RUMBLINGS IN SOUTH CENTRAL PROVINCES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: KISL PGOV PTER MARR IZ
SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS IN SOUTH CENTRAL PROVINCES

HILLAH 00000104 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Events in four South Central provinces over the
last twenty-four hours indicate that although the incidence of
terrorist acts remains low in this seemingly stable region,
tensions are increasingly manifesting themselves in public
demonstrations, ultimatums to provincial governments, and
increasingly tense, sometimes violent confrontations. The
Al-Hassani militia may be taking advantage of public
dissatisfaction with local government to build up its strength,
similar to moves by Muqtada al-Sadr in 2004. END SUMMARY

Qadisiyah Province: Sadrists to Governor - "We will Burn Down
the City"
-------------- --------------
--------------


2. (S) An incident involving Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
personnel in civilian clothing escalated into public demands by
the Diwaniyah Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) for the release of
"three gunmen" by Coalition Forces. Governor Hamza called REO
staff on June 12, stating that the Sadrists will carry out their
threat to "burn down" Diwaniyah if the three "detainees" are not
turned over to the Iraqi Police by 1700 that day. OMS Sheikh
Sadiq Al-Hasnawi told the press, "Diwaniyah will be the center
of the first spark of public anger against the American
occupation." He characterized the alleged release of the
"gunmen" to Coalition Forces as evidence that "the Americans are
supporting death squads in Diwaniyah."


3. (C) Throughout the afternoon and evening of June 12, Iraqi
Police maintained a heavy presence in downtown Diwaniyah,
including patrol cars using their sirens to dissuade public
gatherings. Coalition Forces were also present downtown around
the Provincial Government building. The situation was finally
defused by the reported intervention of the Prime Minister's
Office with OMS officials in Diwaniyah.


4. (C) Separately, up to two hundred members of Al-Sarkhi aka
Al-Hassani, a rapidly growing "Twelfth Imam" militia
demonstrated in downtown Diwaniyah on the same day. According
to REO contacts, the group protested a lack of basic services,
the gas shortage, and overall poor governance in the province.
Al-Hassani may have marched as a way of distinguishing
themselves from similar groups that condone wife swapping,
alcohol, and drugs as a way of hastening the return of the
"Twelfth Imam." Qadisiyah contacts tell us that the militia is
aggressively recruiting new members. Warning flyers are going
up in some Diwaniyah neighborhoods, associating Al-Hassani with
the fringe groups. Contacts note that Al-Hassani appears
well-armed and well financed. In the June 12 demonstration,
however, marchers did not carry weapons and wore white (a color
that can sometimes signify willingness to commit suicide).

Karbala: Al-Hassani Moves Against Iranian Consulate
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On June 11, Al-Hassani members also attacked the
Iranian consulate in Karbala, breaking windows. A local contact
reported that the previous night, ten microbuses with Mahmoud
Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi supporters arrived in Karbala, parking by
the "Husseinyat Al-Iman Al-Sadi" Mosque.


7. (C) Al-Hassani's militia members may have had several goals.
The first was to make a public showing at the Al-Hussein and
Al-Abbas shrines, probably to demand a larger percentage of
donations. Al-Hassani had shown up at the shrines two weeks
before with the same objective.


8. (C) On June 12, the Al-Hassani militia demonstrated in front
of the Iranian Consulate to protest an Iranian television news
broadcast (Al-Kawther) that announced that according to the Qom
hamza, Mahmoud Al-Sarkhi Al-Hassani was neither an Ayatollah
nor a religious authority. The broadcast also (correctly) noted
that there is an Iraqi warrant out for his arrest. Consulate
guards shot in the air to warn Al-Hassani off.


9. (C) COMMENT: Al-Hassani is probably the most anti-Iranian
militia in the South Central provinces, in part because of
Hassani's uncompromising stance against Ayatollah Ali SISTANI
and SCIRI as well as Mahmoud Al-Hassani's complicated, but
undoubtedly competitive relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr. END
COMMENT

Babil: Another Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani Demonstration and Mortar
Attack Against REO Al-Hillah
-------------- --------------
--------------

HILLAH 00000104 002.2 OF 002




10. (C) On June 10, five hundred members of
Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani publicly marched in Babil Province.
Al-Hassani has not made a public demonstration in Babil in
recent memory. Members wore white shirts, perhaps to
distinguish themselves from the Mahdi Militia.


11. (C) On June 11, the REO was attacked for the second time in
two weeks by indirect fire. Six rounds were launched in broad
daylight against the compound. The REO had been under mortar
attack since a single round in October, 2005. There are no
suspects in the attack at this point. On the same day, a road
clearing patrol out of Baghdad was hit by an Explosively Formed
Projectile (EFP) outside of Hillah. Two wounded were medevaced
from the REO. The attack is part of an overall intensification
of incidents against CF in the region.

COMMENT: Al-Hassani Using Muqtada al-Sadr's Play Book?
-------------- --------------


12. (C) COMMENT: The sudden spate of public appearances by
Al-Hassani militia members is reminiscent of Muqtada al-Sadr's
followers marching in 2004 prior to the August uprising. While
the degree to which Al-Hassani is conducting IED and other
attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces is
unclear, it appears that the Al-Hassani miltia is gathering
strength and publicly flexing its muscles. As shown by events
in Diwaniyah this week, the aggressive posturing of non-SCIRI
militias is becoming a serious political headache for
SCIRI-affiliated politicians in South Central Iraq. END COMMENT
MEURS