MUGABE CONFIDANT FLOATS TRIAL BALLOON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000042 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PHUM ZI SUBJECT: MUGABE CONFIDANT FLOATS TRIAL BALLOON Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a January 10 meeting with Ambassador, Father Fidelis Mukonori, Zimbabwe's senior Jesuit and a confidant of Robert Mugabe, recommended western re-engagement, including a secure "way out" for Mugabe. The Ambassador responded he would be open to discussing with GOZ leaders the post-Mugabe reforms needed for re-engagement -- in confidence if they so desired. He added that the presence of some of the current leadership in a post-Mugabe government would make re-engagement far more difficult. Mukonori agreed the transition was underway, said the most objectionable ZANU-PF leaders would not survive politically, and promised to consider arranging private meetings. He also recounted his successful efforts against the education bill and his efforts to broker a GOZ-UN compromise over temporary shelter for the victims of Operation Murambatsvina. End Summary. -------------- A Call for Re-engagement -------------- ¶2. (C) In a discussion at the Embassy, Mukonori told the Ambassador that the ZANU-PF leadership around Mugabe lacked the political clout, intelligence, experience or vision to lift Zimbabwe out of the hole they had dug. Ambition was their central motive and most of Zimbabwe's misgovernance stemmed from their pursuit of individual interest at the complete expense of public interest. Moreover, the party,s elite were increasingly consumed with the presidential succession and many of them saw a possible president when they looked in the mirror. For his part, Mukonori said Mugabe was digging in out of fear and mistrust and was at a loss over how to preserve his legacy. This myopia and vacuum of leadership would thwart any prospects for national turnaround left to itself. ¶3. (C) Under the circumstances, Mukonori continued, Western re-engagement offered the best prospect to break the logjam of systemic misgovernance. He expressed concern that the West might be drifting into its own myopia on Zimbabwe, essentially abandoning the country over the venality of its leadership despite the deepening need of its innocent people. He likened the ruling party leadership and its public to a hungry tiger with a baby in its clutches. He urged the West not to shoot the tiger for fear of killing the baby. Instead, throw the tiger some meat, enticing him to release the baby. Mukonori asked whether the USG and the UK couldn't develop a "joint approach" to Zimbabwe, arguing that Mugabe was serious last August when he said he would rather talk to Tony Blair than Morgan Tsvangirai. -------------- Ambassador on Price of Re-engagement -------------- ¶4. (C) In response, the Ambassador reiterated USG commitment to Zimbabwe as exemplified by its generous humanitarian assistance. The USG was prepared to do more, but not as long as Zimbabwe's leader uniformly rejected all international overtures - a la UN U/S Egeland's recent visit - as an imperialist conspiracy. Moreover, the Ambassador said Mugabe's line on Tony Blair was little more than a diversion from the real issues confronting Zimbabwe. What real value could there possibly be in such a dialogue when Zimbabwe's real problems began at home and not in London, as Mugabe was HARARE 00000042 002 OF 003 fond of asserting. Mukonori said he understood the point. The Ambassador underscored the difficulty of even establishing a common ground for engagement, given the ruling party's obsession with the past and refusal to countenance discussion of Zimbabwe's real problems. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador said that for the USG to engage more deeply Mugabe-ism would have to go, including especially the more violent of the current leadership. In addition, the remaining leadership would have to acknowledge its misgovernance, its need for international support, and begin needed reforms. The Ambassador added that the transition to a post-Mugabe era seemed already to have begun, as evidenced by the growing succession struggle, and that as part of that process we were open to meeting with members of the leadership -- in confidence if they so desired, as long as it was understood from the outset that any potential re-engagement would necessarily be conditioned on real political and economic reform. He suggested that Mukonori could use his good offices to arrange such meetings. ¶6. (C) Mukonori agreed with the Ambassador that Zimbabwe already had a foot in the post-Mugabe era, rendering the octogenarian leader increasingly irrelevant to the country's future. He added that the people would never acquiesce to Mugabe's replacement by any of the worst ZANU-PF aspirants and he promised to give the matter further thought and get back to the Ambassador on arranging confidential meetings with elements of the leadership that might be pen to discussing the future. -------------- -------------- Lobbying the GOZ on Education Bill, Temporary Shelter -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Mukonori also related his successful lobbying efforts in derailing a destructive education bill and his efforts to counter GOZ intransigence on donor-provided emergency temporary shelter. He said it had taken him five months to defeat the education bill. He had avoided direct confrontation with the bill,s author, Education Minister Aeneas Chigwedere. Instead he had lined up parents, teachers, MPs and other ministers and had then approached Vice President Mujuru and convinced her the bill would be a disaster. ¶8. (C) Mukonori said by the time he talked to the President directly, reaction against the bill and Chigwedere had become intense and Mugabe had already been of the view that the bill was "crap". Castigated at a cabinet meeting by Mugabe for endorsing the bill's submission to the parliament in the first place, ministers sheepishly maintained Chigwedere had not shared the bill's details. In subsequent negotiations with the GOZ over details, Mukonori held firm, resulting in the eventual excision of provisions subjecting private school personnel and fee matters to GOZ control. ¶9. (C) Mukonori said he was using similar tactics to try to broker a compromise between the UN and the GOZ on temporary shelter for the victims of Murambatsvina. He said Local Government and Housing Minister Chombo had a personal stake in the GOZ's hostile approach given his central involvement in the operation. In addition, Mugabe had concerns about the type of shelter provided by donors. Mukonori suggested he was making progress in getting the President to take a more receptive view and had been able to outmaneuver Chombo on several occasions, though the matter continued to be debated within the GOZ. -------------- HARARE 00000042 003 OF 003 Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Mukonori's advice on re-engagement may have been a GOZ trial balloon of sorts, though probably not from Mugabe himself. But he was more likely acting on his own and his initial approach reflected a certain naivete in arguing for an unconditional gesture of good will from the international community to Mugabe and his cronies. The Jesuit is close to Mugabe and also to the Mujurus and other senior GOZ officials. We are skeptical that a more engaging posture on our part would prompt Mugabe to confront the country's deep political and economic problems more sensibly. However, post-Mugabe, real reform becomes possible, and this is the time to begin laying out our position and conditions. In that regard, Mukonori's stature and connections make him a potentially useful messenger to the GOZ elite on the price of re-engagement. DELL