MADHI MILITIA ACTIVITY ON THE RISE IN BABIL PROVINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000100

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MADHI MILITIA ACTIVITY ON THE RISE IN BABIL PROVINCE

REF: A) HILLAH 80, B) HILLAH 85, AND C) HILLAH 93

HILLAH 00000100 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, DRC, REO Al Hillah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable.

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SUMMARY
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2. (S) Throughout the second half of May and into early June,
the Madhi Militia (MM and also commonly referred to as Jaysh al
Mahdi or JAM) has increased its presence in Al-Hillah and Babil,
engaging in overt attacks directed against Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF),civilians and Coalition Forces (CF). In addition to
kinetic attacks and placement of Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED),MM units appear more willing to engage in public
intimidation, even in normally quiet Babil. For example, the
recent attacks against Al-Fayhaa newspaper and an America's
Democracy Foundation (ADF, a USAID contractor organization)
sponsored event appear to be coordinated and indicative of an
upward spike in activity. Moreover, the Regional Embassy Office
(REO) continues to receive reports that the MM is fueling
sectarian divides between Sunni and Shi'a tribes in the northern
part of Babil Province. Despite attempts by the Babil police
forces to curb the rise of militia violence, local contacts
report that the MM is augmenting its numbers and expanding its
influence. The reason for the rise in activities is clear, as
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
tightens its grip around provincial governing bodies, the MM and
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS),seeks to prevent their own
political marginalization. The drawing-down of CF in the
southern Babil may encourage the proliferation of MM activities.
END SUMMARY.

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BACKGROUND: MADHI MILITIA ORGANIZATION IN BABIL
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3. (C) The MM is an armed group, directed by Moqtada Al-Sadr, a
radical anti-American Sh'ia Islamist spiritual leader from
Najaf. REO and PRT contacts describe most of the militia's
members as young, poor, uneducated Shi'a males drawn to the
organization for nationalistic and religious reasons. The MM is
present in almost all large towns in Babil. Unlike SCIRI/Badr
(septel) the MM does not have significant control of
governmental institutions in Babil Province, nor sizeable
influence over the provincial security forces.


4. (S) PRT contacts have offered a general picture of MM
structure and operations in Babil over the course of several
recent meetings. Different contacts have echoed a similar
theme, arguing that MM represents a growing threat to the
province as it expands organizational and technological
abilities to conduct operations against ISF and the civilian
population. MM representatives have stated publicly that the
organization is purely political and that members are no longer
armed, contrary to U.S. military reports. While this is
definitely not the case, local contacts and CF, however, stress
that the MM's organizational capabilities in Babil are less
developed than those of the MM in Baghdad or other regions in
South-Central.


5. (S) REO and PRT contacts maintain that the MM in Babil is
structured along the lines of a typical military organizational
hierarchy, composed of platoon to battalion-sized units.
According to Babil Police Chief General Qais Hamza Aboud
Al-Momouri, a MM battalion normally consists of 800 individuals
(COMMENT: It is likely that this number is exaggerated. U.S.
military reports indicate that a MM battalion is composed of a
maximum of 150 individuals and that it is difficult for the
leadership to deploy even a small fraction of this total number
for operations. END COMMENT). Qais also detailed that the MM
is presently manufacturing and deploying increasingly advanced
technology such as Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) for use
against ISF. The U.S. military in northern Babil has reported
the existence of MM special operations groups, including one
unit known as "Sariah Al-Muqtar Al-Thakafi" (SMT). SMT's
primary task is to assassinate Sunnis in northern Babil in order
to fuel sectarian conflicts. Its secondary mission, is to
attack U.S. military and Coalition targets, making it the only
MM contingent authorized to conduct operations against CF in
Babil.


6. (S) While Moqtada Al-Sadr, according to the Babil Police
Chief General Qais and the U.S. military, controls the overall
operations of the MM in South-Central Iraq from Najaf, regional
commanders responsible for individual provinces have assumed the

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authority to undertake independent actions. According to one
U.S. military report, the last time Al-Sadr issued a direct
operational order to regional commanders was at the end of
February 2006, when terrorists bombed two Shi'a mosques in
Samarra. Most MM attacks, according to Qais, are not linked to
an overall MM strategy in South-Central, but tend to be directed
against tactical targets of opportunity. (COMMENT: The U.S.
Army's Second Brigade Combat Team reports that MM has conducted
retaliatory EFP strikes against CF in response to U.S. military
operations. END COMMENT). Qais added that MM senior leadership
has received extensive Iranian support, although the rank and
file tend to be young, poor and unaware of the outside
influence.


