remains presently independent of SCIRI leadership. "Badr," he continued "is loyal to its own leadership and therefore does not want to unify with SCIRI at this time. However, at some point in the future, the two parties may decided to unify into a single entity." ¶8. (C) When asked if he could list specific philosophical and theological differences between SCIRI and the other Shi'a Islamist political parties in South-Central, Qasser responded that, in fact, there are none. The Shi'a Islamist parties, he declared, agree largely upon major political issues, including the creation of a moderate Islamic state that codifies core religious values. Qasser added "individuals who are not Muslim will be respected, but Islam must take precedence over all others in Iraq." Moreover, Qasser observed that SCIRI intends to change its name to the "Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI)," as the revolution was completed with the 2003 U.S.-led liberation. ¶9. (C) COMMENT. Qasser is a friendly and straightforward politician, with little intention of hiding SCIRI political goals in Babil or nation wide. While his polemical commentary is difficult to take seriously, including his interpretation of the Qais controversy, the PC and the role of Badr in Babil, he did offer some interesting observations pertaining to the Shi'a Islamist parities in general. His reflection that most of these political parties share the same ultimate objective of creating an Islamic Iraq is perhaps most striking. PRT staff have asked local contacts time after time if they could articulate key political differences between the various Shi'a Islamist parties - with little success. Also interesting is his assertion that SCIRI intends to support other Shi'a Islamist parties in upcoming local and provincial elections, which possibly alludes to a combined 555 ticket. It remains to be seen what level of cooperation SCIRI officials in Babil will be ableQo obtain from the other Shi'a Islamist parties, many of which remain highly critical of the current SCIRI administration of the province. END COMMENT. FONTENEAU