Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN833
2006-08-21 18:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST,

Tags:  PGOV PINS KDEM GY 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGE #0833/01 2331808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211808Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3967
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0992
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0368
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0145
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2173
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0081
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000833 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/OAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY
SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST,
COALITIONS

REF: GEORGETOWN 743

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000833 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST, COALITIONS REF: GEORGETOWN 743 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: With elections just a week away, Guyana's 65-seat National Assembly is still up for grabs and the security situation remains on edge. While Bharrat Jagdeo looks all but certain to win another term as president with a plurality, his People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) may fall short of the absolute majority it needs to control the National Assembly. If the PPP/C gets less than fifty percent of the vote, it will usher in a new era of coalition politics in Guyana. Opinion is divided over whether Georgetown will descend into post-election violence again this time. END SUMMARY. -------------- Latest Polling Figures -------------- ¶2. (U) Despite the difficulty in conducting statistically valid polls in Guyana, the non-partisan North American Caribbean Teachers Association (NACTA) has a proven track record of political polling in Guyana. Support by party (percent): Aug. 21 Aug. 7 July -------------- -------------- -------------- PPP/C 47 45 42 PNC/R 27 28 29 AFC 16 15 13 JFA 4 5 5 ROAR-GAP 2 2 1 TUF 1 1 1 Undecided 3 4 9 -------------- AFC Plays Kingmaker for Either PPP/C or PNC/R -------------- ¶3. (C) The primary aim of the Alliance For Change (AFC) is to hold the PPP to less than fifty percent of Parliament. AFC Presidential candidate Trotman tells us the AFC will not enter a formal alliance with either the PPP/C or the the PNC/R, but rather prefers for the AFC to work as a constructive, responsible, and independent member of the Parliamentary opposition -- supporting the government when it deserves support and opposing measures that deserve opposition. ¶4. (SBU) However, if it AFC gains six to ten seats in Parliament, the AFC could find itself in position to negotiate with the PPP/C or People's National Congress/Reform-One Guyana (PNC/R) to control a majority in the National Assembly. There are two major obstacles to either coalition formin
g: 1) The AFC's presidential candidate Raphael Trotman and prime ministerial candidate Khemraj Ramjattan split acrimoniously with the PNC/R and PPP/C, respectively, in the past two years; 2) AFC supporters may feel disillusioned by a coalition, since its existence is predicated on rejecting Guyana's two dominant parties. On the other hand, by playing one off against the other the AFC could put itself in a strong position as kingmaker. ¶5. (C) If it linked up with the PPP/C, the AFC could be in a position to demand a few key Cabinet seats as the junior partner in government. Given the lack of a PPP/C track record in working constructively with another party and the AFC's vehement criticism of the PPP/C government, this scenario would surely cause friction. Furthermore, Trotman tell us that he is wary of linking with the PPP/C unless it cleans house. He is specifically worried that major PPP/C figures may be indicted in the U.S. for narco-trafficking and does not want to be associated with a PPP/C government if that happens. Post thinks a PPP/C-AFC alliance would either break down quickly or, in an optimistic scenario, provoke a salutary upheaval within the PPP/C as incompetent and/or corrupt party cronies get eased out. ¶6. (SBU) A PNC/R-AFC combination of the two largest opposition parties could provide them with enough seats to control the National Assembly. This would give the coalition a strong hand in developing legislation with the PPP executive and allow them to push their own initiatives. The AFC would be bolder in negotiating with the PNC/R -- a party in long-term decline that now appeals almost solely to Afro-Guyanese -- than with the PPP. -------------- PPP/C and PNC/R Gang Up to Keep AFC Out in Cold -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Another potential scenario -- widely rumored in Georgetown -- is that the PNC/R will join forces with the PPP/C. Although these two parties have been bitter rivals for over forty years, they could grudgingly enter a coalition in order to preserve the status quo and shut out the AFC. Both parties have enjoyed the benefits of an entrenched two-party system, so the threat of having to share power with the upstart AFC may drive them together. "Re-merging" with the PPP (the PNC originally splintered from the PPP in the 1950s) would effectively spell the PNC/R's end -- but its leadership is so desperate to get back into the corridors of power that it might not care. -------------- No Clarity on Post-Election Violence -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In the run-up to election day, Georgetown is crawling with "Guyana watchers" from far and wide (i.e., OAS, The Carter Center, CARICOM, UK, USG) who have followed the nation's electoral scene since Guyana's first free election in 1992 -- yet there is no consensus around the potential for post-election violence. There are too many new variables at play, including the potential impact of the AFC. During much of the past year it looked like the PNC/R was trying to derail the election process to provoke a constitutional crisis and/or an international response. The PNC/R is hotly contesting the election. But this does not necessarily indicate that PNC/R elements -- still convinced that the PNC/R will lose -- may not try to use violence as a tool to secure a role in government. Many Guyanese seem resigned to violence because it happens after every election, but no one has specific information about what could happen this time. ¶9. (SBU) The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) intends to announce final election results to the public by 20:00 Wednesday August 30. The intervening 48 hours is a critical period for those who would foment unrest. But if the announcement of results drags out longer or appears disorganized, it will give disgruntled factions an excuse to mobilize and protest. Much is riding on GECOM's performance to reduce the chance of violence. Unfortunately, GECOM is behind on key communictions and logistics issues despite the donor community's repeated urging over the past several months. GECOM is still sorting out the plan and funding for setting up a media center to announce the results. Also, they have not finalized its strategy for transmitting the results from the field to GECOM. Guyana has been in this position before -- hectic, last-minute election preparations. Odds are that something will go wrong. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) If the PPP/C pulls off an absolute majority, then the next five years will just be more of the same for Guyana. Forty years of single-party dominance of all branches of government have served Guyana poorly (first by the PNC, then the PPP/C since 1992). The legislature has serious work ahead of it in order to implement the reforms Guyana needs to secure stability and development. A scenario that includes a third party block in Parliament positioned to be the balance of power gives all major parties political a real stake and has the best chance of shaking up Guyanese politics. END COMMENT. Thomas

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