7. (S) In Babil Province, according to U.S. military reports,
the MM operates one main office located in Al-Hillah, and has
branch offices in most major cities. The MM has divided each
branch office into four units, known as the political,
educational, media, and social committees. According to the
U.S. military, the political committee is responsible for
reporting information to the main office. The social committee
partakes in cleaning streets, directing traffic, selling
propane, establishing guard schedules and announcing blood
drives. The media committee selects speakers and teachers for
Friday prayers and monitors religious celebrations, while the
education committee is responsible for religious instruction.


8. (S/NF) According to sources on the Babil Provincial Council
(PC),Al-Sadr had recently asked Sheikh Ibrahim Hamdi to assume
the position of commander of all MM forces in Babil. Hamdi
declined the offer, stating that he had no desire to be
responsible for bloodshed in Babil and Al-Hillah. Turning to a
second choice, the source contends, Sadr requested that Sheikh
Muhannad from southern Babil to head the MM in the province.
Muhannad, known for attacks against ISF according to the source,
was reportedly selected by Sadr to specifically increase MM
kinetic activities in the province. Regardless of the current
leadership, MM attacks in Babil are currently on the rise. Six
months ago it was almost unheard of that the MM would use
intimidation tactics to publicly enforce their Shi'a Islamist
vision in Babil, whereas today such activities are growing ever
more commonplace.

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ATTACK ON AL-FAYHAA NEWSPAPER
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9. (S) On May 14, MM threatened Al-Fayhaa newspaper, a local
independent publication in Al-Hillah, for reportedly publishing
anti-Sadr articles. Later the same day the MM assaulted the
homes of two of the paper's editors with grenades. Babil police
confirmed that the MM targeted the newspaper because it was
considering publication of a story detailing a supposed pact
between the MM, Badr Corps and Da'wa Party to divide up Babil
into distinct parts. During a separate interview, Saad M. Anad
(strictly protect),an Iraqi businessman and contact of REO
staff, confirmed that Al-Fayhaa considered publishing this exact
story. Additionally, the newspaper previously reported that the
MM severely beat and hospitalized a cell-phone shop owner for
selling pornographic material.


10. (S) After the May 14 attack on the two editors, Al-Fayhaa
retracted the story about the MM attack upon the cell-phone shop
owner and decline to publish the article about the alleged Shi'a
Islamist pact to divide up Babil. A May 17 article declared, "A
peaceful solution has taken place and everybody is satisfied.
Our newspaper would like to apologize for publishing false news.
That occurred because our sources were not accurate and had
personal agendas." After the retraction, Al-Fayhaa has started
publishing pro-MM articles, including ubiquitously printing
Al-Sadr's picture on almost every page.

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MADHI CLOSURE OF A USAID SPONSORED EVENT
--------------


11. (S) On May 30, approximately sixteen armed MM members raided
an America's Democracy Foundation (ADF) sponsored outdoor public
event for students in downtown Al-Hillah, and subsequently
closed the affair. According to eyewitness accounts, the MM
members entered the venue at approximately 10:30am and shut it
down because it violated Al-Sadr's fatwa against playing
non-religious music in public. Witnesses also reported that the
twenty-five Al-Hillah police who were responsible for guarding
the location stood-down and allowed the MM entry onto the site.
The witnesses, however, softened their statements by adding that
the IPs refused to resist because of the high probability of
inadvertently inflicting civilian casualties.


12. (S) In a recent meeting, Colonel Mohammed Husseni Al-Jubori
Abass, the Babil Police Chief's deputy, confirmed the eyewitness

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accounts. Abass also added that the Babil Police Chief General
Qais fired the commander of the unit responsible for security at
the site, and had secured arrest warrants from the Al-Hillah
judiciary for the MM members involved. Colonel Abass claimed
that at the time of the incident he and General Qais were
meeting with U.S. military commanders and therefore were unable
to direct the IPs to protect the event.

