Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH102
2006-06-12 16:11:00
SECRET
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

QADISIYAH PROVINCE: SADR, SCIRI, AND SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV KISL MARR PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO5959
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0102/01 1631611
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121611Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0655
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0641
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0706
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000102 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL MARR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: QADISIYAH PROVINCE: SADR, SCIRI, AND SECURITY

HILLAH 00000102 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000102

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL MARR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: QADISIYAH PROVINCE: SADR, SCIRI, AND SECURITY

HILLAH 00000102 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) SUMMARY: Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Militia (MM) and his
political organization, Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS),
increasingly dictate the pace of events in Qadisiyah Province.
While the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) holds
20 seats out of 41 on the Provincial Council, SCIRI is on the
defensive, hobbled by growing public resentment against a
provincial government that fails to provide basic services.
Popular support for Sadr is growing, fueled by rural
displacement, Sadr-provided social services, and OMS willingness
to intercede with provincial government workers. Mahdi Militia
is also taking advantage of its infiltration into police units
and the reluctance of SCIRI to move against Mahdi. MM is
showing a more aggressive public posture, including pressing
Governor Hamza to declare large swathes of Diwaniyah "no go" for
Coalition Forces. Upcoming elections will likely lead to a
Sadr-dominated Provincial Council. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On the evening of May 29th, ex-Qadisiyah Governor Jamal
Susoon Al-Zamili left a crowded Diwaniyah cafi, crossed the
sidewalk, and was gunned down at the door of his car. The hit
was immediate and professional. A team of shooters in a moving
car, accompanied by two spotters, quietly left the scene.
Although the murder took place on a crowded, downtown street,
the police, unaccountably absent from their normal evening
patrol, did not respond for an hour.


3. (S) This assassination illustrates several trends in
Qadisiyah's security and political situation: 1) local
political parties are focusing on upcoming provincial elections.
Al-Zamili was likely killed to prevent his running. (Note: The
killing may also have been linked to announcement of a Sadrist
"fatwa" against local collaborators with Coalition Forces); 2)
In perverse testimony to Al-Zamili, politicians here expect
voters will be pulled toward candidates exhibiting leadership

and proven ability to perform; 3) The police are politicized,
infiltrated by both Badr Organization (SCIRI-affiliated) and
Sadr militias, and are poorly led; and 4) intensified violence,
including assassinations, is spreading northward from Basra into
formerly quiet South Central provinces. For the first time,
Multinational Division - Central South (MND-CS) last month
categorized the provincial security situation as "unstable."

Sadr's Growing Political Clout - SCIRI's Growing Anxiety
-------------- --------------


4. (C) REO Staff talked to provincial politicians, community
leaders, journalists, and staff at Camp Echo (just outside of
Diwaniyah) in assessing the province's current security and
political situation. Most observers linked the heightened
tension and levels of violence in the province to the growing
influence of Muqtada al-Sadr's followers (Office of the Martyr
Sadr) and its associated militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (aka Mahdi
Militia) and various offshoots.


5. (C) During 2004 and 2005, the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Party took advantage of voter support
for candidates seen as following the marjaya'a (school of
Ayatollah Ali SISTANI) in Najaf. Even though many SCIRI members
are more attuned to the preachings of Iranian Ayatollah Khameni
than to SISTANI, the party campaigned hard in Qadisiyah rural
communities, associating itself as a religious party affiliated
with SISTANI whenever possible. Ultimately, SCIRI took 20 out
of 41 Provincial Council seats with Sadrist landing just five
seats.


6. (C) REO contacts agree that if provincial elections are held
within the next six months, that proportion will likely reverse
itself. The editor-in-chief of Diwaniyah's newspaper predicted
an Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) sweep in a recent talk with REO
staff.

Behind A Sadrist Victory at the Polls: Social Services,
Nationalism, and Intimidation
-------------- --------------
--------------


7. (C) Surging Sadrist strength in Qadisiyah Province rests on
several factors. An accelerating depopulation of rural
communities is packing the disenfranchised into three poor and
overwhelmingly Sadrist neighborhoods in Diwaniyah City. Rural
villages are losing residents due to acute potable water
shortages, abandoned irrigation because of siltage and weed
infestation, widespread grain and rice smuggling that displaces
local agricultural production, and chronic fuel shortages that
hinder transportation.


