VIETNAM'S 20 YEARS OF DOI MOI: ECONOMIC REFORM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 HANOI 001438 SIPDIS STATE FOR E, EAP/MLS AND EB/TPP/BTA/ANA STATE PASS USTR DAVID BISBEE AND GREG HICKS STATE PASS USAID FOR ANE/AA KUNDER/KENNEDY/WARD USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OPB/VLC/HPPHO TREASURY FOR OASIA SENSITIVE SIPDIS Ref: A) Hanoi 1240 and previous B) Hanoi 943 and previous E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV PREL PINR VM SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S 20 YEARS OF DOI MOI: ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRESS ACCELERATED BY THE BTA HANOI 00001438 001.2 OF 007 SENSITIVE - DO NOT POST ON THE INTERNET ¶1. (SBU) Summary: This year marks the twentieth anniversary of Vietnam's adoption of its "doi moi" (renovation) policy aimed at transforming its command economy to a market economy. While the momentum has not been smooth or steady, Vietnam has made significant progress since the policy's adoption in 1986. On a very basic level, Vietnam can feed itself and produce enough rice to be among the top three exporters worldwide as well as a leading exporter of coffee and marine products. However, the debate over the pace and extent of reforms caused them to stall in the late 1990s. Reviewing highlights of economic reform over these two decades, with a focus on the last five years, illustrates that there has been much progress, but that the areas where reform is lagging have been the focus of discussion in the bilateral and multilateral WTO accession negotiations. The U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement revived economic reform efforts and, together with the changes required on the road to WTO accession, has maintained and accelerated it. Nevertheless, Vietnam's leaders still need to make some hard choices about the lagging areas of reform, especially financial sector and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. That is where the reformers need to concentrate next. End Summary. Why and What of Doi Moi? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Despite whatever ideological commitment Vietnam's leadership may have had to its Marxist- Leninist system of collectivized agriculture, heavy industry and trade with other Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries, they failed in their attempt to introduce a productive collective agricultural system on the reunited south in the decade after 1975. The effort to impose the collective system in the South did not go far enough to make it succeed as in many other communist countries or in North Vietnam after 1954. Long time resident economist Adam McCarty has attributed the reluctance to use force to impose this change because of a desire to end bloodshed after so many decades of war in Vietnam. At the same time, the failed attempt to collectivize agriculture and the resulting deterioration of the sector turned what had been a productive market based system in the south into a partially collectivized unproductive system. Declining agricultural output meant food production shrank, the GDP growth rate fell from 8.4 percent in 1984 to three percent or less in 1985-1987, and annual inflation rose to 400 percent in 1985. Exports slowed especially to COMECON trading partners. In addition, a variety of external factors including declining Soviet assistance, isolation from ASEAN countries and others as a result of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and a short but bloody and destructive border war with China in 1979 weakened Vietnam's ability to cover external war debt repayment obligations and to meet basic domestic needs. ¶3. (SBU) By 1986, Vietnam's weakening economic performance and a looming famine compelled the leadership to change course. Drawing lessons from China's economic liberalization, but taking little input from the few foreign assistance donors, they crafted their own strategy. Adopted at the Sixth Party Congress, doi moi ("renovation) acknowledged the need for a successful private sector (especially in agriculture),adopted a more outward oriented economic policy, gave greater autonomy to state owned enterprises and began to decentralize the State system. As National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Van An recently told visiting Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, "Vietnam learned that [Communist elimination of private ownership] is an ineffective system because it deprives people of economic incentives to work." Popular HANOI 00001438 002.2 OF 007 confidence in Doi Moi and participation in the economy was hesitant at first, but began to show results in the lead up to the Seventh National Communist Party Congress in 1991, where Doi Moi was publicly validated. ¶4. (SBU) Vietnam's continued economic liberalization was also necessitated by the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union's international subsidized economic system, which ended friendly credit terms, subsidized commodity sales and import quotas. A popular joke at the time reflected Vietnam's economic desperation in the form of a telegram exchange between