SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-VIETNAM HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000196 SIPDIS SIPDIS DRL FOR A/S LOWENKRON FROM CDA JOHN BOARDMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PREF VM SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-VIETNAM HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE REF: A. HANOI 36 ¶B. HANOI 111 ¶C. 05 HANOI 3043 ¶D. HANOI 188 ¶E. HCMC 72 AND PREVIOUS HANOI 00000196 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. John S. Boardman per 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary Lowenkron: Mission Vietnam looks forward to welcoming you to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The bilateral Human Rights Dialogue, the first since 2002, will help us to bring into focus a number of key issues our two countries will need to address this year, particularly in the lead-up to the President's November visit. It will also help to underscore to the Vietnamese that progress in addressing core American concerns and values must keep pace with the substantial progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship. The GVN has sought a resumption of the Dialogue for over a year, and they were quick to agree to respond positively to our initial proposal last year. The GVN, eager to enter the WTO, understands that human rights issues will factor into Congressional deliberations on whether to grant Vietnam Permanent Normal Trading Relations status. ¶2. (C) However, with a large portion of Vietnam's political elite preoccupied with pre-Communist Party Congress maneuvering -- the Congress is expected to be held in April -- you may find your interlocutors to be unwilling or unable to go out on a limb for difficult, sensitive or controversial positions. For the next few months, risk aversion, ensuring Vietnam's interests are protected and avoiding the impression of knuckling under to foreign pressure will likely be guiding principles of all senior Vietnamese officials. This was borne out in the recent human rights dialogues of others, including the EU, Norway and Australia, in which the GVN officials were reportedly tough and inflexible (Ref A). ¶3. (C) At the last Dialogue (in November 2002),both GVN and USG representatives expressed the view that the discussions were not productive. Subsequently, the Department suspended the Dialogue, citing a lack of concrete results from the exchanges. In resuming the Dialogue, we need to have realistic targets that both represent real improvements in the situation in Vietnam, but also are achievable in Vietnam's current domestic political climate. We also want to think about how we can offer assistance in making changes, rather than just demanding reform. ¶4. (SBU) Based on the draft agenda that we and the GVN have basically agreed to, we have a number of thoughts on the topics at hand: Religious Freedom -------------- ¶5. (C) After several high-profile steps forward in 2005, including the exchange of letters on religious freedom, the amnesties for many prisoners of concern and the publication of several new laws and regulations governing religious affairs, we are now in a lull. Legalization of house church operations under the new legal framework on religion has been slow. While there have been some significant improvement in a number of previously troublesome provinces in the Northwest and Central Highlands, Protestants there and in other localities continue to have problems. Nearly a year after the promulgation of the legal framework on religion, implementation at the local level remains inconsistent. Other religious leaders remain under provisions similar to house arrest. In addition, the GVN has told us that there will likely not be any large-scale amnesties this year under which remaining prisoners of concern might benefit. ¶6. (C) In the wake of the Ambassador's delivery of our post-CPC strategy message (Ref B),the Vietnamese will probably use the Dialogue to address some of our specific concerns, such as the pace of church registrations and openings. They will press hard for a commitment from us to at least look with a favorable eye to lifting this year Vietnam's CPC designation. We need to continue to underscore our concerns about slow and uneven implementation of Vietnam's framework on religion. We also need to impress upon our interlocutors the importance of keeping up the momentum in religious freedom, particularly in advance of the President's visit. Criminal Codes and International Standards -------------- HANOI 00000196 002.2 OF 003 ¶7. (C) During the Dialogue, we will discuss the repeal of Decree 31/CP, which allows the GVN to place individuals under administrative probation without trial. We see this as a long-term goal and worth addressing, but not something that we can likely achieve in the short- to medium-term. If time allows, another possibly productive subject to raise is the revision of Vietnam's criminal procedures code. The National Assembly amended the criminal procedures code in 2003 to allow more rights for defendants, and set a goal of changing courtroom procedures to an "adversarial" model (in which lawyers debate the case) from the current "investigative" model (in which the judge leads the questioning). There is political support for these changes, but little action so far. In addition to merely encouraging progress, this is one area where we may be able to offer some cooperation, possibly by directing an HRDF grant to the American Bar Association and its proposal to begin work in Vietnam (Ref C). No other countries are addressing criminal procedures code reforms in their bilateral dialogues. Political and Religious Activists -------------- ¶8. (C) Our list of political and religious prisoners is not long, and several of the individuals on the list have been imprisoned for many years. Although the GVN has told us not to expect any amnesties similar to last year's, we believe that this may not be the final word on the subject and that continued encouragement for individual amnesties or sentence reductions can yield positive results. Activists Pham Hong Son, Nguyen Khac Toan and Nguyen Vu