Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GUATEMALA607
2006-03-27 21:58:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Guatemala
Cable title:
GUATEMALA: MILITARY MODERNIZATION NEEDED
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGT #0607/01 0862158 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 272158Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9259 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J2 RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J-5// RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS GUATEMALA 000607
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL EAID PHUM SNAR KPKO GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MILITARY MODERNIZATION NEEDED
UNCLAS GUATEMALA 000607
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL EAID PHUM SNAR KPKO GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MILITARY MODERNIZATION NEEDED
1. (SBU) Summary: The Guatemalan military faces increasing
challenges in operating and maintaining its aging equipment.
The Guatemalan military has a modernization plan but no
funding to support the plan. The GOG stipulated that
modernization funding must come from either sale of military
properties or international donations; neither of these
sources has proven to be viable. The Guatemalan military's
ability to fully execute counternarcotics and peacekeeping
missions will continue to be hindered by a lack of military
modernization. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The Guatemalan military suffers from an inventory
of aging and obsolete equipment in its ground, air, and naval
forces. Operational readiness rates for its equipment are
very poor due to lack of funding for operations and
maintenance. The military also has little funding for
procurement of spare parts, which in many cases are expensive
or even non-existent because of the age of the equipment.
For example, of the six UH-1H and Bell 212 helicopters in the
Guatemalan Air Force inventory, only two are currently
operational. All three of the Air Force's A-37 ground attack
aircraft are currently grounded due to a lack of parts. The
Guatemalan Navy shares some of the Air Force's readiness
problems but is even more handicapped by a lack of funds to
pay for fuel costs. The lower-tech ground forces are less
constrained but the Army's truck fleet is dilapidated because
of a lack of spare parts and maintenance funds.
3. (U) To address these issues, the Guatemalan military
developed last year a detailed four-year procurement plan for
1.08 billion quetzales (approximately 144 million dollars).
85 percent of the spending was destined for mobility purposes
(primarily purchase of aircraft and boats) and 4 percent for
communications, with remaining funding for expenses not
related to purchase of new equipment. For calendar year
2005, the plan proposed the expenditure of 232 million
quetzales (approximately 31 million dollars) to purchase six
helicopters, four 86-foot boats, a light aircraft, and
communications gear. None of this equipment was purchased,
however, due to lack of funding.
4. (U) The Berger Administration agreed in 2004 that the
Defense Ministry allocation in the GOG budget should include
0.10 percent of the GDP for military modernization during a
four year period to begin in 2005 and end in 2008. In 2006,
this would have been approximately $30 million. In
principle, funding for military modernization would be
derived principally from the sale of Defense Ministry
properties and financing through international assistance
(i.e. soft loans and donations).
5. (U) Initial military hopes of gaining funding through the
sale of properties quickly dimmed, because the GOG
transferred many surplus military properties to
municipalities and other government entities, and because of
legal controversy surrounding many military properties. An
interagency commission determined that the military possessed
442 properties, of which 60 could possibly be sold. However,
critics have claimed that, of the 60 properties identified
for possible sale, ownership of 50 is in dispute. The
Defense Ministry strongly denied this charge, asserting that
military properties that belonged to other institutions or
individuals have been returned to their rightful owners.
6. (SBU) In 2004, the Guatemalan military sought donations
of excess defense articles from the German Government. This
approach petered out in 2005 for various reasons, including a
requirement for Guatemala to pay for transportation costs of
surplus equipment and the change in governments in Germany in
the fall of 2005. During the same time, a Russian offer to
reequip the Guatemalan military on very favorable economic
terms drew interest from some quarters of the Guatemalan
military, most notably the then commander of the Air Force.
Concerns about the apparently too-good-to-be-true financial
terms and the bad Russian reputation for maintenance and
spare parts support, together with a lack of follow through
on the Russian side, led the Russian proposal to fall out of
favor with the Guatemalan military.
7. (SBU) Comment: In order to effectively use scarce
defense funding, the Guatemalan military needs more modern
platforms that are economical to operate. Without such
modernization, the Guatemalan military will be handicapped in
efforts to participate in counternarcotics and international
peacekeeping operations. Guatemalan military plans to
finance at least part of its modernization with reimbursement
funding from participation in UN peacekeeping operations were
superseded by the need to fund operations expenses in support
of the civilian police. Release of $3.2 million in frozen
USG MAP funds to buy spare parts and communications gear,
along with U.S. donations of excess defense articles will
make up some of the shortcomings, but the Guatemalan military
will continue to suffer from the constraints of aging and
obsolete equipment until it finds an internal or external
mechanism for funding replacement of its equipment.
