FINLAND: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH FM TUOMIOJA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001003 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN FI CY GR TU SUBJECT: FINLAND: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH FM TUOMIOJA AND THE COMMISSION ON CYPRUS Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In Helsinki Sept. 27, DAS Bryza encouraged the Finnish Presidency to implement its plan for helping the EU and Turkey move forward on Cyprus, and stressed that all US efforts on this issue aim to support the Finnish EU Presidency's own initiative. Finnish FM Tuomioja welcomed the US suggestion that introducing incentives for both sides (such as Varosha or Ecran airport) would increase the Finnish plan's long term chances for success. In the short term, Bryza and the GOF agreed that keeping "the package minimal for now" is the best strategy for helping the EU and Turkey avoid a train wreck on Nov. 8, when the Commission's progress report is due. Bryza said the US role is to step back and allow the Finns to carry out their plan, but emphasized that we stand ready to weigh in as requested to move the parties toward a Famagusta-Varosha agreement. Tuomioja thanked the US for its support and helpful input on the Finnish plan, and noted that the Finns would likely come back to seek support as the process proceeds. End Summary. ¶2. (U) DAS Matthew Bryza held separate meetings September 27 in Helsinki with Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, with MFA Director General for European Affairs Kari Halonen, and with Enlargement Commission Special Advisor Jaakko Bloomberg, aimed at helping the Finns move forward with their EU Presidency plan to help the EU and Turkey move forward on Cyprus by forging a compromise on the reciprocal opening of ports. Tweaking the Finnish Plan -------------- ¶3. (C) Tuomioja opened by noting that Finland is making a concerted effort to avoid an EU-Turkey train wreck over Cyprus on November 8, when the Commission is due to publish its report on Turkey's progress in the accession process. He also expressed thanks for the fruitful meeting he had with A/S Dan Fried in New York regarding the Finnish Presidency's plan. Finland has begun to "shuttle" among the parties, and is trying to keep "the package minimal for now" to increase the chances for buy-in from the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the run-up to Nov. 8, Tuomioja said. Although Tuomioja said he "wouldn't rate the chances for success any greater than 50 percent" over the long term, he viewed as very positive that fact that no one had said "no" to the proposals thus far. ¶4. (C) Bryza encouraged the Finnish approach, noting that the US thinking closely matched the incentives the Finns have come up with. The US began its effort on ports in July, just as Finland was beginning its own effort. The US now sees its role as standing behind the EU Presidency effort, but stands ready to weigh in with any of the parties or offer whatever other support it can to help the process proceed. Bryza did suggest that the Finnish plan's chances for success in the longer term may increase if it incorporates additional elements should an impasse emerge. In particular, he suggested a moratorium on property sales in the north -- if not an eventual return of property -- as a carrot for the Cypriots, and the eventual opening of Ercan airport as a carrot for the Turks. Bryza shared with the Finns the fact that the Greek Cypriots had told him they liked many of the ideas in the Finnish plan but that they wanted something more (which they left undefined) on Varosha. The Turkish side, meanwhile, had responded with less interest but was "studying" the package. Tuomioja welcomed the US suggestions and called them "eminently reasonable," although he and Bryza agreed they represent potential "red lines" and would have to be addressed carefully, and only if the Finnish effort stalls. Tuomioja noted specifically that while all 25 EU MS supported the Finnish plan, the GOF may well need to seek US help to counter increasing "anti-Turkey" statements (particularly in France and Germany) as well as to press the Turks to show some kind of flexibility. Keeping Turkey on Track -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In separate meetings, Finnish MFA Director General for Europe Kari Halonen said that the Finnish Presidency remains steadfast in the view that the EU must keep its commitments to Turkey; i.e., that the European perspective remains open if Turkey engages in the necessary reforms. Moving the goalposts or concepts like "privileged partnership" threaten to alienate the Turks and increase the danger of the GOT's "returning to thinking the EU is a Christian club." Bryza emphasized HELSINKI 00001003 002 OF 002 to Finnish officials that while the US supports eventual Turkish membership in the EU, its main interest is seeing a "reformed Turkey" bolster its democratic and market institutions and serve as an example to inspire other reformers in Muslim majority countries; Turkey is important to Europe and the West, but not so important that it can enter the EU without engaging in the necessary reforms. Commission Perspective -------------- ¶6. (C) Bryza also met separately with Jaakko Bloomberg, EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn's Special Advisor for Turkey and Cyprus. While Brussels is fully supportive of the Finnish Presidency's efforts on Cyprus, Bloomberg said the Commission also emphasizes a three-track process: the EU Presidency plan, the EU accession criteria for Turkey, and the UN Good Offices process on Turkey/Cyprus. While these tracks are mutually reinforcing, the Commission believes that the standoff over the ports, in particular, cannot be resolved without UN involvement. Bloomberg also noted that if the EU Presidency process "does not fail" and the UN process starts building space for compromise, it will become more difficult for the EU or skeptical member states to fabricate reasons to derail Turkey's accession process. ¶7. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. WARE