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THE MADHI MILITIA AND THE BABIL POLICE
--------------


13. (S) During a June 2 meeting, REO and PRT staff asked
Al-Hillah Mayor Imad Lefta about his impression of the MM raid
on the ADF celebration. The Mayor stated that it was a scandal
that the IPs under Qais failed to protect innocent Iraqi
civilians. He added that the IP failure was hardly surprising
as most police in Al-Hillah are a "bunch of mercenaries who are
terrified of the Sadrists." Lefta specifically warned REO and
PRT staff that while General Qais and the ISF of Babil fully
desire to eliminate the MM threat, they possess neither the
resources nor the manpower to accomplish this task. The Mayor,
also concerned with what he termed as the growing influence of
the Badr Corps in the province (septel),stated that the good
people of Al-Hillah are now living between two militias. He
stressed two points concerning this issue: One, that the recent
wave of MM violence is intended to increase visibility of the
organization in anticipation of upcoming provincial and local
elections and two, the brewing tension between the MM and Badr
Corps is artificially fuelled by the Iranians in order to weaken
Iraq.


14. (S/NF) Politically, some Sadrist members of the Babil
Provincial Council have supported the besieged Babil Police
Chief (reftel A, B and C) and have told REO and PRT contacts
that the secular Shi'a General is the only individual with the
capabilities to stabilize the Province and counter the SCIRI
dominated PC. Other reports indicate that MM-Babil police
cooperation runs on a much deeper level. A few U.S. military
reports suggest that the militia provides the Babil Police, and
specifically Al-Hillah SWAT with human intelligence, primarily
directed at Sunnis concentrated in the northern part of the
province. One report even states that an unidentified Al-Hillah
SWAT member attends MM meetings in Iskandariyah so that the two
groups can coordinate actions.

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CREATING SECTARIAN AND TRIBAL STRIFE
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15. (S) Documents captured by U.S. military units in northern
Babil indicate that the MM plans to carry out covert attacks on
Sunni population centers designed to sustain fighting between
the Sunnis and CF. One such MM document detailed information on
how individual commanders could instigate tribal conflicts to
fuel the already tense security situation. During a May 27
security briefing at the REO, Iraqi Second Brigade Commander
Colonel Hatim Al-Husseiny detailed recent fighting between the
Al-Gharran (Shi'a) and Al-Ubaid (Sunni) tribes on the
Babil-Wasit provincial border. According to Hatim, the Iraqi
Army (IA),with the assistance of Babil IPs, had successfully
intervened and ended the conflict.


16. (S) Hatim further stated that during the operation, the IA
killed twenty-one MM. When REO staff asked how the IA killed MM
during operations to end a tribal dispute, Hatim replied, "these
conflicts occured since the fall of the old regime and the
militias do get involved." General Qais, more bluntly, related
to REO and PRT staff that Iran supports all militias in order to
"bleed Iraq dry" and that Iranian intelligence encourages MM
leadership to instigate tribal conflicts. Other reports
indicate that Shi'a tribes contract JAM/MM for protection
services against Sunni tribes.

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COMMENT
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17. (S) By all accounts, MM activity is on the rise in Babil and
designed to impose their own religious interpretations upon the
province while at the same diminish SCIRI/Badr power. The
recent wave of attacks suggests a few key points. First, the
militia is becoming ever more organized and better able to carry
out actions, even if such attacks are only against targets of
opportunity. Second, the Babil security forces are not able to
neutralize or isolate this threat alone. Finally, MM strategy
in the province is relatively simple. Local commanders engage
targets to demonstrate their strength, whether it be against
public events, independent media outlets or kinetic action
against the provincial security forces. This does not mean the
MM intends to solve their political difficulties with SCIRI (or

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any other group) through force of arms. Instead, these actions
are meant to enforce a continued and overt presence that will
have direct political benefits in the upcoming local and
provincial elections.


18. (U) This cable was cleared by the U.S. Army's Second Brigade
Combat Team.
MEURS