DERHAM
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL EAID PHUM SNAR KPKO GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MILITARY MODERNIZATION NEEDED
1. (SBU) Summary: The Guatemalan military faces increasing
challenges in operating and maintaining its aging equipment.
The Guatemalan military has a modernization plan but no
funding to support the plan. The GOG stipulated that
modernization funding must come from either sale of military
properties or international donations; neither of these
sources has proven to be viable. The Guatemalan military's
ability to fully execute counternarcotics and peacekeeping
missions will continue to be hindered by a lack of military
modernization. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The Guatemalan military suffers from an inventory
of aging and obsolete equipment in its ground, air, and naval
forces. Operational readiness rates for its equipment are
very poor due to lack of funding for operations and
maintenance. The military also has little funding for
procurement of spare parts, which in many cases are expensive
or even non-existent because of the age of the equipment.
For example, of the six UH-1H and Bell 212 helicopters in the
Guatemalan Air Force inventory, only two are currently
operational. All three of the Air Force's A-37 ground attack
aircraft are currently grounded due to a lack of parts. The
Guatemalan Navy shares some of the Air Force's readiness
problems but is even more handicapped by a lack of funds to
pay for fuel costs. The lower-tech ground forces are less
constrained but the Army's truck fleet is dilapidated because
of a lack of spare parts and maintenance funds.
3. (U) To address these issues, the Guatemalan military
developed last year a detailed four-year procurement plan for
1.08 billion quetzales (approximately 144 million dollars).
85 percent of the spending was destined for mobility purposes
(primarily purchase of aircraft and boats) and 4 percent for
communications, with remaining funding for expenses not
related to purchase of new equipment. For calendar year
2005, the plan proposed the expenditure of 232 million
quetzales (approximately 31 million dollars) to purchase six
helicopters, four 86-foot boats, a light aircraft, and
communications gear. None of this equipment was purchased,
however, due to lack of funding.
4. (U) The Berger Administration agreed in 2004 that the
Defense Ministry allocation in the GOG budget should include
0.10 percent of the GDP for military modernization during a
four year period to begin in 2005 and end in 2008. In 2006,
this would have been approximately $30 million. In
principle, funding for military modernization would be
derived principally from the sale of Defense Ministry
properties and financing through international assistance
(i.e. soft loans and donations).
5. (U) Initial military hopes of gaining funding through the
sale of properties quickly dimmed, because the GOG
transferred many surplus military properties to
municipalities and other government entities, and because of
legal controversy surrounding many military properties. An
interagency commission determined that the military possessed
442 properties, of which 60 could possibly be sold. However,
critics have claimed that, of the 60 properties identified
for possible sale, ownership of 50 is in dispute. The
Defense Ministry strongly denied this charge, asserting that
military properties that belonged to other institutions or
individuals have been returned to their rightful owners.
6. (SBU) In 2004, the Guatemalan military sought donations
of excess defense articles from the German Government. This
approach petered out in 2005 for various reasons, including a
requirement for Guatemala to pay for transportation costs of
surplus equipment and the change in governments in Germany in
the fall of 2005. During the same time, a Russian offer to
reequip the Guatemalan military on very favorable economic
terms drew interest from some quarters of the Guatemalan
military, most notably the then commander of the Air Force.
Concerns about the apparently too-good-to-be-true financial
terms and the bad Russian reputation for maintenance and
spare parts support, together with a lack of follow through
on the Russian side, led the Russian proposal to fall out of
favor with the Guatemalan military.
7. (SBU) Comment: In order to effectively use scarce
defense funding, the Guatemalan military needs more modern
platforms that are economical to operate. Without such
modernization, the Guatemalan military will be handicapped in
efforts to participate in counternarcotics and international
peacekeeping operations. Guatemalan military plans to
finance at least part of its modernization with reimbursement
funding from participation in UN peacekeeping operations were
superseded by the need to fund operations expenses in support
of the civilian police. Release of $3.2 million in frozen
USG MAP funds to buy spare parts and communications gear,
along with U.S. donations of excess defense articles will
make up some of the shortcomings, but the Guatemalan military
will continue to suffer from the constraints of aging and
obsolete equipment until it finds an internal or external
mechanism for funding replacement of its equipment.
DERHAM