CDA DISCUSSES POTUS VISIT, BILATERAL ISSUES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 002599 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/AWH AND DRL/IRF E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 TAGS: PHUM KIRF PREL PGOV ECON VM SUBJECT: CDA DISCUSSES POTUS VISIT, BILATERAL ISSUES WITH MFA HANOI 00002599 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Jonathan Aloisi, reason 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Charge met on October 10 with MFA Americas Department Acting Director General Pham Van Que to continue discussions related to the POTUS visit. Que suggested that President Bush consider adding a short visit with the Communist Party's General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, in part to balance the bilateral schedule being developed for PRC President Hu Jintao. MFA also questioned us on a possible POTUS "religious roundtable," suggesting a broader guest list as more appropriate. The Charge stressed the need for a country-to-country Peace Corps agreement with both Que and subsequently with the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). He called for GVN decisions replacing highly enriched uranium in the Dalat research reactor. Que noted that Vietnam Airlines will definitely purchase ten Boeing Aircraft and that a Motorola deal is "under active consideration." Other issues raised included religious freedom, the Maritime agreement, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Ambassador,s request to visit a prominent dissident in prison, the text of the President,s joint statement, the American Presence Post concept and the DEA-Ministry of Public Security MOU. Que made a strong pitch for U.S. "engagement" with Vietnamese banks regarding establishment of U.S. representative offices. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On October 10, the CDA met with MFA Acting Director Pham Van Que to continue discussions on a list of POTUS-related bilateral issues. The first portion of the discussion was dominated by North Korea (reported septel). In this report, we also include information from the CDA's subsequent meeting with the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) on the Peace Corps. President's Meeting schedule (and General Secretary) -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding the POTUS visit, Que suggested that President Bush seek a meeting with Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh in addition to his meetings with SIPDIS President Nguyen Minh Triet and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung, during his bilateral schedule on the afternoon of November 17. Que argued that General Secretary Manh is "Vietnam's top leader," and that such a meeting would therefore be appropriate. Alluding to reports that former President Clinton had found the former General Secretary overly focused on "the past" during their year 2000 meeting, Que promised that President Bush would find the conversation with Manh "interesting and forward looking." Que then implied that the MFA wishes the meeting to "provide balance," as Chinese President Hu Jintao will meet with all three top leaders during his separate bilateral schedule on the margins of APEC. The MFA does not want stories after the POTUS and Hu visits to focus on differences in the reception Vietnam gave the two leaders. President's Meeting Schedule (and Religious Freedom) -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Que noted that the GVN is waiting for information about the President's proposed schedule of events in Ho Chi Minh City. While a business roundtable with Vietnamese businessmen is a "good idea" for the agenda, the GVN is concerned about possible events with themes related to religion or human rights. Que suggested that we consider expanding the religious meeting to include GVN civil society officials such as representatives of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (the party's popular organization watchdog),the Women's Union, the Vietnam's Veteran Association and representatives of Vietnam's ethnic minority communities. The CDA stressed that the White House is in charge of preparing the POTUS schedule, and that all of the President's events will be well-planned and appropriate. (Comment: We assess the MFA's demarche on this point as an effort to go on record expressing concern about possible POTUS events as insurance against accusations within the GVN should the POTUS schedule evoke criticism from hardliners here. End Comment.) Peace Corps -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The CDA noted that he planned to meet with Vice Minister Nhung of the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) later October 10 to discuss the current status of the negotiations to sign a country agreement establishing a Peace HANOI 00002599 002.2 OF 004 Corps (PC) mission in Vietnam. The Congress and the Administration support the establishment of a mission as an important sign of the state of the bilateral relationship, but there are still problems. The United States absolutely requires a government-to-government Country Agreement, for example. While MOET has been designated as lead ministry in dealing with Peace Corps, clearly others must weigh in on status issues and overall policy issues. Que stated that MOET will have the power to sign an agreement on behalf of the entire GVN, but "the MFA will assist if there are any problems." In addition, the GVN wants to make sure that the ten initial volunteers "are suitable." ¶6. (SBU) The CDA subsequently met with MOET Vice Minister Tran Van Phung to advance discussions on an agreement to establish a PC presence in Vietnam. The CDA indicated that we understand that the Prime Minister's Office had given MOET the lead on reaching an agreement before the POTUS visit. The United States shares the goal of reaching agreement before the POTUS bilateral meetings on November 17, assuming all necessary arrangements are completed. The CDA reiterated that one necessary step was the conclusion of a government-to-government "country agreement" clearly defining the status of the PC in Vietnam. A separate "program agreement" would include other details. We also will not consider "pilot" or "test" status, but could discuss step-by-step expansion of the program from an acceptable initial number of volunteers (PC would need to send a minimum of 20 volunteers each year in the first two years). We also wish to anticipate in our agreements recognition of goals to expand beyond: (a) the two initial cities; and (b) the English language among subjects taught by volunteers on future deployments. ¶7. (SBU) The CDA described at length our positions on these issues and engaged in constructive discussion with the Vice Minister and his staff. We passed the template country agreement and underscored the need for a government-to-government document. ¶8. (SBU) MOET confirmed the CDA's understanding that the GVN is interested in quickly reaching an agreement. After some discussion, they also acknowledged the benefit to all (including MOET) of an unambiguous government-to-government "country agreement" on status issues, which touch on various GVN bureaucracies. They now also understand our concern about "pilot" designation, and agree to discussion of stages, with the possibility of discussion of new locations and new subjects in future stages. They took note of our request for 20 volunteers in the first deployment, followed by 20 more the next year. On the "Country Agreement" issue, in particular, MOET - which would presumably not be the signatory agency - must report to higher levels within the GVN. The Vice Minister pledged to do this, but could not promise when an answer would be received. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: Today's meetings helped increase understanding, narrow differences, and define remaining problems. While MOET appears ready to carry water on the "country agreement," the Embassy will re-engage GVN officials in other bureaucracies in an attempt to obtain a breakthrough on the "Country Agreement" and other issues. Dalat Reactor -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The CDA noted that in a recent meeting with Vice Minister Thang of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST),he explained to the gathered MOST representatives why the proposed swapping of highly enriched uranium for low enriched uranium at the Dalat research reactor is a counter-proliferation important issue that, if resolved in advance of the POTUS visit, would be a strong indication of our cooperation in that area. This is an easy matter to address, but we need the GVN to make a political decision to sign 1) a non-proliferation agreement and 2) a nuclear swap agreement. We are willing to spend money and work with the Russians to make this happen. If the GVN does not decide to go ahead with the project now, the security at the reactor must be improved as it is not adequate at present, the CDA added. Que replied that the MOST is preparing a proposal in tandem with other agencies for consideration by the Prime Minister's office. Religious Freedom -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The CDA noted that he had twice called on HANOI 00002599 003.2 OF 004 Commission for Religious Affairs (CRA) Chairman Ngo Yen Thi to press for progress in advance of the U.S decision on Country Of Particular Concern (CPC) status. We are seeking to meet again with the CRA for further updates. Que acknowledged the GVN interest in engagement, hopefully leading to the lifting of CPC status, which - along with PNTR - the Vietnamese see as a "deliverable" for the upcoming bilateral visit. Proliferation Security Initiative -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The CDA noted that recent events underscore the importance of flexible, multilateral approaches to non-proliferation issues. He reiterated our desire to see Vietnam join the Proliferation Security Initiative. Que had no response. Commercial Advocacy -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Que raised the issue of impending commercial deals before the President's visit and noted that Vietnam Airlines has decided to buy ten Boeing aircraft for approximately USD two billion. On the two proposed power plant projects (AES and Gannon),the GVN does not think it will be able to sign a quick deal with Gannon as there are many "special interests" involved and any deal would "take time to work out." On the other hand, the GVN "is actively considering" a deal for the purchase of Motorola equipment. Maritime Agreement -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The CDA noted that the Maritime Agreement is apparently "in trouble" because of Vietnam's concerns that it might complicate Vietnam,s WTO aspirations. However, if the GVN gives us more information, we may be able to find ways to resolve the issue. Que noted that the GVN hopes "no other countries pay attention to the issue in Geneva so it can be resolved." American Presence Post (APP) Danang -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Que asked for more information about our proposed APP in Danang. The CDA noted that we have not made a formal proposal yet to open such a post. Que stated that "if we accept your eventual proposal we will want something in return," such as the opening of a Vietnamese Consulate in Houston. The CDA provided Que with a list of existing APPs in France and Canada, as earlier requested. Prisoners of Concern -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The Charge reiterated the Ambassador's request to visit prominent imprisoned dissident Nguyen Vu Binh in prison. Que had no comment. Joint Statement -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The Charge asked about the status of GVN feedback on the text of the Joint Statement for the President's visit. Que promised to provide GVN feedback "within two weeks" and predicted that "we will have a good, substantive statement," and that Hanoi will seek to add even more to the document. PNTR/WTO Accession -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Que noted that the Ministry of Trade (MOT) is unhappy about the recent agreement between USTR, the Commerce Department and Congress to remove the Senate's holds related to textile concerns about Vietnam's WTO accession. "Some Vietnamese businessmen are now saying that it would be better to have textile quotas rather than be subject to anti-dumping charges under the deal," he said. The CDA noted that the deal cannot be changed, but the U.S. experts are engaging all concerned parties to explain the implications of the assurances presented in the letter to Senators Dole and Graham. Banking/Money-Laundering/DEA-MPS MOU -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Que noted that the GVN would like Vietnamese HANOI 00002599 004.2 OF 004 commercial banks to be able to open representative offices in the United States. Econ/C explained that, according to the Federal Reserve, only one Vietnamese bank (VietCom Bank) has applied to open an office in the last two years, and that the bank is not actively pursuing its application. Although the Federal Reserve has strict criteria for allowing foreign banks to operate in the United States, the process is open and over 20 percent of the banks operating in the United States are foreign-owned. Among the Federal Reserve's concerns are in the area of anti-money laundering and there are still problems with Vietnam's anti-laundering regulations, he added. ¶20. (SBU) Que stated that Vietnamese banks are not experienced doing business in the United States and they are watching to see how Vietcom Bank fares. Que stated that the uncertainty is affecting views of the United States within the financial sector, and ) via the press - more broadly in Vietnamese society. There are concerns that the USG has made a political decision to deny Vietnamese banks entry into the United States. ¶21. (SBU) The CDA debunked this notion but acknowledged that both sides should seek to correct this false perception. One way this might be done would be to arrange discussions between the Vietnamese banking community and/or media and the Federal Reserve Bank, not to discuss specific cases but rather to outline general requirements and the application process. He promised to provide feedback on the status of Vietcom Bank's application as soon as it is available from the Federal Reserve. ¶22. (SBU) The CDA noted that the Ambassador recently met with the Department of Justice and the Drug Enforcement Administration in Washington to be briefed on the full extent of the money laundering problem affecting the United States and Vietnam. On the subject of broader law enforcement cooperation, the USG would like to see MPS agree to sign an MOU with the DEA prior to the President's visit, the CDA said. ALOISI