(U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121)

S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000815 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2031 TAGS: PINR PGOV SNAR GY SUBJECT: (U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121) REF: A. SECSTATE 130068 ¶B. GEORGETOWN 804 ¶C. GEORGETOWN 787 ¶D. GEORGETOWN 743 ¶E. GEORGETOWN 725 ¶F. GEORGETOWN 679 ¶G. GEORGETOWN 433 ¶H. GEORGETOWN 235 ¶I. GEORGETOWN 205 ¶J. 03 GEORGETOWN 1150 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Post presents response to ref A. ¶2. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE GUYANA ELECTIONS COMMISSION (GECOM)? HOW IS CHAIRMAN STEVE SURUJBALLY VIEWED WITHIN GECOM? (C) The much-maligned GECOM has withstood constant criticism and is on track to deliver free and fair elections August 28. One commissioner resigned in late July. Then an internal memorandum from the Deputy Chief Election Officer, in which he threatened to resign and cast doubt on the feasibility of an August 28 election, leaked to the press. But the inexorable momentum towards elections has now taken over and steamrolled these obstacles. This does not mean that Surujbally has suddenly become a unifying, admired figure -- deep fissures remain in GECOM. But the professionalism of the technical staff, who care deeply about their reputations, is now the driving force. And because preparations are in their final operational stage, the politicized commissioners have less opportunity to undermine the process. ¶3. (C) HOW UNIFIED IS THE PPP GOING INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS? (C) The PPP is trying very hard to present a very unified campaign face, but divisions lurk beneath the surface. Jagdeo and the party are not on the same page. The PPP was scrambling until just before Nomination Day to assemble its list of candidates. (S) Jagdeo told Ambassador Bullen July 11 that there will be "substantial" cabinet changes after the elections and he has already informed these ministers. One casualty may be Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon, who has held that position as Guyana's de facto number two since the PPP came to power in 1992. Luncheon has even criticized Jagdeo in recent meetings with Ambassador and DCM, and described conflicts between the PPP government (Jagdeo, essentially) and PPP party headquarters. Other observers have described the split between the idealistic Communist wing of the party (who, ironically, are fairly well-disposed to the U.S.) and the opportunists who entangled the party/government into dealing with narco-criminal Roger Khan. (C) Khemraj Ramjattan told PolOff in June that his contacts on the PPP's Executive Committee said there is a real split in the party leadership over Jagdeo. The old-timers fear that Jagdeo will force them out if he wins another term in office. ¶4. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT NAGAMOOTOO HAS GONE BACK TO THE PPP. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PPP, GOING INTO THE ELECTIONS? (C) The PPP hopes that charismatic party-veteran Nagamootoo will bring in another 3 to 4 percent of the popular vote. This is a coup for the PPP, letting him back into the party -- chastened but in a much weaker position. Nagamootoo's presence on the PPP candidate list allows it to court young voters (who might be drawn to the AFC) while still appealing to older, traditional PPP supporters. But relations between Jagdeo and Nagamootoo are reportedly poor. No doubt, announcing in 2003 that he would seek the 2006 PPP presidential nomination did not endear him to Jagdeo (ref J). Nagamootoo has been virtually non-existent at PPP campaign events, which focus on Jagdeo, PM Hinds and new faces on the PPP list. Rumor has it that Nagamootoo is out of the country for all of August. ¶5. (C) WHAT IS MOSES NAGAMOOTOO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE (AFC) PARTY AND ITS LEADER KHEMRAJ RAMJATTAN? (C) They are close personally and professionally, but Ramjattan must have been disappointed that his friend and colleague went back to the PPP. The younger but more successful attorney Ramjattan shepherded Nagamootoo's late entry into law practice. And Nagamootoo publicly stood by Ramjattan during his 2004 expulsion from the PPP. ¶6. (C) WILL NAGAMOOTOO TRY TO CHALLENGE JAGDEO WITHIN THE PPP? WHAT IS NAGAMOOTOO'S SUPPORT BASE WITHIN THE PPP? WHAT IS HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? (C) It is very unlikely that Nagamootoo has the support within the party hierarchy to mount a serious bid to challenge Jagdeo. His principled 2005 "disengagement" (or expulsion) from the PPP over the Gajraj affair surely alienated the inner circle. However, Nagamootoo is undoubtedly thinking of ways to use post-election negotiations over control of the National Assembly to gain a significant position. (C) Nagamootoo has broad appeal with the general public and those nostalgic for the PPP of the Cheddi Jagan era (see opinion poll results para 7). But as time passes, the PPP becomes more and more Jagdeo's party and less Jagan's. Nagamootoo is a genial, well-liked man. However, he has spent most of his adult life in the confines of the PPP structure and frankly does not have much chief executive style leadership experience. ¶7. (C) DOES JAGDEO HAVE THE MAJORITY OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE PPP AND ITS CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO REMAIN LEADER OF THE PARTY? