INTERAGENCY EFFORT TO APPREHEND GUYANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000424 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - PPETTY CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: SNAR PREL PINS KCRM GY NS SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY EFFORT TO APPREHEND GUYANESE NARCO-CRIMINALS REF: A. PARAMARIBO 259 ¶B. PARAMARIBO 39 ¶C. GEORGETOWN 112 ¶D. GEORGETOWN 278 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador met April 20 in Port of Spain with Ambassador to Suriname Marsha E. Barnes and officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),Department of Homeland Security (DHS),Department of Justice (DOJ),and Embassies Georgetown and Paramaribo. The meeting accomplished two goals: a) DHS and DOJ briefed Ambassadors on the status of criminal cases against Guyana's most wanted narco-traffickers; and b) Ambassadors charted a course of action aimed at getting these narco-criminals into U.S. custody as expeditiously as possible. END SUMMARY -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (C) Shaheed "Roger" Khan is Guyana's number one narco-trafficker, but the threat he poses to U.S. national interests extends much further than just drug smuggling (ref C). He has brokered drugs-for-guns deals, sending weapons to the FARC for cocaine. He is reported to have social and operational links to Desi Bouterse, former Surinamese strong-man, convicted narcotics trafficker, and possible coup-plotter (ref B). Khan was a driving force behind the "Phantom Squad" that carried out extra-judicial killings with impunity in Guyana in 2002-03. Currently, he is trying to use secretly taped conversations of Guyana's police chief to engineer a shake-up in the police leadership (ref D). In short, Khan is no longer just a prominent cocaine smuggler - he threatens the internal security of Guyana and others in the region. -------------- -------------- Strong Case against Khan and other Guyanese Narco-Criminals -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The DHS officials outlined their long investigations of Guyana-New York cocaine smuggling rings, confirming that thousands of kilograms of cocaine from Guyana (originating from Colombia and Venezuela) have been imported into the U.S. in recent years. A common thread running through these investigations is that Khan, along with his accomplice Clay Hutson, are the primary sources of cocaine from Guyana. The Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) handling these cases believes that the evidence against Khan and Hutson is now strong enough to move forward with charges against them for conspiring to import cocaine into the U.S., adding "if we get them, we will convict them". ¶4. (C) Once indicted, DOJ intends to seek the extradition of Khan and the others. The GOG has no track record to speak of in fulfilling extradition requests. In fact, the GOG effectively rebuffed a 2003 extradition request for many of these same individuals because the Attorney General insisted that the relevant witnesses come to Guyana in order to proceed. This was a preposterous condition given the justified fear these witnesses felt about returning to Guyana. Ideally, the GOG will be more cooperative this time around and realize that harboring these narco-criminals is self-destructive. DOJ will seek to submit confidential affidavits in support of the extradition requests rather than bring witnesses to Guyana. Unfortunately, extradition remains an untested route, so the Ambassadors have explored alternative methods for getting the prospective indictees into custody. -------------- Suriname Alternative -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassadors also met privately with their RSOs, DEA, and the AUSA to determine how best to get Khan and the other prospective indictees into U.S. custody. The top priority is to locate Khan, who has gone to ground since March 2006 army/police raids on his properties in Guyana (ref D). (Note: One of the prospective indictees was arrested in connection with these raids.) Khan is believed to travel to Suriname regularly - entering illegally - where, surrounded by his henchmen, he feels relatively at ease and consorts with Bouterse. Embassy Paramaribo has learned from police intelligence that Khan has crossed into Suriname twice in the past month by helicopter for meetings along the Corintijn River, returning the same day. ¶6. (C) Ambassadors agreed that the GOS might have greater interest in resolving the Khan problem and expelling him rather than allow him to remain in Suriname as an outlaw and potentially destabilizing force. Because of this, Ambassador Barnes agreed, once advised that individuals have been indicted, to first approach the GOS at the highest levels before Ambassador Bullen approaches the GOG - which she has since done (ref A). -------------- Plan for Guyana -------------- ¶7. (C) Once the extradition paperwork has been prepared, and after Ambassador Barnes has gauged GOS support on this issue, Ambassador Bullen will approach President Jagdeo to give him advanced warning of the imminent requests. Post believes the next two months provide auspicious timing to convince Jagdeo to assist in locating and handing over these narco-criminals. National elections are anticipated in September. Guyana's deteriorating security situation means that Jagdeo's PPP party is extremely vulnerable to this issue on the campaign trail. These extradition requests will offer a tailor-made chance for Jagdeo to back up his anti-drug trafficking rhetoric with deeds. If he does not cooperate, then word of the requests is likely leak out, causing him and his party great embarrassment in Guyana. ¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Paramaribo. Bullen