economic cadres in Hanoi and Moscow. Hanoi: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS HERE GRAVE. ASSISTANCE URGENTLY NEEDED. Moscow: THINGS ARE TOUGH ALL OVER. YOU MUST TIGHTEN YOUR BELTS. Hanoi: AGREED. PLEASE SEND BELTS. ¶5. (SBU) By 1990, inflation was less than 70 percent, food production was again rising and export performance was improving. Continued improvements in agricultural production (especially rice),the shift away from trade with COMECON countries, expansion of exports of petroleum as well as new products like coffee, rice and seafood all fueled growth. The nascent private sector began to contribute to economic activity. Foreign investment began to flow, mainly to export oriented sectors. In the early 1990s, Vietnam benefited from the international rush to invest in Southeast Asia and the beginning of trade relations with China, reopened in 1991. In 1993, Vietnam began actively cooperating with ASEAN, and in 1995 joined ASEAN and normalized relations with the United States, increasing the flow of trade and investment that began with the end of the U.S. embargo in 1994. By that time, Vietnam was growing well and moving towards a market economy with inflation under control and progress in poverty reduction. New export sectors like garments expanded rapidly. ¶6. (SBU) The reform measures implemented during 1989- 1996 spanned a broad range. The Government dismantled collective agriculture, replaced it with a system where the family was the basic unit, guaranteed land tenure to farmers, allowed them to sell produce on the market and liberalized the domestic rice trade. Further reforms included removal of most administered prices, unifying the exchange rate and allowing it to be set by trading on the interbank market. Two key interest rate reforms were raising interest rates to positive levels in real terms and switching from setting deposit rates to controlling interest rate spreads. The size of the civil service shrank. The Ministry of Trade eliminated many trade barriers (including most import quotas), allowed enterprises rather than the State to make foreign trade decisions, and allowed more enterprises to engage directly in trade. The Government set up the State Bank of Vietnam as a central bank and opened the banking system to private and cooperative banks, joint stock banks, joint venture banks and foreign banks. The number of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) fell from 12,000 to 6,000, though most eliminated were marginal and quite small. Nearly all direct subsidies to state enterprises from the budget stopped, although other subsidies continued. The National Assembly passed laws on the budget, foreign investment (later amended several times in response to investor concerns), companies and bankruptcy. The tax system changed to include a three-tiered value added tax, a uniform tax on enterprises rather than on profits and equal tax rates between private and state enterprises. This rapid progress earned Vietnam a reputation as an emerging "tiger" and led to greater FDI inflows. 1997: Financial Crisis and Hardliner Resurgence -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) Progress stopped abruptly in 1997 for several reasons. First, the Asian financial crisis slowed HANOI 00001438 003.2 OF 007 growth throughout the region, causing the decline and withdrawal of investment that had originated from other Asian countries. In addition, many U.S. investors who had flocked to Vietnam in the euphoria following normalization in 1995 withdrew because of frustration with the poor business climate and corruption. Domestic discontent manifested itself in 1997 and early 1998 in the form of large-scale rural protests against corruption and capricious local officials. Protests and "instability," the rapid withdrawal of foreign capital and the general malaise (and accompanying political change) in the region in 1997 weakened the hands of the reformers and led to a resurgence in the power of so-called "hardliners," which peaked with the replacement of the relatively reformist Communist Party General Secretary Do Muoi by the apparatchik ideologue Le Ka Phieu. ¶8. (SBU) Le Ka Phieu linked the pace of reforms to the question of the appropriate relationship with the West and the extent to which reforms were actually part of "peaceful evolution" that should be resisted. This came to a head when Central Bank Governor Cao Sy Kiem, a key reformer, tried to move forward too fast for the newly nervous Politburo and was discredited allegedly for mismanaging loans. According to one long-term observer of Vietnam, these charges were trumped up. The bad debts were there (and still are) regardless of who is the SBV governor. The National Assembly, acting through its Party controlled Secretariat, refused to approve his reappointment after the 1997 Party Plenum. Thereafter, the National Assembly began taking a more active role in economic management, notably by setting the annual inflation target. Several annual consultative group meetings of donors, as well as the World Bank and IMF, called for Vietnam to reinvigorate its reform process, but there