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S POPULAR SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF THE PARTY? WHAT INFLUENCE DOES JANET JAGAN EXERT WITHIN THE PPP, ON JAGDEO, ON OTHER KEY POLITICAL ACTORS? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S LEADERSHIP STYLE WITHIN THE PARTY AND WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT? HAS IT CHANGED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, AND IF SO, HOW? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAGDEO OF KHAN'S IMPENDING TRIAL? (C) Jagdeo enjoys greater support outside the party than he does among the old guard of the PPP inner circle. That said, the PPP Executive Committee realizes that Jagdeo is the best shot they have at winning an outright majority. An October 2005 poll of politicians' popularity showed that 58 percent of respondents had a favorable view of Jagdeo, second only to TV muckraker and small party leader C N Sharma. 53 percent of respondents had a positive opinion of Nagamootoo; former President Janet Jagan scored 51 percent. (C) Jagdeo has tried to personalize his leadership as much as possible, with the help of his gaggle of "Presidential Advisors" whose allegiance is largely to Jagdeo rather than the party (e.g., Robert Persaud - media, Kellawan Lall - political, Manniram Prashad - investment, Odinga Lumumba - Community Development). For example, the state-run TV station (NCN) bombarded the airwaves this summer with spots declaring that the "personal intervention of His Excellency President Bharrat Jagdeo" made World Cup soccer coverage possible. (Note: Despite the overt suggestion that Jagdeo forked over cash himself, he actually just directed NCN to buy the broadcast rights at a loss due to scarcity of advertisers.) This episode may seem innocuous, but it underscores the extent to which Jagdeo and the state media try to portray him as benevolently overseeing his fiefdom. Not so long ago, Jagdeo was still considered by most political observers as a pawn of the party hierarchy. Now some PPP stalwarts must be fretting over the president they created. (C) There are no signs that Jagdeo's micro-managing leadership style has changed in the run-up to elections. In fact, the August 28 election date is largely a product of his determination to have elections before the September 2 extended constitutional deadline. (S) Even at 85 years old Janet Jagan remains the matriarch of the PPP, although her role will decline rapidly as her health continues to decline. She still appears in public at party events and writes a column in the PPP organ "Weekly Mirror". Tellingly, Jagdeo apologized to Ambassador Bullen July 11 for Jagan's vitriolic column that described the "stench of rendition" in relation to Khan's expulsion. Jagdeo took pains to make clear that Jagan does not speak on behalf of the GoG. (Note: This is the first Guyanese election in over fifty years that has not featured Janet Jagan as a prominent member of the PPP slate.) (S) The possibility that Khan reveals the PPP's dirty laundry is the big wild card. Post understands that Khan may have compromising information about Jagdeo. If Khan does reveal this information in a proffer, it would spell the end for Jagdeo. Nagamootoo could benefit in this scenario -- but it is a long shot. The conventional wisdom says that the highest levels of the GoG will go to great lengths to prevent Khan from spilling the beans. ¶8. (C) WHAT IS THE AFC'S SUPPORT BASE? (SBU) EmbOffs have observed very mixed crowds at AFC events -- cutting across ethnic, age, social and economic lines. The question is whether the AFC will retain this support into the polls. In past elections, similar levels of support for "up and coming" parties disappeared at the ballot box. Please see ref B for a more thorough status report on the AFC. ¶9. (C) WILL THE AFC SUPPORT THE PPP OR PNC/R IN THE ELECTIONS? (C) The AFC will support neither party in the elections. Depending on the results, the AFC will probably be open to joining a coalition after the elections to control the National Assembly. ¶10. (C) WHAT IS FORMER PNC/C MEMBER RAPHAEL TROTMAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH RAMJATTAN? (C) EmbOffs have met on numerous occasions with Trotman and Ramjattan, both together and individually, in recent months. There is no indication that their relationship is strained. They are united in a shared disgust for what the PNC and PPP have done for Guyana. Ramjattan appears comfortable with being the AFC's prime ministerial candidate behind Trotman's presidential bid. ¶11. (C) HOW UNITED IS THE OPPOSITION PNC/R AND WHAT ARE THE PARTY'S MOTIVES IN TRYING TO DELAY ELECTIONS? REF H INDICATES THE PARTY HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION APPROACHING THE ELECTIONS SINCE 2002, AFTER THE DEATH OF ITS FORMER PARTY LEADER DESMOND HOYTE. REF C INDICATES THE PNC/R IS DELIBERATELY DELAYING THE VOTE BECAUSE PARTY OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN WIN. (C) Please see ref D for more on the image problem facing the PNC (or the PNC/R-One Guyana platform, as it is now known). Despite continuing to complain about the voters list, the PNC leadership appears resigned to an August 28 election and probably realizes that pushing for further delay at this point would be self-defeating. However, we cannot