(C/NF) GUYANA RESPONSE: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED

S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000640

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INR
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR
PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2031
TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PREL PGOV GY NS
SUBJECT: (C/NF) GUYANA RESPONSE: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED
ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES (C-AL6-00586)

REF: A. SECSTATE 92995

B. PARAMARIBO 399

C. GEORGETOWN 433

D. 02 GEORGETOWN 1425

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Post presents response to ref A. Noting that Shaheed
"Roger" Khan is now in custody, Post takes this opportunity
to mention other narco-criminals in Guyana eager to take over
Khan's turf (see paras 14-17). As Minister of Home Affairs
told Ambassador at their June 23 meeting: "When one star goes
down, another one goes up."


2. (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED
"ROGER" KHAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP?

See previous SIMO reporting from Georgetown.


3. (S/NF) HOW AND THROUGH WHAT MEANS DOES KHAN SUPPORT
BOUTERSE? WHAT CAN OR DOES BOUTERSE OFFER IN RETURN?

No longer applicable.


4. (S/NF) IS KHAN ACTIVE IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE, AND IF SO,
WHICH DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS DOES HE DEAL WITH? DOES HE
MAINTAIN TIES TO ANY OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS, SUCH AS TERRORIST
OR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS? WHAT FINANCES AND TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY DOES HE HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL?

Khan is a known drug trafficker who is believed to have ties
with Colombian, Brazilian, and Venezuelan drug trafficking
groups. Post does not know that Khan has ties to terrorist
groups. Post does believe that Khan has ties to organized
crime groups. Khan had access to large sums of money and
could purchase whatever technical resources he needed. In
2002, for example, the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) detained
Khan and two others (including a Guyana Police Force (GPF)
officer) after finding them in possession of an armored
vehicle, military arms and cell-phone surveillance equipment
(ref D). The latter was a Cellular Protocol Analyzer model
CSM 7806 manufactured by Smith-Meyers. Khan and the others
were hastily released, the charges dropped, and the equipment
returned.


5. (S/NF) HOW OFTEN, AND WHERE, DOES BOUTERSE TRAVEL TO
GUYANA? REF C INDICATES KHAN WAS LAST IN SURINAME IN JANUARY
2006, BUT ANALYSTS WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON HOW OFTEN HE
TRAVELS TO SURINAME.

Post is unaware of any specific travel by Bouterse to Guyana.
However, he has stated publicly that he travels to Guyana
and Brazil despite the Interpol Red Notice against him.


6. (S) OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE, DO BOUTERSE OR KHAN HAVE
ANY PLANS TO CREATE CIVIL UNREST THROUGH PROPAGANDA, RUMOR
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL LEADERS,
OR STIRRING RACIAL OR SOCIOECONOMIC TENSIONS?

Yes. Khan has pursued a very active "public relations"
campaign to paint himself as a Robin Hood figure, polarizing
Guyanese opinion in the process (ref C). Through his
intermediaries, this campaign continues even after his
arrest:

-- Khan claims that he fled to Suriname because Guyanese
security forces were on a hunt to murder him.
-- He accuses the USG, the GDF, GPF, and the PNC/R (Guyana's
main opposition party) of colluding to remove the PPP
government.
-- He disseminated two secret recordings (there may be
others) of Police Commissioner Winston Felix's conversations
in a bid to force him out.
-- He claims credit for bringing the 2002-03 crime wave in
Guyana under control, meting out vigilante justice on behalf
of the government.

Background: The ruling PPP (supported by Indo-Guyanese)
distrusts the GPF and GDF because they are staffed and led
mostly by Afro-Guyanese. In private conversations, PPP
insiders reveal their paranoia about the security forces'
connections to the political opposition and possible
coup-plotting. In this environment, Khan finds an
Indo-Guyanese audience willing to believe that he is their


protector against Afro-Guyanese criminals. Khan exploits
this to stir racial tensions and discredit his enemies. But
this influence has its limits. Recent demonstrations --
organized and bankrolled by Khan and his associates --
protesting the conduct of joint services raids on the
properties of suspected criminals fizzled out quickly.


7. (C) HOW CAPABLE ARE THE SURINAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE TO
QUARANTINE ANY DISTURBANCES? HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES
BOUTERSE HAVE ON SURINAME'S MILITARY AND POLICE?

Post defers to Embassy Paramaribo's response.


8. (S) WHAT IS BOUTERSE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RULING
PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY (PPP) IN GUYANA? IS THE PPP
SUPPORTING BOUTERSE'S EFFORTS?