was little progress. Reformers were stifled for several years until the recognition grew that Vietnam needed to trade with the United States in order to integrate more fully into the world economy. Negotiated over five years, the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the United States gave the reformers a means to push forward again. The BTA was so controversial that it took over a year for the Party to decide to support signing the agreement; the decision to ratify and implement the BTA came simultaneously with the decision to eject Le Ka Phieu and his hardliner allies from the leadership, and represented a strong victory for reformers. The BTA: Reform Momentum Regained -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The BTA not only helped restore reform momentum, but accelerated it. When it finally took effect in December 2001, 18 months after being signed, the BTA provided a road map with annual targets for reform that would bring the economy and legal system onto the path towards WTO accession. Although often portrayed monolithically as the catalyst for a sharp rise in bilateral trade, the BTA has also had a profound impact on Vietnam's system of governance and leaders. At its heart, the BTA's WTO standard reforms foster rules-based governance, greater transparency, protection of corporate rights and a level playing field for all participants, which by definition reduce the Party's power over the economy in general and over specific economic actors in particular. The reform framework of the BTA had the additional benefit of eliminating ongoing case-by-case policy debate on reform; the BTA's prescription of necessary changes turned economic reform from a fundamental policy question into a bureaucratic implementation issue. BTA Spurs Lawmaking Changes -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The most profound change that the BTA set HANOI 00001438 004.2 OF 007 into motion was establishing a process to make laws systematically, consistently and transparently. Requiring input from a variety of stakeholders, both foreign and domestic, through a public comment process contrasts starkly with the previous practice in which the Government made all decisions in isolation. Drafters of laws must consider not only what fits into Vietnam's existing legal system, but also how to comply with the BTA as well as other international obligations, including WTO rules. The establishment of key standards and procedures for making laws in the so- called Law on Laws of 2002 energized the drafting ministries, greatly improving both quality and quantity of legislation. The BTA also requires the publication of all laws in both English and Vietnamese in the Official Gazette (similar to the U.S. Federal Register). Subsequent legislation has established a process to inform local governments of national policy and a system to handle complaints. The BTA Requires Trade Regime Changes -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The BTA provides both countries most favored nation trade status which must be renewed annually. Since some 60 other countries have MFN for trade in goods with Vietnam, tariff reductions and other privileges for trade in goods granted to the United States under the BTA must also be extended to these countries. It also required Vietnam to shift to transaction valuation for customs duties which in turn meant that the GVN had to develop and publish a tariff schedule in late 2003. This schedule also enabled the shift from quotas to tariffs and the reduction of unaccounted for "customs fee charges." Tariff rates have gone down and Vietnam has removed quantitative restrictions on most imports. State trading enterprises (i.e., Government and non-Government enterprises, including marketing boards, which deal with goods for export and/or import) must now act in accord with WTO standard rules. Subsidies are being phased out. Some U.S. firms have been gradually receiving trading rights that allow them to import and export goods directly without having to go through a State-owned or local trading company, but they still cannot distribute goods within Vietnam themselves. The GVN is revising technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures based on national treatment principles that do not create obstacles to trade. Vietnam has removed requirements on investors such as local content and export/import ratios in accord with requirements of the WTO TRIMS agreement. ¶12. (SBU) The Government began creating a level playing field for domestic firms by giving equal status to the private and state sectors in 2001. The BTA requirement to treat U.S. and domestic firms the same way (i.e., national treatment) expands this leveling in various ways including the provision of services. Since the BTA entered into force, Vietnam has eliminated discriminatory prices (often two-tiered pricing structures) and fees for various goods and services such as telephone installation, telecommunications services, water, tourist services, motor vehicle registration, international port charges, electricity and air passenger transport. Vietnam has also equalized various