SUBJECT: ENGAGING ZIMBABWE: LOCAL DIPLOMATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000342 SIPDIS AF/S FOR BRUCE NEULING; NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE; DEPARTMENT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV EAID ZI SUBJECT: SUBJECT: ENGAGING ZIMBABWE: LOCAL DIPLOMATIC Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Eric T. Schultz, Reason 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOZ,s latest charm offensive combined with the country's continuing downward spiral has resulted in another bout of diplomatic soul-searching in Harare. The international community here has been debating whether to engage the GOZ and if so what the message should be. Heads of OECD Missions met on March 14 and a group of donor nation Ambassadors met with UN staff March 15. Although there are differences in nuance, virtually all of the Western Ambassadors agreed that in any dialogue Zimbabwe had to take concrete reform steps before the international community could consider a positive response. End Summary. -------------- OECD Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) In his resume following the meeting, the new British Ambassador, Andrew Pocock, said he felt that it had been the U.S. and UK against the rest of the participants, who in addition to the European Union Ambassadors (minus the French Ambassador, who declined to participate),included: Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and Norway. Although overstated, he was correct that a number of the participants favored a positive response to the GOZ,s latest talk of "bridge-building," primarily out of concern for the welfare of Zimbabweans who were suffering as the country continued to implode economically. ¶3. (C) In response to these calls, Pocock and the CDA made a number of interventions to the effect that while the U.S. and the UK did not oppose dialogue, the GOZ would need to make concrete reforms before the international community could consider assistance and that we should be realistic about what to expect from the GOZ, given its steadfast refusal to reform. Pocock noted that Mugabe,s sincerity was in question as was his ability to deliver; he might be "in power, but he was not fully in control" of the GOZ. Nonetheless, the UK was in favor of "testing' both. ¶4. (C) The CDA noted that in response to the Ambassador's November speech in Mutare, the GOZ had equated calls for changes to its policies with calls for regime change. If this remained their position, a dialogue would lead nowhere. Moreover, the international community needed to be mindful of its leverage. GOZ economic officials knew what reforms were needed and had acknowledged that the country would need U.S. $2-3 billion to stabilize the economy. The only conceivable source for this amount of external financing was the International Financial Institutions. ¶5. (C) Unintentionally summing up the meeting, the German Ambassador said we "had to talk to the Zimbabweans," but only Mugabe had the authority to make concessions, and Mugabe was paranoid and would not meet with western representatives, but still "we had to talk to them." -------------- UN Donor's Meeting -------------- ¶6. (C) UN ResRep Zacharias convened a meeting of donor community Ambassadors the next day, March 15. Many of the same Ambassadors attended this meeting, but the tone was strikingly different. Zacharias said that following the March 8 IMF vote not to restore Zimbabwe's voting rights, GOZ moderates had approached the UN for help on how to implement economic reforms. He called for donations to provide the GOZ with this technical assistance but met with a resounding no, with the Canadian, Austrian, and Belgian Ambassadors arguing that the GOZ knew what to do but lacked the political will to do it. (N.B. The IMF team that has been visiting Zimbabwe every six months has provided the GOZ with technical advice while in-country, which has been ignored, and has made itself available by phone or e-mail from Washington, which the GOZ has also failed to take advantage of.) ¶7. (C) Zacharias then asked for donor support for the GOZ,s National development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, part of the GOZ,s obligations under the Millennium Development Goals. The response was again unsupportive. The Spanish Ambassador summed up the situation by noting that since it was GOZ policies that were preventing growth and increasing poverty, this was a futile exercise absent GOZ policy reforms. ¶8. (C) Zacharias also reported on Secretary General Annan,s possible visit to Zimbabwe. He said Annan would only come if he could move things forward in Zimbabwe, specifically by restarting a dialogue between the GOZ and donors. To that end, Annan wanted to come to Harare with something to offer and to leave with some concession from Mugabe and the GOZ. (N.B. The newly returned UN OCHA representative, Agnes Asekenye-Oonyu, in a private meeting with the CDA and the USAID Director on March 14, said the GOZ was becoming increasingly desperate for Annan to visit and jump start reengagement but was as yet unwilling or unable to offer meaningful concessions.) ¶9. (C) The EC and Swedish Ambassadors, seconded by the USAID Director, responded that it was up to the GOZ to make the initial concession not the international community. The Japanese Ambassador, surprisingly supported by the French, said Annan should be prepared to speak frankly while here and not expect to broker a solution. The Belgian Ambassador had the last word and, echoing the CDA,s comments from the previous meeting, noted that Annan and the UN should make clear that the GOZ should not try to equate calls for policy reform with "regime change." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The GOZ remains its own worst enemy. Following the parliamentary elections a year ago it threw away months of effort courting the Europeans by reacting to its two-thirds majority not with moderation but with Murambatsvina. Similarly, its latest charm offensive is being undercut by radical economic policies, such as the threatened takeover of the mining sector, and by repressive political tactics, such as the trumped up charges that the MDC was plotting violence. ¶11. (C) The result is that the international community on the ground here remains, despite some distaste for sanctions, largely onside when it comes to maintaining pressure on the GOZ. In addition, while many of our diplomatic colleagues favor dialogue and want the international community to be forward leaning, they also agree that the ball is in the GOZ,s court to make real changes. The trick for us and the UK will be to maintain this international solidarity in the face of GOZ efforts to drive wedges. SCHULTZ