GUYANA POLL DATE UNDER THREAT: ELECTION PREVIEW #6

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000308 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM OAS GY SUBJECT: GUYANA POLL DATE UNDER THREAT: ELECTION PREVIEW #6 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 248 ¶B. GEORGETOWN 181 ¶C. GEORGETOWN 167 ¶D. GEORGETOWN 71 ¶E. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The likelihood of Guyana holding elections by the August 4 constitutional due date has plummeted over the past ten days. The Guyana Elections Commissioner (GECOM) Secretariat - the technical staff - took the country by SIPDIS surprise March 24 when they circulated a draft revised plan showing an election date (E-day) pushed back from July 18 to September 25. Because of the resulting uproar, GECOM has continued to tweak the revised plan and, as of a March 31 draft, E-day is slated for August 24. Any delay beyond August 4 is cause for serious concern, as it would usher in an unpredictable and volatile political situation. All stakeholders must take decisive action within the next two weeks - otherwise an election delay is inevitable. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Key Guyana elections developments in the past two weeks: - March 21: Charge meets with PNC/R leaders, who reiterate their stance that publishing a preliminary voters list (PVL) - to be used in the "claims and objections" (C&O) period - based on the 2001 voters list without prior house-to-house verification of every name on the list is "unacceptable" and wil not be allowed to happen. The proposed house-tohouse verification would cost US$2 million and tae at least six months (ref B). - March 24: Doors meet with GECOM just as the revised plan wit the September 25 E-day is circulated. GECOM Chaiman Dr. Steve Surujbally calls the revised plan "first step towards the bloodbath." - March 2: President Jagdeo calls impromptu meeting with mbassador and UK, Canada, and EU chiefs of missionto express his displeasure with the revised plan saying he "can't contemplate an extension" beyod August 4. - March 27: Jagdeo calls all-hands meting - with donors, GECOM (including Surujballyand the other six commissioners), and both JointInternational Technical Assessors (JITAs) - to ubraid GECOM for not fulfilling its mandate to delier elections within the constitutional timeframe. - March 28: GECOM commissioners hold their stattory weekly meeting, fail to make any of the decisions needed to break the political impasse over election preparations. - March 29: Donors issue joint statement that they "are satisfied that the GECOM Secretariat has the technical capability and capacity . . . to deliver free and fair elections within the constitutional timeframe". - March 29-31: GECOM staff, JITAs, and some commissioners hold working sessions on the revised plan, move the proposed E-day to August 24, but no formal decision is taken. ¶3. (U) There are four protagonists in this unfolding drama: GECOM; Jagdeo and the ruling PPP/C party; the parliamentary opposition parties (led by the PNC/R); and the international donors. However, the Guyanese electorate - who should be the fifth protagonist - is virtually precluded from participating due to political manipulation. -------------- GECOM -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The GECOM commissioners remain deadlocked 3-vs-3 along political lines. Chairman Surujbally can break the deadlock by casting a deciding vote, but he is extremely reluctant to do this, out of both a desire for consensus decision-making and a not unreasonable fear for his personal safety. ¶5. (C) The GECOM Secretariat, led by Chief Elections Officer Gocool Boodhoo, is extremely frustrated by the commissioners' inability to agree on key issues, thus preventing the Secretariat from completing its election preparations. At SIPDIS Jagdeo's March 27 meeting, an exasperated Boodhoo spelled out clearly the four critical decisions that the commissioners must make quickly to get preparations back on track: a) how to handle verification of the voters list; b) how to compose the PVL; c) how to incorporate results from the Electoral Office of Jamaica fingerprint analysis project (ref E); and d) when to set the eligibility cut-off date for 18 year olds to vote. Even with these timely decisions Boodhoo believes holding elections by August 4 would be "difficult". ¶6. (U) Moving ahead with printing the PVL is of utmost importance because that will serve as the basis for the C&O process when political parties and the public can come forward with information to further refine the voters list. C&O was scheduled to commence April 4. The draft plan has C&O delayed until May 2 - a major disruption to the election timeline. ¶7. (U) The atmosphere at GECOM is tense. Inside, the Secretariat is working under pressure to craft a realistic SIPDIS election plan, while their political masters bicker rather than give urgently needed policy guidance. Outside, opposition protesters continue to picket demanding full house-to-house verification; GECOM even received a bomb threat March 29. -------------- Jagdeo & PPP/C -------------- ¶8. (C) Jagdeo is very concerned that an election delay will tarnish his reputation on the international stage - he seems desperate not to be seen as a head of state who cannot hold elections on time. In meetings with donors and GECOM, Jagdeo expressed his utter disbelief that E-day could slip from July 18 in the original plan to September 25. He