HILLAH 00000102 002.2 OF 004



8. (S) In the last six months, OMS has put considerable effort
into providing social services and a "shadow government." An
Allawi-affiliated politician remarked that Mahdi Militia
occupies mosques and other community buildings and the police
remain silent. A recent report suggested that Qadisiyah OMS
received eighty million Dinars (approximately USD 500,000) in
April to fund assistance to poor families. A community activist
commented that Sadrists are known for providing small loans to
newlyweds and for paying for medical treatment. Applicants are
interviewed, screened, and if accepted, the local OMS office
directly pays a local hospital to perform the procedure
(generally disbursing between 100 and 200 USD).


9. (C) Frequently, residents in Sadr neighborhoods who want
something from local government turn instead to Sadrist clerics
or OMS representatives who in turn send a militia delegation to
meet with the appropriate Director General (DG) in the
provincial government. A Diwaniyah lawyer recently noted that
perhaps in response, many of the DGs are growing out their
beards in order to appear more religious. Another contact
offered up pictures of Sadrist-organized clean-up campaigns in
Sadrist neighborhoods. The newspaper editor concluded that the
"shadow government" is, in fact, the real government for many in
Diwaniyah.


10. (C) Finally, at the grassroots level, Sadrists continue to
identify themselves as Iraqi, not Iranian (regardless of
whatever munitions and terrorist training Mahdi Militia and
Muqtada al-Sadr accepts from Iran behind the scenes). Iranians
are not popular in Qadisiyah, and Muqtada al-Sadr's appeal as a
homegrown nationalist has not diminished. In the last two
months, drivers have widely taken to affixing MAS stickers to
car windows. The Diwaniyah lawyer commented that teenagers have
taken to wearing MM-style black clothing, partly out of respect,
and partly because they believe they will be hassled less by the
police if they look like Mahdi Militia. In April, the two weeks
of sporadic campus riots that paralysed Diwaniyah University
would likely have ebbed away if not for the popularity of
Sadrist campus leaders working behind the scenes.

SCIRI Counter-Moves: Taking Over the Reins of Government
-------------- --------------


11. (C) SCIRI has not stood still in countering growing OMS
strength. But their countermoves are primarily aimed at
consolidating control over governmental functions. SCIRI
leaders are reportedly actively recruiting professionals,
particularly physicians, to give themselves more of a
technocratic sheen. The head of the Diwaniyah Authors
Association reported that members are being told that the
Association's activities are anti-Islamic and participants would
be better off attending SCIRI functions. The SCIRI Provincial
Council bloc has not hesitated to remove independent DGs; for
example, the Education DG. The newspaper editor argued that
SCIRI intends to remove all secular DGs before the next
elections.


12. (C) SCIRI is putting considerable energy into strengthening
control over provincial security forces. In August 2005, after
a protracted political struggle, Police Chief Abdul Wahabb was
removed from his post by Minister of Interior Jabr and
dispatched to Baghdad. During his tenure, Wahabb, a former
Brigadier General in the Iraqi Army, successfully suppressed
overall violent acts in Qadisiyah. Wahabb's replacement, Abd
al-Abass, has impeccable Badr credentials - ex-POW in Iran and
years of resistance activity against Saddam Hussein from across
the border - but reportedly, no law enforcement or formal
military experience. Abbass is universally regarded as weak and
ineffective. COMMENT: A similar campaign is underway in Babil
Province as the Governor and Provincial Council SCIRI members
seek to replace the independent and effective incumbent with a
SCIRI party loyalist. END COMMENT


13. (C) With Abbass in place, the Qadisiyah Provincial Council
is moving to place Badr Organization (militia) members and SCIRI
party loyalists into IP units. Following what is now common
practice in South Central provinces, the Minister of Interior
has reportedly agreed to allow the PC to allocate slots in a new
1000 officer police battalion to be stood up in Qadisiyah. Each
Council member will nominate their share of 900 places, giving
the bulk of the battalion to Badr and Mahdi Militia. The
remaining one hundred places are to be distributed among local
tribal leaders (Sheikhs).