discount the possibility that the recent surge in violence may be part of an effort by PNC extremists to force an election delay, causing a constitutional crisis that would require a politically negotiated solution. ¶12. (C) HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES THE CURRENT PNC/R LEADER ROBERT CORBIN HAVE WITHIN THE PARTY? ARE THERE ANY OTHER PARTY MEMBERS THAT COULD CHALLENGE CORBIN'S LEADERSHIP? WHO ARE CORBIN'S KEY ADVISERS? WHAT IS THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? DOES HE HAVE A SHADOW CABINET, AND IF SO, WHOM DOES IT CONSIST OF? (C) Corbin is on shaky ground within the party heading into elections, but that is nothing new. Rumors of his stepping down have circulated for years -- yet no one has staked a convincing claim to replace him. Trotman was an up-and-comer until he split with the party; Winston Murray is widely admired but not seen as Afro-Guyanese enough; Vincent Alexander is a steady and loyal deputy but lacks sufficient charisma; Stanley Ming is winding down his involvement in politics; and then there are a number of PNC firebrands who possess no more voter appeal than Corbin. So the party is stuck with a man whose well-known history as a rapist and an enforcer under Hoyte and Burnham prevent him for winning many votes outside of Afro-Guyanese. He does not have a formal shadow cabinet, although some PNC MPs focus on specific issues (e.g., Debbie Backer, Hamley Case, and Basil Williams - security; Winston Murray, Jerome Khan, and James McAllister - economic development). ¶13. (C) PAST REPORTING INDICATES THE PNC/R IS STALLING ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS DEMAND OF VERIFICATION OF THE VOTER LIST. HAS THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED ANY IMPENDING DECISION ON THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS? HOW DOES THE PNC/R SEE THE SITUATION PLAYING OUT IF ELECTIONS CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED BACK? (C) A lawsuit dealing with the residency requirement issue is now before the court. But given how slowly cases crawl through Guyana's court system, no one expects a quick and final decision on the matter. So the lawsuits are unlikely to affect the August 28 date. However, a decision in the future in favor of a residency requirement could give PNC supporters reason to discredit the 2006 election results. There is precedent in Guyana -- Justice Claudette Singh ruled on a case that vitiated the 1997 election results just weeks before the 2001 election. ¶14. (C) THE PNC/R CALLED FOR A RALLY IN OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MAY. HAVE ANY OF THE OPPOSITION'S RALLIES OR PROTESTS MATERIALIZED? (SBU) The PNC has held campaign rallies with moderate success. But the protests they tried to mobilize against GECOM failed to catch on. ¶15. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN GUYANA? HOW WELL EQUIPPED ARE GUYANA' S SECURITY FORCES TO HANDLE ANY POSSIBLE ELECTION VIOLENCE? HOW SOLID IS INTERIM COMMISSAR HENRY GREENE'S AUTHORITY OVER THE POLICE? WHAT IS HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? (C) The security situation had improved after the Guyana Police Force (GPF) and Guyana Defence Force (GDF) began joint raids on suspected drug traffickers' properties in March 2006 and after U.S. law enforcement took leading narco-criminal Shaheed "Roger" Khan into custody in June 2006. However, the calm was shattered August 8 when gunmen attacked the Eccles/Bagotstown area just south of Georgetown. This rampage culminated in the execution-style killing of five staff at the printery of the independent Kaieteur News (ref C). This operation bore similarities to the February 2006 Agricola/Eccles massacre (ref I). The capital is now very much on edge as people try to decipher what this means. A series of bank robberies August 11 and rumors of a planned break-out at the main prison are also contributing to the fearful atmosphere. (C) Guyana's security forces have received riot control training from the UK and may be capable of handling a level of violence associated with previous elections -- mob activity in central Georgetown. However, the more powerful weapons and sophisticated tactics used by criminals in Guyana since 2001 pose a greater threat. The GPF is incapable of preventing or responding to this type of threat; the GDF would need to get involved. (S) Doubts remain as to how vigorously the predominantly Afro-Guyanese GPF and GDF ranks would quell aggressive protests by Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters. The PPP leadership is paranoid that the security forces are not loyal to the government. However, they do see Acting Police Commissioner Henry Greene as their man, which may have played into Jagdeo's thinking in elevating him. Greene wants to satisfy his political patrons and cement his position as permanent commissioner -- so is likely to cooperate with the PPP's wishes when it comes to handling election violence. However, Greene is also known to be on the payroll of narco-traffickers who have connections to some in the "Buxton resistance" -- whose members are responsible for recent horrific crimes, none of which Green solved in his former role as Crime Chief. Note that the PPP does not mind some pre-election violence, as that props up their cynical pitch to Indo-Guyanese that they must vote PPP or else suffer at the hands of Afro-Guyanese criminals (ref H). (C) Greene's authority over the police appears to be holding. Although some senior GPF members detest Greene, there have been no mass resignations yet as some had predicted. (Note: These may still happen if Greene is made permanent commissioner.) Greene's leadership style (if it can be called that) is to compensate for his professional incompetence and serial sexual assault of female subordinates through sycophancy, intimidation, bureaucratic manipulation, and cultivating relationships with well-connected criminals (ref E). ¶16. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ARE CONNECTED TO THE PNC/R AND ARE NOT LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT? (S) There is no concrete information to substantiate rumors that GDF Chief of Staff Brigadier General Collins is connected to the PNC. Greene has divided loyalties -- to the government on the one hand (see para 15),but also to the various narco-traffickers, alien smugglers and other criminal elements he consorts with. Ninety percent or more of GDF and GPF personnel are Afro-Guyanese and the conventional wisdom is that they must then be connected to the PNC -- but this is an over-generalization. Many GPF officers take their jobs seriously but lack the resources to take on better equipped and organized criminals, just as many GDF officers take pride in their professional duty to defend the state. What is clear, though, is that certain ex-GDF officers (both in Guyana and overseas) are aligned with the PNC. For example, ex-GDF Oliver Hinckson -- who is believed to have links with the "Buxton resistance" criminals -- openly associates with the PNC and may act in some security advisor capacity within the party. ¶17. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCES ARE STAGING A COUP D' ETAT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT? (C) No. Collins told his peers at the May 2005 Caribbean Heads of Defense conference that there has never been a coup in Guyana and there never will be. He and all of his senior staff had expected to visit Washington for a high-level visit in late July, until Jagdeo quashed all travel by security forces until after elections. Such a trip would seem unusual for a cabal of coup-plotting officers just prior to elections. ¶18. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT WEAPONS WERE STOLEN FROM A GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCE DEPOT. IS THERE ANY FURTHER INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE STOLEN WEAPONS OR THEIR INTENDED USE? (C) One of the AK-47s, still in its packaging, was found by a joint services operation June 3 in Enterprise, near Buxton. It is widely believed that the weapon was planted there. The joint services have reportedly recovered three more of the missing AK-47s as part of its ongoing operation to take down the August 11 bank robbers. The search to locate the missing weapons has lost some steam over the past two months, despite USG assistance in administering polygraph exams to GDF personnel. ¶19. (C) THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMMISSION CLAIMS THE TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE HEAVILY ARMED GROUPS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. WHO, IF ANY, ARE THE ARMED GROUPS AT EACH PARTY'S DISPOSAL? WHAT WEAPONS AND OTHER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO EACH PARTY AND/OR ARMED GROUP? HOW HAS ROGER KHAN'S EXPULSION TO THE US AFFECTED THE SECURITY BALANCE ON THE GROUND? TO WHAT EXTENT DO ANY OF KHAN'S LIKELY SUCCESSORS AS HEAD OF GUYANA'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD MAINTAIN TIES TO EITHER POLITICAL PARTY? (C) Both parties appear to have access to weapons and armed groups. Khan's armed group was believed to be at the PPP's disposal -- although it might be more accurate to say that the PPP was at Khan's disposal. Another armed group -- the so-called "Buxton resistance" -- includes notorious local criminals such as Rondell "Fine Man" Rawlins. It is definitely anti-PPP but is not necessarily at the PNC's disposal, and it also has links to Khan. Some interlocutors refer to three or more armed groups. Regardless of the number, these groups are driven primarily by criminal agendas, but are susceptible to political manipulation. (Note: Speculation about possible PNC involvement in recent criminal activities to be reported septel.) All groups have access to AK-47s and handguns, but have the resources to acquire other weapons through drug trafficking, money laundering, or other criminal proceeds (ref G). For instance, during a July 30 skirmish between the joint services and criminals camped out in the "backlands" behind villages along East Coast Demerara, one criminal threw a grenade at the security forces (inexpertly, as he blew his arm off in the process). Some observers speculate this might be related to the grenades stolen recently from a Surinamese army depot. (C) It is not yet clear how Khan's departure from the scene has affected the security balance. Khan's potential successors -- such as Clayton Hutson, Omprakash "Buddy" Shivraj, Bramhanand Nandalall -- are all believed to have some ties with the PPP government that has been in power for fourteen years. They have all built criminal enterprises and substantial wealth under the PPP's nose, which they could not have done without the government's acquiescence. Thomas