ARREST OF KARBALA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ROILS SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000105 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL IZ SUBJECT: ARREST OF KARBALA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ROILS SOUTH CENTRAL POLITICS CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lack of public information about the arrest of Karbala Provincial Council Chairman Sheikh Akeel Fahem al-Zubaidi fueled condemnation of the raid in Friday afternoon sermons throughout the South Central region. Sadrist clerics were the most vehement in condemning the ISF/CF raid. At least one cleric promised there would be retribution to come. The Najaf provincial government reportedly said it would suspend contact with Coalition Forces to protest the raid. However, Karbala public demonstrations have been relatively low-key so far. Karbala Governor Dr. Akeel Mahmood Kareem Al-Khaza'li and the Provincial Council called upon the Prime Minister to investigate why "an elected representative of the people" was detained. Press reporting continues to follow the line that an arms cache found in al-Zubaidi's home was simply weapons belonging to his Personal Security Detail. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) An early morning raid on the compound of Karbala Provincial Council Chairman Sheikh Akeel Fahem al-Zubaidi by Iraqi Security Forces backed by Coalition Forces netted large sums of cash and a large cache of weapons, including sniper rifles and RPGs. Al-Zubaidi is reportedly a senior commander for terrorist activities in the province, and has ordered the placement of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that resulted in the deaths of six US soldiers. ¶3. (C) The Karbala provincial government immediately announced a halt to cooperative activity with Coalition Forces. The Provincial Council suspended operations and municipal workers were told to suspend work for two days. Deputy Provincial Council Chairman Abdul Al -aal Yaseen Mohammed told REO staff that Iraqi Forces were present at the raid as a "formality." The Americans, the DPCC continued, had failed to present in advance to Governor Al-Khazali concrete evidence needed to prove that an important representative of the people was actually wanted for terrorist acts. ¶4. (C) DPCC Al-Aal Yaseen Mohammed stated that there had been four public demonstrations so far against the raid and detentQ Local contacts and CF staff present in the provincial government building reported that the demonstrations had been relatively poorly attended and obviously staged by the governor. ¶5. (C) Press reporting and Friday afternoon prayer sermons generally followed the line presented by Karbala provincial government; the seized weapons were for use by Al-Zubaidi's 75-person Personal Security Detail. Sadrist clerics in Karbala, Najaf, and Babil were particularly vehement in condemning the attack and warning that the attack would lead to retribution. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: The halfheartedness of the defense for Sheikh Al-Zubaidi suggests that it is common knowledge that Al-Zubaidi is a true "bad guy." However, the detention of a prominent elected public figure raises the stakes for regional provincial leaders, most of whom have considered themselves immune from prosecution for corruption or ties to terrorist activities. For this reason, political leaders here will likely want to spin out their condemnation of Al-Zubaidi's detention. In the absence of a compelling public case as to why Al-Zubaidi needed to be taken off the streets, Sadr and Da'wa party organizers will put substantial effort into whipping up public indignation over the raid during the days to come. END COMMENT FONTENEAU