tax rates, including those on corporate income, special consumption tax and value added tax as well as abolished the withholding tax on foreign investors. The BTA: More Market Access, But Slowly -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Vietnam has also taken a number of steps to improve market access in service sectors, though far more gradually than on goods and other commitments. Under the BTA, U.S. firms are slowly being allowed HANOI 00001438 005.2 OF 007 limited access often only to provide foreign firms services in such sectors as accounting, architecture, engineering, computer services, market research, management consulting, construction, health, travel and travel services. While there has been some progress in financial services, telecommunications and distribution, greater market access in these key areas was on the table at the WTO bilateral discussions. The single biggest impediment to liberalization in these areas has been the continued dominance of State-owned enterprises (Sues) in key sectors which still account for 29 percent of GDP. In 2005, Vietnam raised the cap on foreign investment in a Vietnamese non-financial firm that is listed on the stock market from 30 percent to 49 percent and abolished the equity limit imposed on a single foreign investor in a Vietnamese company. The BTA Means Greater Competition -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The BTA called for the GVN to establish the legal framework so that new entrants foreign and domestic could compete on an equal footing with established and even dominant firms. Effective in July 2006, the new Investment and Enterprise Laws aim to create a more favorable business environment to promote the development of the rapidly expanding private sector and to provide more freedom to investors in doing business while improving corporate governance at the inefficient SOEs. Evaluating the effectiveness of these laws must await the implementing regulations, due out in the summer. With the establishment of the Competition Authority under the Competition Law which took effect in July 2005, Vietnam began laying the basis to spur competition by protecting new entrants against SOE monopolies in such fields as telecom and energy. However, as in other countries, building an effective competition authority takes time, especially with no independent regulatory agencies in place and few competition policy experts. Recent steps to encourage independent power producers into the market to boost generating capacity on a fairly urgent basis will not only help create competition, but also put pressure on the power monopoly, Electricity of Vietnam, to improve its own efficiency. Other new laws such as the revised civil code, an e-transactions law and the intellectual property rights law are also aimed at protecting the rights of firms. Judging the effectiveness of these and many other new laws will have to await the drafting and enforcement of implementing regulations. The BTA Changes Bureaucratic Culture -------------- ¶15. (SBU) In changing the way that laws are created and increasing transparency requirements, the BTA has also spurred a profound change in the bureaucratic culture. The GVN has moved from calling virtually all documents "State secrets" to launching a Government information portal, posting information on the internet and computerizing and modernizing State administrative management. The BTA's legal drafting requirements, technical assistance and various cross cutting issues have fostered interagency coordination. This coordination began at nearly zero, but BTA implementation and WTO negotiations and a variety of investment missions and study tours have advanced it. Being forced to deal with cross-cutting health issues such as SARS, HIV/AIDS and Avian Influenza have also fostered not only interagency cooperation and coordination but also transparency in sensitive subjects, some of which were previously treated as secret. While far from perfect, especially on public SIPDIS health issues, coordination is improving and could improve markedly with the departure of some ineffective but influential players. HANOI 00001438 006.2 OF 007 ¶16. (SBU) The BTA has also spurred changes in the culture of the judicial and legislative systems. The GVN now recognizes the need to train judges, most of whom were appointed for their revolutionary rather than their legal credentials. The increased focus on lawmaking and the return of Vietnamese attorneys trained abroad have made lawyer organizations more active. A meeting with U.S. Supreme Court officials led Vietnam's Supreme People's Procuracy to decide to publish past cases, which were previously not matters of public record. Elected from among loyal Communist party members, National Assembly members have begun debating rather than just approving bills. A better informed Assembly with a greater voice has even made some significant changes to Government-drafted laws, including having the State Audit report to the legislature rather than to the Prime Minister's office. Reform in Vietnam: What Has Not Yet Happened and Why -------------- -------------- ¶17. (SBU) While