Binh are three of our most prominent prisoners of concern, and we should continue to underline that these individuals cause more harm to Vietnam (and its international image) in prison than outside of prison. This will be no more true than during this APEC year. ¶9. (C) Ending harassment of released activists will be harder to achieve. The difficult step of releasing prisoners is a political decision involving leaders at the national level. Monitoring individuals falls to local security officials, who are not sensitive to international criticism. Given the Ministry of Public Security's (MPS) seeming obsession with knowing everything about domestic "threats," we doubt this surveillance will cease. That said, we should continue to argue for freed activists' enjoyment of civil rights, including having access to the Internet and freedom to travel abroad. Freedom of the Press -------------- ¶10. (C) This will be a difficult area to engage in, particularly because the Vietnamese are (in some ways, justifiably) proud of their growing and sometimes feisty print and electronic media. You will likely hear the line that Vietnam now has hundreds of daily newspapers and weekly magazines. Your interlocutors will also likely argue that Vietnam does not want or need untrammeled, Western-style press freedoms that can be socially disruptive. ¶11. (C) Calling for the repeal of Internet regulations will also face stiff opposition: the GVN deeply fears the Internet as a tool to spread social dissent, and some currently imprisoned activists crossed the line when they used the Internet to carry out their activities. One way to approach this issue could be to explore opportunities to develop the independence of Vietnam's print media, perhaps from the standpoint of "tackling corruption" or building the capacity of journalists' associations. Cooperative programs in these areas will likely be more political palatable for the GVN than seeking broad (and longer-term) reforms for greater press freedom. Prison Conditions -------------- ¶12. (C) We need to focus on increased access to prisons by members of the international community, as well as Vietnamese engagement with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Although there were no prison visits in 2005 by international representatives, in previous years the GVN was more open in allowing somewhat scripted visits by diplomats. Further diplomatic visits would be a very achievable deliverable (and one that we hope to be able to arrange during your visit to Ho Chi Minh City). That said, we do not think that the UN HANOI 00000196 003.2 OF 003 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which in the past condemned GVN treatment of Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, Father Nguyen Van Ly, Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, will readily be invited to Vietnam. Securing an invitation for the ICRC to visit a prison may be a good first step. Respecting the Rights of Ethnic Minorities -------------- ¶13. (C) Greater international access to the Central Highlands for international observers is a success story of the past year. We will not want to rest on our laurels, however, and should seek to secure from the GVN a commitment to continued access. We will also want to follow up concerns raised by recent monitoring visits and seek GVN assistance in facilitating private meetings with returnees (which local authorities have heretofore been unwilling to accept, with the exception of UNHCR's most recent trip (Refs D and E)). The question of U.S. funding for development activities will also likely come up, and we should be prepared to emphasize our commitment to work in tandem with the GVN to achieve legitimate development goals while addressing GVN concerns about certain groups. While the Central Highlands could easily take up an entire day of discussions, we should nevertheless use the time allotted for this topic to raise the Northwest Highlands, an area to which we do not think the GVN is sufficiently attentive and which faces many of the same (or worse) problems of the Central Highlands. Discrimination -------------- ¶14. (C) The GVN has asked for "discrimination8 to be on the Dialogue's agenda (and, in fact, was one of the GVN's proposed topics for the EU dialogue.) With the EU, the Vietnamese raised their concerns about discrimination in the EU. Among their talking points: the riots in France were caused by discrimination against those of Arab/African descent; British police shot dead an innocent Brazilian because of racism; and, German national Khaled Al-Masri's rights were violated when he was transported to Afghanistan. We can expect similar arguments and should be prepared to acknowledge where we have problems, but stress that we always seek to address these issues in an open and transparent way. Human Rights and Security -------------- ¶15. (C) This topic was also featured in the EU dialogue, and GVN officials raised the War on Terror and new EU counterterrorism laws. They alleged that new UK CT legislation would allow the expulsion of suspected extremists and permit closure of mosques thought to harbor potential terrorists. In addition to similar arguments, we may also hear about anti-Vietnam groups and individuals that are permitted to operate in the United States. It is usually useful to respond to this line of argument by urging the GVN to provide us with whatever information they have to allow us to pursue whether American laws are being broken. In Closing -------------- ¶16. (C) We have been unusually fortunate to have two years in a row in which banner events, such as last year's visit by the Prime Minister and this year's by the President, have helped to set a positive tone for bilateral relations. Progress this year in human rights and religious freedom can both help to lay the foundation for a successful visit by the President and ensure that our relationship enshrines critical values shared by the United States and many in the international community. Your visit, and the resumed Dialogue, will be an important step in that direction and we look forward to welcoming you. CHARGE: BOARDMAN