South China's Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GUANGZHOU 031861 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INR NRC FOR COMMISSIONER JAZCKO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2021 TAGS: ENRG KNNP KSCA ECON CH SUBJECT: South China's Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station: Commissioner Jazcko Tours Ling Ao Facility CORRECTED COPY (U) Classified by Consul General Robert Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a September 26, 2006 tour of the Ling Ao units of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station near Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, Steven Lau, Senior Vice President of the Daya Bay Operations and Management Co., told NRC Commissioner Gregory Jazcko that Chinese plans for nuclear power development envisage a combination of indigenous and imported pressurized water reactors (PWRs). China will have to import the reactor vessels for the units under construction at Daya Bay, likely from Japan, but plans to roll and weld them locally. Lau also explained the need to hire new staff to handle an expanded nuclear power program. Security measures at Daya Bay's reactor sites include a mixed civilian and military guard force, fences, closed-circuit TV cameras, microwave and infrared sensors, and hydraulic bollards. Coordinated security drills are conducted regularly. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Lau told Commissioner Jazcko that Daya Bay has six pressurized water reactor (PWR) units - four units are currently in operation and two are under construction. The units are primarily constructed of components supplied by Framatome/Areva. FUEL -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Lau said that the fuel elements are fabricated in China from components imported from France. Although China has the ability to produce the full fuel elements domestically, the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Co. (GNPJVC) prefers to continue with the current system using proven materials. GNPJVC had only one slight leak problem two years ago and one potential leak that was never identified. GNPJVC keeps two quality control personnel at the fuel fabrication plant. Lau noted that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) costs are much greater than in the United States - about 0.5 cents per kWh to a contractor. SNF is stored in the Spent Fuel Pool for at least eight years. Daya Bay started moving SNF to a wet storage facility in Lanzhou two years ago. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) plans to build a reprocessing plant in Lanzhou but has not yet received funding. The NRC delegation visited the nearly empty Spent Fuel Pool at Ling Ao, which contains only 22 fuel elements. PLANNED LING DONG REACTORS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) GNPJVC is building two 1080 MW reactors at the Daya Bay Ling Dong site, which are updated versions of the systems at Ling Ao, to be completed in less than 60 months for approximately USD 3 billion. GNPJVC expects a minimum of 50% self reliance for unit 1 and 70% for unit 2. China will have to import the reactor vessels, probably from Japan, but plans to roll and weld them locally. China's nuclear power development plan envisions a combination of indigenous and imported PWRs. Lau noted that he did not know why China purchased the CANDU reactors at Qinshan Phase III, but he assumed it was a political decision. ¶5. (SBU) For the Generation III reactors currently in the bidding process, GNPJVC is asking for a 55 to 58 month building term. Lau stated that anything longer than 60 months is unacceptable. POWER GRID PROBLEMS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) GNPJVC's main electricity distribution problems come from upstream in the mainland network - every transmission irregularity in the grid effects Daya Bay, notably from Three Gorges, Guizhou, and Guangxi, which use DC lines. These irregularities sometimes cause reactor shutdowns ("SCRAMs"). GUANGZHOU 00031861 002 OF 003 BEST PRACTICES -------------- ¶7. (U) In the briefing, and while touring the facility, Lau emphasized GNPJVC's commitment to business acumen, safety management, safety culture, and human performance. As a result of following industry best practices, Daya Bay has a capacity factor close to 90%, and plans to decrease annual outage time from 31 days to 26 days within five years. ¶8. (U) The areas of the station seen were modern and well- maintained. The NRC delegation noted that the Chinese take a very conservative approach with respect to protection from contamination, which requires the removal of all except modesty garments before donning station-provided clothing. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) According to Lau, Daya Bay cannot be a member of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) because Taiwan's nuclear facilities are members. However, Daya Bay participates in the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) program. ¶10. (SBU) The off-site review board for Daya Bay is composed primarily of Americans, including two former NRC employees - Jack Martin, former Regional Administrator of Regions III and IV, and Clay Warren, a senior resident inspector at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant in Massachusetts and at the Arkansas nuclear power plant, who transitioned to senior management at several licensees. EXPERIENCE DILUTION -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Lau explained that one of the main challenges for GNPJVC, and China's nuclear power program as a whole, is experience dilution. China has a small group of reactor operators, technicians, and maintenance staff who have around 10 years of experience. As the program grows, many new personnel will be hired, effectively diluting the overall experience in the industry. GNPJVC has started a training program, recruiting engineering students from around China to receive nuclear specific training at the Daya Bay site (a new dorm is under construction at Daya Bay to house the students). Lau noted that most of the students come from outside Guangdong Province, as the engineering education in Guangdong is considered substandard. SITE SECURITY -------------- ¶12. (S) Lau said the security program at Daya Bay relies on a total guard force of about 300 people from three organizations - the local guard staff of about 100, 42 local police, and about 150 from the military who are stationed adjacent to the reactor site. The facility has two security fences, closed-circuit TV cameras, and microwave and infrared sensors inside the fences. Hydraulic bollards prevent unauthorized vehicle access to the reactor sites. In an emergency, about 600 People's Armed Police (PAP) can be called up almost immediately, and up to 1,000 PAP can be called up within an hour. The plant management cannot communicate directly with the military forces on site; the military uses a separate radio communication frequency. The local guard force and the military also have different shift schedules. However, all three security forces hold coordinated drills. Lau described an unplanned drill, where he and another staff member disguised themselves, purposely breached the outer fence and timed the response. During the unplanned drills, responders were instructed by Lau not to report in once they arrived at the scene, thereby triggering the next level of security. The local guard staff arrived within one minute, the police force within five minutes, and the GUANGZHOU 00031861 003 OF 003 military within eight minutes. WASTE STORAGE -------------- ¶13. (S) The delegation also visited Daya Bay's low-level waste storage site, which is directly adjacent to the Guangdong Province low-level storage site for medical and research waste. The Daya Bay site consists of two rows of open crates - an older Westinghouse design, according to Lau. Once a crate is full, it is covered with dirt. The waste is retrievable if a new site or disposal system is established. Lau stated that the provincial storage site was simply a low building, holding drums of waste. While the site is fairly remote and surrounded by hills, the only security at the site appeared to be a fence and a guard at the entrance building. GOLDBERG