there has been considerable progress in Vietnam in recent years, especially on trade reform, there is more to be done in that area, as well as in two other areas where reforms have lagged. Although the GVN has long included among its goals reform of the financial sector and of SOEs, progress in these areas has been limited. The number of SOEs has declined from around 12,000 in the early 1990s to below 3,200 by September 2005, but most of those eliminated have been quite small. Another key issue is that State-owned commercial banks still dominate the credit market. Since they still lend to SOEs, even to non profitable ones, the amount of non-performing loans are considered high, but have not yet been clearly identified. No doubt part of this is the importance of these areas to maintain economic growth in an economy where the State still intervenes regularly. In addition, only in the past year has the World Bank begun to focus at a high level and with adequate staff on the key issue of financial sector reform. ¶18. (SBU) On market access, what remains to be done is essentially what the WTO accession process needs to accomplish in terms of liberalizing some key services sectors, reducing the role of the State in economy and improving upon BTA implementation in IPR and distribution. In evaluating this situation, one must recall that the BTA deliberately left the most difficult and intractable issues for WTO accession. This explains why the difficult sectors in our WTO bilateral accession negotiations have included restrictions on the activities of foreign firms in the areas of energy, telecom, finance and distribution. It is not surprising that these areas generate a good deal of government revenues for SOEs. Thus, the vested interests opposing liberalization of these sectors include not only the ministries controlling the SOEs and the SOEs themselves (who no doubt benefit financially from these firms),but those in the GVN responsible for maintaining a healthy revenue stream in the midst of tariffs declining due to cuts for the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and WTO, as well as an inefficient tax collection system. ¶19. (SBU) On another level, one of the reasons for the success of the BTA was Vietnam's swift recognition that it would need technical assistance to accomplish these reforms. The result was the USAID-funded Support for Trade AcceleRation (STAR) program which has provided nearly five years of independent assistance and advice to the GVN and helped revise the legal and regulatory framework. In fact, at the 2005 Consultative Group of Donors which pledged USD 3.5 billion in ODA, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan singled out the USD four million STAR project as the best of all and called on other donors to emulate it. In areas where reform has lagged, such as financial sector or SOE reform, there HANOI 00001438 007.2 OF 007 is no single blueprint like the BTA. A range of multilateral and bilateral donors engage in various projects and spend much time coordinating to ensure they are not duplicating efforts. But progress is slow. Corruption -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Another key area where progress has been slow is in attacking corruption. Although there have been more headlines about it in recent years, it continues virtually unabated. The recent PMU-18 scandal has focused much attention on the broader issue of corruption in Vietnam and elicited statements from the highest levels in Vietnam in support of ending it. Proof of the GVN commitment, however, will have to emerge over time in concrete actions, not only on prosecuting the guilty in the PMU-18 scandal, but also in legal and administrative reforms to prevent and end corruption. The extent to which the leaders are able to contain if not eliminate graft will be key to maintaining not only the reform momentum, but also their own hold on power. ¶21. (SBU) Comment: While the momentum has not been smooth or steady, Vietnam has made significant progress since it adopted doi moi in 1986. On a very basic level, Vietnam can feed itself and produce enough rice to be among the top three exporters worldwide as well as a leading exporter of coffee and marine products. On this, and the other positive impacts of doi moi, the leadership has agreed for some time. However, the debate continues over the pace and extent of reforms, which is linked to the question of the appropriate relationship with the West and the extent to which reforms were actually "peaceful evolution." Concern about this issue led more conservative elements to beat back reformers bringing on the reform doldrums of the late 1990s. Vietnam has a strong desire to climb the technological ladder. This will be a strong incentive to continue down the path of economic liberalization. The BTA revived economic reform and the road toward WTO accession has maintained it. However, for the next phase of doi moi, Vietnam's leaders need to make some hard choices about the lagging areas of reform, namely financial sector and SOE reform as well as how they handle corruption. End comment. BOARDMAN