GOG WEAKNESSES AND U.S. SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 000429

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO USTR, NSC FOR DAN FISK, DOD FOR ROGER
PARDO-MAUER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID SMIG CVIS ETRD MASS SNAR GT
SUBJECT: GOG WEAKNESSES AND U.S. SUPPORT

REF: A. 05 GUATEMALA 2395


B. GUATEMALA 428

Classified By: Ambassador James M. Derham for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The February 23 announcement that TPS
(Temporary Protected Status) has been extended for citizens
of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua prompted immediate
critical reaction from President Berger, Vice President Stein
and Foreign Minister Briz, culminating in a reproachful
meeting with the Ambassador and DCM February 28. While we
believe we have been able to manage the TPS issue, the GOG's
sharp, almost panicky reaction brought into relief a larger
issue: The growing sense in Guatemala that the USG takes the
GOG for granted, is unable or unwilling to support a friend
and ally and is, by extension, leaving the door open for a
populist government with questionable personal and financial
ties to win office in 2007. For all of the personal politics
and drama that characterize the Berger government, we do see
some substance to their misgivings. End summary.


2. (C) Although we have been clear with the GOG for months
that TPS was a non-starter, the February 23 announcement of
that program's extension for Salvadorans, Hondurans and
Nicaraguans provoked a major twitch in Guatemala's body
politic. Immediately after the media announcement of the TPS
extension, President Berger called Foreign Minister Briz, who
then called the Embassy 3 times (from Tokyo where it was
between 0230 and 0730). Vice President Stein called us only
once, but it was a lengthy call. Briz's calls carried a hint
of desperation ("...what can I do to fix this?") while
Stein's call hinted at anger ("...I'd better stay away from
the media today"). On February 27 Briz called the Ambassador
to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry to discuss TPS.


3. (C) On February 28, President Berger summoned the
Ambassador to a meeting with Vice President Stein and Foreign
Minister Briz to discuss TPS and the broader state of our
bilateral relationship. Berger handed the Ambassador a
letter for President Bush in which he expresses his dismay
and concern that, in spite of Hurricane Stan, Guatemalans
remain excluded from TPS. (Translated text in ref B;
original coming via pouch). The hour-long meeting was best
characterized by Berger's repeated statement that he was
upset about TPS and concerned about our broader relationship.
Our conversations with Berger, Stein, Briz and Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs Cabrera have taken the edge off the TPS
issue for now and the media attention to the TPS announcement
has been limited, although the GOG told us they will continue
to push for TPS or some other form of improving the lot of
its citizens in the U.S.


4. (C) It is clear from this flurry of telephone
conversations and face-to-face meetings that the GOG's sharp
reaction to the TPS announcement is symptomatic of a larger
problem: The perceived asymmetry in our bilateral
relationship. The Guatemalan perspective is that, in spite
of their support of U.S.-promoted policies and programs, the
USG has not reciprocated with significant support for the
Berger Administration on its most pressing issues: TPS,
CAFTA implementation, and military/security assistance.
Furthermore, Berger and company view our declining
development assistance and our inability to make Guatemala
eligible for a Millennium Challenge Compact as punishment for
the sins of their predecessors, the kleptocratic Portillo
government. The GOG also believes that their closest Central
American neighbors (El Salvador, in particular) receive
better treatment from the USG than does Guatemala. For them,
this adds up to evidence that the U.S. takes Guatemala for
granted, and generates a popular view that the Berger
administration is too weak to advance its interests with the
U.S.


5. (C) The perceived USG indifference to Guatemala is
troubling to the Berger administration and weakens their
ability to govern. As they see it, clear USG support would
help them confront the growing threat of organized crime,
better manage their fractious intra- and inter-party
politics, and build popular sentiment that there is a pay-off
for sticking with orthodox economic policies, fighting crime
and corruption, respecting international legal and human
rights norms, and continuing with the process of building
workable democratic institutions. Without USG support and
rewards for the pro-U.S. policies they are pursuing, Berger
and company fear that the 2007 elections will be fertile
ground for populist candidates with questionable personal and
financial ties who will exploit the current government's
weaknesses.


6. (C) Embassy appreciates that the Berger government's
perspective on the relationship with the U.S. is not balanced
and we have emphasized in private and in public the range and
depth of our cooperative efforts. We have also made the
point that the government (all three branches),the private
sector and civil society need to do a better job in assuming
responsibility and working to address the challenges that
beset Guatemala. We also recognize that the personalities
involved here (an insecure Foreign Minister, a left-of-center
Vice President in a right-of-center government, and a
President who quickly shifts his attention from one issue to
the next generate false emergencies). We also understand
that there are no easy overrides in Washington to accommodate
Guatemalan desiderata on issues such as migration, CAFTA
implementation and assistance. Nevertheless, fair or unfair,
the Berger government's perception is that they have not been
served well by their alignment with the U.S. Embassy has no
quick fix to propose, but does want to raise the alert that
this perception is a reality and may well have an unhelpful
influence on the 2007 presidential elections.
DERHAM