Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HARARE49
2006-01-17 15:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

TSVANGIRAI ON MDC CONGRESS(ES),ACTION PLAN,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ZI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000049 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON MDC CONGRESS(ES),ACTION PLAN,
FACTIONAL POLITICS


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000049 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON MDC CONGRESS(ES),ACTION PLAN, FACTIONAL POLITICS Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador on January 13 that he was pleased with progress on his party's provincial congresses and ongoing reconstitution of the party leadership. He reported on preparations for the March 18-19 MDC national congress, which included meetings with key civil society players in late February. Tsvangirai held out little hope for reconciliation with MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube and castigated the SAG for its purported alignment with and/or support of his rival faction. The opposition leader said he hoped to visit Washington after the party congress had articulated a national plan of action, and closed with a plea for outside support of the party's capacity to implement the plan. End Summary. -------------- Provincial Congresses Proceeding Well -------------- ¶2. (C) During a call on the Ambassador at the Residence, Tsvangirai said he was impressed with the new leadership SIPDIS emerging from MDC provincial congresses around the country. All provincial congresses had been concluded, save Bulawayo and Matabeleland South, which he said would be "trickier" than the others given sensitivities about the party's overall ethnic balance. (N.B. Tsvangirai's office subsequently circulated reports on the Bulawayo and Matabeleland South congresses and their election of new provincial leaderships January 14-15.) Tsvangirai noted that the party's women's wing had been especially instrumental in "defending unity" (i.e., rallying behind his faction) and making the congresses productive. -------------- Preparing for National Congress -------------- ¶3. (C) Asked by the Ambassador to characterize the party's character following recent events, Tsvangirai said we would have to see what leadership and plan of action emerged from the national party congress, which he noted had been postponed from late February to March 18-19. He expressed concern about the "zealousness" of some within the leadership at this juncture, and noted that the "aggressives" and the "the more com
pliant" would have to reach some accommodation in the run-up to the congress. Roy Bennett, for example, had admirable energy as Manicaland's new chairman but needed to take a more "strategic" vision. ¶4. (C) In this vein, the party was conducting "direction courses" for the new provincial leaderships to teach what Tsvangirai's "paradigm shift" meant, i.e., "disobedience SIPDIS within the law; not business as usual." These meetings were proving useful opportunities to shape expectations of the membership and the leadership and to gauge specific concerns and practical limitations for action. To further inform a new action plan at the March national congress, the party would also conduct stakeholders meetings with the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions, the National Constitutional Assembly, churches, and others from civil society in late February. -------------- Getting on with an "Amicable Divorce" HARARE 00000049 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about inter-factional relations, Tsvangirai said that Welshman Ncube's personal intransigence underpinned the other faction's apparent opposition to reconciliation. Tsvangirai noted that there were a group of MPs who were pushing for a unified congress, largely out of concern for the fate of their seats. Tsvangirai had encouraged the MPs's efforts, but noted that the other side's demands, such as protected positions and augmented power to the Secretary-General position, made a unified congress unlikely. Hand-picking protected leadership slots would be counter-prodcutive, Tsvangirai concluded; what was needed was the regeneration of SIPDIS a democratic force in sufficient number to challenge Mugabe and ZANU-PF. In the meantime, each faction was preparing its own congress. (N.B. The Ncube faction's congress is scheduled for February 21-22.) Accordingly, Tsvangirai was ready to "get on with an amicable divorce" and move on. -------------- Ethnicity and the South Africans -------------- ¶6. (C) Tsvangirai expressed bafflement over the Ncube faction's motives and goals. Noting that ethnicity pervades all African politics, he observed that the ethnic dimension might give Ncube and Sibanda a seat at the table with ZANU-PF, but it assured the them a losing hand in the long run. He said the South Africans played a "heavy role" in events and may have supported a Ncube-ZANU-PF deal, but Zimbabweans never would. Noting the Ncube faction's closeness with the SAG (many of their leaders reportedly were in South Africa that day),he said that the SAG was inadvertantly discrediting itself among Zimbabweans with its partisanship. He reported that he had been trying unsuccessfully to secure an appointment with the South African Ambassador to express his concerns. -------------- Washington Trip? -------------- ¶7. (C) Tsvangirai noted that he had discussed with party principals and NDI the advisability of a visit by MDC leaders to western capitals, including Washington. Tsvangirai said he had concluded that such travel would best be deferred until after the party congress, when divisions would hopefully be behind the party and a new plan of action could be showcased. In the meantime, the party would dispatch a low level delegation to engage the Zimbabwean diaspora overseas, including in the United States. The group would not meet with governments but would sell the party to the diaspora, seeking to tap its ideas and resources. ¶8. (C) In closing, the opposition leader reiterated interest in outside assistance in further preparing the party's leadership and membership for the coming paradigm shift. He said he had discussed the matter with NDI. -------------- Biti: Divorce Papers in the Works -------------- ¶9. (C) The Belgian Ambassador on January 17 told the Ambassador that Tsvangirai-aligned MDC Secretary for Economic Affairs Tendai Biti recently showed him a draft document the two factions were negotiating to govern the terms of their separation. Among the terms of separation were that HARARE 00000049 003 OF 003 Tsvangirai's faction would retain the MDC name; each faction SIPDIS would largely retain possession of assets already within its possession inside Zimbabwe; the factions would split the party's overseas assets evenly; each faction would continue to be associated with the Zimbabwe Institute, the party's principal vehicle in South Africa; and MPs would be free to affiliate themselves with either party without interference from the other. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The focus of inter-factional relations has largely shifted from conflicting smear campaigns and reconciliation efforts to preparation for a future apart. Assuming the Ncube faction doesn't begin to negotiate a purported "solution" to the the GOZ's legitimacy crisis, we don't discount the prospect of these two groups eventually collaborating against the ruling party. For now, however, each is going through a necessarily introspective process of consolidating its support and defining itself. We continue to view the Tsvangirai camp as in ascendance, certainly among the grassroots and civil society. This may yet provoke periodic distracting media attacks and legal actions by an insecure Ncube faction, and the battle over party assets may yet prove to be further disruptive. ¶11. (C) In any event, rejuvenation of meaningful democratic pressure on the Mugabe regime in 2006 will likely hinge largely on Tsvangirai's ability to marshal a credible action plan that can capture the public imagination. We have heard Tsvangirai talk a good game before and then fail to follow SIPDIS through. More importantly, the people of Zimbabwe have heard it too, and are increasingly disillusioned by the lack of action. Tsvangirai could still revive his fortunes but this will require a major ramping up of efforts. DELL

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