14. (S) For SCIRI, however, the integration of Badr militia
members into provincial IP units may have limited impact. JAM
has its own placement campaign. One source stated that the
Jaysh al-Mahdi regularly pay $300 per head to have members
registered on police payrolls. Irregular check points are
sometimes manned by militia members wearing either official IP
uniforms or military-style clothing. A May 30th raid found
IED-making materials at the house of a MM-affiliated Diwaniyah

HILLAH 00000102 003.2 OF 004


police officer. NOTE: Throughout South Central, fringe Sadrist
units appear to operate independently of Muqtada al-Sadr's chain
of command. These groups, for example, the Fadilah unit (not
associated with the political party of the same name) are
outside of the scope of this cable. END NOTE


15. (S) JAM units in Qadisiyah regularly intimidate provincial
police. Two weeks ago, Mahdi Militia gunmen reportedly broke
into the Diwaniyah police headquarters, put a gun to the head of
a top commander, and demanded the release of MM members detained
two days prior. A MM-launched rocket attack against Camp Echo
took place not far from a police checkpoint that offered no
interference. In the last two months, MM attacks against police
stations in Diwaniyah have increased. Often, militia members
direct small arms fire against stations manned by police from
outside the community. On June 5, for example, police
checkpoints in two heavily Sadr districts were targeted by SAF.


16. (C) For the moment, Iraqi Army units in the province
(elements of the Eighth Army Division) are not as politicized.
The screening process for recruits has been much more
transparent and open to all applicants. General Uthman Mohammad
Farhood is a well-regarded independent. Under his leadership,
the IA is upgrading its intelligence gathering and ability to
conduct operations in the province.

Executive Dis-function: Governor Hamza Moves Closer to Sadr
-------------- --------------


17. (SBU) On June 1, Qadisiyah Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza and
OMS co-sponsored a "security conference" in Diwaniyah. The
Governor's own party, SCIRI, stayed away. Other parties, NGOs,
and civic associations joined OMS and the Governor in analyzing
the upward trend in provincial violence. Sadr spokesman Sheikh
Al-Hasnawi charged that assassinations were being conducted by
"death squads supported by coalition forces." He stated that
the provincial council should be "independent" instead of
controlled by the Americans.


18. (C) The increasingly high profile of Sadr political and
terrorist activity in the Province seems to have pushed Governor
Hamza into a difficult and restrictive accommodation with local
Sadrists. At every opportunity, he pushes for a ban on CF
activity in Diwaniyah, announces that CF patrols are not
welcome, and accuses the CF of exacerbating provincial tension.
His attempts to delineate CF "no go" zones in Diwaniyah coincide
with an increasingly bold Mahdi Militia tendency to challenge
downtown CF patrols near Sadrist neighborhoods or mosques.
COMMENT: In private, he is generally friendly and cooperative.
Unlike other South Central provinces, the Governor or Provincial
Council has not periodically instituted boycotts on contacts
with the USG. END COMMENT


19. (C) At this point, neither Hamza nor the Provincial Council
can run on their accomplishments. The Provincial Council has
refused to make public its list of Iraqi government-funded
projects, adding to suspicions that it may be "double dipping."
Reportedly, the province rarely pays an advance to contractors
or makes timely progress payments, leading many potential
bidders to seek work on US-financed projects or take on projects
in other provinces or Baghdad. Qadisiyah voters do not see
material improvements to their lives and do not believe that the
provincial government serves them well. The Governor is on the
defensive and his public statements show him increasingly
willing to lean on Sadr backing.

Run-Up to Elections: SCIRI/Sadr Co-Existence, Fadilah Pushing,
Moderates at the Back
-------------- --------------


20. (C) SCIRI may be growing more nervous about increasingly
public Sadr political and social services activity, but the two
parties enjoy a relatively harmonious sharing of power in the
province. There are no indications that SCIRI is tempted to use
its control of Iraqi security assets to move against Sadrist
militia, either those controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr or splinter
groups operating autonomously. SCIRI and Sadr cooperate in
Provincial Council decision-making.


21. (C) SCIRI, OMS, Fadilah, and Da'wa parties are gearing up
for elections. SCIRI and Sadr are reportedly canvassing
potential candidates for their slates. The SCIRI slate will
reportedly hold some non-SCIRI loyalist candidates, but the
make-up of the Sadr slate is still closely-held within OMS.


22. (C) Moderates have not yet begun to hustle, even though many
contacts optimistically believe that the poor performance of the
religious parties in delivering public services opens an
opportunity for moderates and non-sectarian parties to gain
seats in the next election. But, as one contact quipped, "How
are we going to run without our own militia?"