repeatedly asked - and did not receive a satisfactory answer - what had changed to throw off the election schedule. He is "totally against" a postponement of elections past the August 4 constitutional due date and challenged GECOM to fulfill its mandate to conduct elections by then. Specifically, he told GECOM Chairman Surujbally that he should cast a deciding vote if necessary. ¶9. (SBU) Jagdeo misstepped tactically in calling the March 27 meeting with GECOM and donors before the commissioners had the opportunity to discuss the revised plan. This has led to strong criticism from the opposition that he is meddling in GECOM's work. -------------- PNC/R - Opposition -------------- ¶10. (U) The revised plan plays directly into the opposition's hands. Almost every relevant opposition party (with the exception of the upstart Alliance For Change) endorses an election postponement, as that is the easiest way for them to gain leverage in negotiating with the GoG. The national assembly must dissolve no later than May 4. The national assembly's life can be extended with a constitutional amendment supported by a two-thirds majority, which would require the PNC/R's support. ¶11. (C) The opposition will use any election delay as a pretext to press even harder for full house-to-house verification of the 2001 voter's list that will be the basis for the 2006 PVL. The PNC/R leadership revealed the true motive behind their insistence at March 21 meeting with Charge. They want to remove emigrants from the voters list on the flimsy assumption that emigrants are predominantly Indo-Guyanese and therefore more likely to be PPP supporters. (Note: At least 100,000 Guyanese have emigrated since 2001. There is no overseas voting, but Guyanese emigrants maintain the constitutional right to vote and may return to Guyana to do so. The voter's list was accepted by party leaders before the 2001 election and verified by Guyanese and international scrutineers both before and after the 2001 election. Even with an otherwise unnecessary "verification" exercise, no legal means currently exist to disenfranchise emigrants.) ¶12. (C) At the same meeting, the PNC/R leaders said that young Afro-Guyanese are drawn to more extreme factions advocating an election boycott. They explained that a delay would "minimize that element's basis for anger", a not so subtle allusion to the very real threat of political violence if the PNC/R's demands go unmet. -------------- Donors -------------- ¶13. (U) Donors remain determined not to get embroiled in the internal political dispute over election preparations. They are wary of getting dragged into the blame game over elections that has already begun. ¶14. (U) The donor signatories (U.S., UK, Canada, EC) to the elections memorandum of understanding with GECOM and the GoG issued a joint statement March 29. In it, the signatories stated they "are satisfied that the GECOM Secretariat has the technical capability and capacity . . . to deliver free and fair elections within the constitutional timeframe", and they "urge all political parties . . . to work with GECOM to find timely responses to the political challenges" to elections. ¶15. (SBU) Donors agree that the most promising way to get election preparations back on track and to minimize political violence is through a strong high-level international political presence on the ground. This was a key element of the OAS proposal for a Guyana Electoral Observation Mission circulated to donors several weeks ago. However, OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin has stopped seeking someone to fill that role because of inadequate donor response to OAS' funding request for this mission. (Note. USG has committed US$50,000; Canada CDN$75,000; and Brazil US$5,000.) The funding gap is over US$400,000. ¶16. (SBU) The PNC/R must be offered some inducement to convince it to cooperate with elections. During Ramdin's February 12-15 visit to Guyana he mooted the concept of a pre-electoral pact "guaranteed by the international community", committing the political parties to implement reforms to Guyana's governance system immediately after elections (ref C). The international community has very little leverage to force the PNC/R to cease obstructing the election process. Ramdin's proposed political pact is the best bargaining chip available, but will require a high-level, multilateral initiative to broker a deal. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The window of opportunity to get Guyana's election process back on track is closing fast - so fast that unless GECOM and other stakeholders (including the USG and other donors) take decisive action within the next two weeks, Guyana has no chance of sticking to its constitutional timeframe. As of now, the JITAs believe that GECOM "could still pull off the elections if it had the will" to do so. ¶18. (SBU) Comment continued. Despite the ongoing debate over when E-day should be, the fundamental impasse remains the opposition's reluctance to go ahead with elections they are convinced they will lose. The opposition will not commit to the electoral process until it gets a good enough political deal to compensate. Post firmly believes that Ramdin's proposed OAS Electoral Observation Mission offers the best chance to clinch such a deal. The likely alternative is sobering - the opposition will stonewall on elections while its militant factions use verification as an excuse to commit political violence. End comment. BULLEN