Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GUATEMALA379
2006-02-24 14:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Guatemala
Cable title:  

GUATEMALA: MILITARY RESERVISTS TO AID POLICE

Tags:  MOPS PHUM KCRM PGOV ASEC GT 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 000379 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
TAGS: MOPS PHUM KCRM PGOV ASEC GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MILITARY RESERVISTS TO AID POLICE


Classified By: Ambassador James Derham, Reason, 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 000379

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
TAGS: MOPS PHUM KCRM PGOV ASEC GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MILITARY RESERVISTS TO AID POLICE


Classified By: Ambassador James Derham, Reason, 1.4 (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: In response to steadily increasing
violent crime and personnel shortages in Guatemala's National
Civilian Police (PNC),the GOG announced a plan to deploy
3,000 military reservists and ex-soldiers as auxiliary police
agents until the end of 2006. After receiving a month of
training, these auxiliary agents will be deployed in regional
units under the leadership of detailed active duty Army
officers and contracted retired Army officers, and under the
command and control of the PNC. Human rights groups have
reacted negatively, charging that the proposal violates the
Peace Accords and represents a militarization of the police.
The GOG is under extreme pressure to address violent crime,
and turned to the military in an effort to quickly deploy
additional police personnel. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The proposal calls for the recruitment of 3,000
persons who must be between 18 and 30 years of age, have a
high school diploma, and have completed military service or
graduated from the military high schools located in various
regions of the country. These new agents will be divided
into six squadrons of 500 personnel and quartered at military
bases in the capital and in the departments of Peten,
Huehuetenango, Zacapa, Jutiapa, Mazatenango, and Escuintla.
The military will have administrative control of these
squadrons, i.e. be responsible for housing and feeding the
personnel, but the units will be under the operational
command and control of the PNC. Troops in these squadrons
will not have arrest authority. The military will separately
continue to provide personnel (approximately 1,500 soldiers)
for deployment in joint patrols with the PNC.


3. (SBU) The squadrons will be led by 72 active duty
officers detailed to this duty, as well as 70 retired
officers on contract. The unit members are scheduled to
receive 30 days of training before being deployed.
(President Berger has ordered that the personnel be equipped
and deployed by April 7, the Friday before Holy Week.) The
military will be in charge of this training but it is to

include participation of Police Academy trainers and possibly
others. The training will apparently focus on use of force
and other legal issues but will also include a human rights
component. Additional on-the-job training will be provided
after the squadrons are deployed.


4. (U) The initial costs for this proposal are to be split
between the Defense Ministry (50 million quetzales,
approximately $6.7 million at current exchange rate),and the
Ministry of Government (40 million quetzales or $5.3
million). The GOG has also said it will seek to identify
additional funding.


5. (C) The Army Finance Director and Army Operations Chief
separately told Embassy PolMilOff that the Ministry of
Government has not cooperated with Defense Ministry efforts
to devise plans to share expenses. The Finance Director said
that he had tried several times to schedule meetings with his
Government Ministry counterparts, without success. The
Operations Chief expressed doubts that Ministry of Government
would provide much, if any, funding for this effort and
reported that he and other senior officers had advised the
Defense Minister that the burden for this effort would likely
fall solely on the Defense Ministry. The Operations Chief
also reported that the additional 3,000 persons would be
counted as military personnel, thus increasing the size of
the military above its (authorized) strength of 15,500.


6. (SBU) Various human rights groups expressed opposition to
the plan, arguing that it represented a violation of the
Peace Accords as well as the PNC Organic Law. Activists
claimed that the plan contradicted Peace Accord commitments
to reduce the size of the military and ensure the civilian
character of the police. Critics have argued that such an
expenditure would be better invested in the PNC, and a few
also voiced concerns that the measure opened the way for a
return to human rights abuses committed by
military-controlled security forces during the internal
conflict. Retired General Julio Balconi, a member of the
official Security Advisory Council (CAS),opined that the
purpose of the plan was to send a message of security to the
population in dangerous areas, and that the people were not
concerned about the specific nature (police or military) of
the security personnel as longer as the personnel provided
some measure of safety. Some politicians have also
questioned the plan on budgetary grounds, noting that the
recently-approved GOG budget did not include any funding for
the proposal.


7. (C) Comment: With the widespread popular perception that
public security is continuing to decline under the Berger
Administration - a belief only strengthened by a murder rate
that climbs every year - the Berger Administration is under
great pressure to take visible measures to rein in violent
crime. The Defense Minister, despite some apparent
misgivings among his own officers, has responded with a novel
plan to put more cops on the street. The full details remain
to be worked out, and it also remains to be seen if military
worries about a lack of cooperation by the Government
Ministry will be borne out.


8. (SBU) Comment continued: Regarding compliance with the
Peace Accords, the agreements called for a 33 percent
reduction in the size of the military; actual reductions have
decreased the size of the military by 67 percent. An
increase of two or three thousand to the official force
strength of the military will still leave it greatly under
the Peace Accords limit. The addition of 3,000 military
reservists and ex-soldiers to back up a police force of some
18-20,000 personnel should not be characterized as a
"militarization" of the police, especially as these personnel
will be under the operational command and control of
(civilian) police officials and will not have arrest
authority.
DERHAM