HILLAH 00000102 004.2 OF 004



23. (C) During the run-up to elections, SCIRI and Sadrists will
likely keep to parallel tracks. They will cooperate in the
Provincial Council and with us to bring public services on-line.
Both Sadr and SCIRI will likely augment their private social
services. Here, SCIRI will have the edge due to superior
funding. For example, SCIRI so far has provided by far the bulk
of private assistance to displaced families arriving in the
province.

Will Elections Spur Terrorist Activity?
--------------


24. (S) The Fadilah Party is seen as the richest political
organization in Diwaniyah. COMMENT: Presumably due to their
control of southern Iraq oil black market trafficking. END
COMMENT Party operatives have the best offices, drive new SUVs,
and are reported to be in the process of standing-up their own
local militia battalion (NOTE: not connected to the Sadrist
"Fadilah" movement). If OMS and SCIRI find themselves ramping
up spending in response, this could indirectly become a driver
for Iranian-financed attacks against Coalition Forces in the
province. Violent activity may also be spurred as Mahdi Militia
finds competition for recruits from the Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani
militia, a even more violent Shi'a splinter group. On June 12,
unarmed members of the Al-Sarkhi group marched on the provincial
government building in a rare public appearance.


25. (S) Sadrists continue to target local residents who
cooperate with Coalition Forces. In the last few weeks, the
Mahdi Militia has reportedly issued a four hundred name "Black
List" of individuals working at Camp Echo or previously
associated with the Coalition Forces. Badr terrorist cells may
undertake their own attacks, attributing them to Sadr when
possible. The return to Diwaniyah of Sheikh Ramsey, a local
Sadr leader arrested last year and recently released from
prison, is significant. He has already been seen in public and
will likely energize Mahdi Militia activity.


26. (S) Badr militia terrorist acts are harder to identify.
While several recent assassinations in neighboring Wasit and
Najaf provinces seem too sophisticated for Mahdi Militia (the
use of silencers, for example),very little happening in
Qadisiyah has an obvious Badr signature. It may well be that
Badr terrorist cells deliberately pass off their attacks as
Sadrist by adopting Sadr-style tactics. So far, despite
occasional rumors, neither group seems to be targeting Sunnis
outside of ex-Baathists.


27. (S) In Qadisiyah, Sadrist attacks against Coalition Forces
began to increase in April and peaked in mid-May at three times
average levels. An Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack
on April 12 killed two CF personnel west of Diwaniyah in the
first lethal attack in many months and a rare EFP attack south
of Diwaniyah on Route Tampa killed one US soldier on June 9.
Indirect fire (mortar and rocket) against Camp Echo is now
occurring on a weekly basis. Much of the increase is probably
attributable to new-found Mahdi militia aggressiveness and
determination to seize the initiative in and around Diwaniyah.

Always Look to the Dark Side
--------------


28. (C) On June 3, OMS held a graduation ceremony for local
Sadrists completing training in the sciences, theology, and
Islamic thought. In public comments, Sheikh Haider Hussein
Al-Ghara'wi stated, "This is a message to the dark forces that
the Mahdi Army is not just an armed force, but soldiers working
for justice and fairness." On June 6, Mahdi Militia members
reportedly took over a downtown Diwaniyah gas station,
straightened out the lines of waiting cars, and kept
distributing gas past the curfew.


29. (S) Regardless of their civic public face, OMS and SCIRI
continue to resort to intimidation and selective targeting of
anyone offering resistance to their religious and political
agendas. While Sadr and SCIRI sharia courts are not as evident
as in 2004 and 2005, Diwaniyah couples walking together are
still dragged into mosques for "trials." SCIRI is less menacing
to the professional and moderate class in Qadisiyah than the
lower class swaggering of Mahdi Militia, but some REO contacts
are debating whether they can safely decline a SCIRI invitation
to run on their ticket if asked. Others speculate that SCIRI
will seek to either suborn candidates or place their own
loyalists on any slate proposed by a non-religious party. Some
reports suggest that Badr terrorist activities are not as
evident because the Badr Organization simply asks local police
to arrest targets on trumped-up charges. Given the infiltration
of Qadisiyah police by both Badr and Mahdi, even the strongest
central government will find it difficult to ensure that other
parties will find their voice in the campaigning to come.
MEURS