Post is unaware of any relationship between Bouterse and the
PPP. However, Bouterse has links with the PNC/R (ref B). As
Home Affairs Minister Gail Teixeira recently told Ambassador:
Bouterse's link with Buxton is a "key factor" for Guyana and
Suriname because so much "revolves around him". (Note:
Buxton, an Afro-Guyanese community about 10 miles east of
Georgetown, is a hot-bed of criminal/militant activity. Desi
Bouterse's son Dino organized a Surinamese soccer team's trip
to Buxton a few years ago. It is believed that the team bus
carried weapons to Buxton.)


9. (S) WILL EITHER GUYANA OR VENEZUELA GRANT BOUTERSE ASYLUM
OR PROVIDE HIM WITH OTHER SUPPORT? IF SO, WHY WOULD THEY DO
SO?

Post does not believe that Guyana would grant Bouterse asylum
or provide him with other support.


10. (S) DOES BOUTERSE HAVE TIES TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS
THAT MAY CONSIDER OFFERING HIM ASYLUM OR OTHER SUPPORT?

Post defers to Embassy Paramaribo's response.


11. (C) WHAT IS KHAN'S ABILITY TO HELP DESTABILIZE THE
GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE ELECTIONS?

While active in Guyana, destabilizing elections did not seem
to be a priority for Khan. Keeping a pliable PPP in power
through a successful re-election suited his interests.
However, even in custody Khan could potentially cause great
embarrassment to -- or even bring down -- Guyana's government
by revealing his links with the PPP and the skeletons in its
closet.


12. (S/NF) IS THERE EVIDENCE, BEYOND POSSIBLE CONJECTURE,
THAT KHAN ENJOYS SOME LEVEL OF POLITICAL PROTECTION FROM
SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND, IF SO, FROM
WHOM?

Khan did enjoy political protection from GoG officials at the
highest levels. At a minimum, former Home Affairs Minister
Ronald Gajraj and long-time Head of the Presidential
Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon collaborated with Khan.

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Gajraj (now Guyana's High Commissioner to India) orchestrated
Guyana's "death squads" in 2002-03 -- certainly in close
collaboration with Khan. Luncheon (President Jagdeo's
deputy) is known to have intervened and ordered the
authorities to release Khan and return his equipment as
described in para 4. Also, eyewitnesses say they have seen
Khan leaving the President's office.

Ever since Khan's May 2006 indictment in the U.S. on drug
charges, the GoG has tried assiduously to distance itself
from him.


13. (S/NF) WHAT ARE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT'S OPTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES, ASSUMING THERE IS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO,
FOR, AT A MINIMUM, CONTAINING KHAN AND HIS ACTIVITIES OR, AT
BEST, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING HIM?

Even in the unlikely event that the GoG and the security
forces were on the same page and determined to go after
narco-criminals, their ability to do so is extremely limited.
The narco-criminals have entourages of highly-trained,
well-armed ex-tactical squad members at their disposal. The
GPF cannot compete with them. In addition, corruption and
tip-offs are so rampant that the GPF and GDF rarely enjoy the
element of surprise.


Even if these challenges were overcome, a successful arrest
would stand little chance of progressing through the judicial
system. Guyana has not convicted a single drug trafficker of
note.

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WAITING IN THE WINGS
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14. (C) Khan was the brashiest of Guyana's narco-criminals,
but he was by no means the only one. Others will certainly
try to fill the void left by Khan's departure from the local
scene. Two leading candidates are Bramhanand (Alt: Bramhand,
Brammanand) Nandalall and Clayton Hutson (DOB:31-Dec-64).
Older than the upstart Khan, they have been active in drug
trafficking for many years. Nandalall is the "godfather" of
organized crime in Guyana. Khan and Hutson both worked for
him before setting them up their own criminal organizations.


15. (C) Ambassador met with Home Affairs Teixeira June 23 to
discuss Khan and other matters. Teixeira was eager to share
her views on the risk and instability that Khan's capture
causes in Guyana. She guesses Hutson might become the next
kingpin. She said that Nandalall is keeping very quiet and
is rumored to be cooperating with the U.S.


16. (C) Teixeira warned that Khan's departure from the scene
opens the door for the criminal situation to become more
political -- she said it will no longer be about "just
narcotics, but about ethnicity" as well. She fears that if
Hutson uses this opportunity to assume a larger role, then he
and his accomplices will pose a serious political threat with
the help of drug and gun trafficking.


17. (C) COMMENT. GoG leaders were comfortable with Khan
because they thought he was on their side; the possibility of
a new kingpin allied with the political opposition makes them
very nervous indeed. Other sources indicate that Nandalall
is more likely than Hutson to take over as Guyana's number
one narco-criminal. Judging from Teixeira's tone, Hutson
leans politically towards the PNC/R. Nandalall's political
stance is uncertain, but it is telling that the PPP
government has never gone after him during his many years of
criminal activity. END COMMENT.
BULLEN