EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000248 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY SUBJECT: EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 224 ¶B. GEORGETOWN 205 ¶C. GEORGETOWN 181 ¶D. GEORGETOWN 167 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Members of the Private Sector Commission (PSC) met with donors March 8 and 10 to discuss their deep concerns about preparations for Guyana's upcoming elections, the deteriorating security situation, and the disturbing nexus between the two. These Guyanese civil society figures are certain that the two major political parties (the ruling PPP/C and opposition PNC/R) have heavily armed groups at their disposal. The PSC implored the donors to intervene somehow to defuse the situation. The donors demurred, reminding the PSC that it is primarily the Guyanese people's responsibility to resolve the country's political impasse. Separately, Ambassador met March 10 with Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Chief of Staff Edward Collins, who tried to dispel rumors of a coup plan by expressing his commitment to defending the state. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Private Sector Group Predicts Escalating Political Violence -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The PSC is an advocacy group of prominent business leaders (Guyana's wealthy and wise) that takes public stances on various issues - including governance and security matters. It is as active a civil society organization as exists in Guyana, a fact that often puts it in the GoG's doghouse, given the GoG's instinctive aversion to unsolicited advice from outside the cabinet. In addition to Ambassador, U.K., Canada, Brazil, EU, UNDP, IMF, and IDB Chiefs of Mission attended. ¶3. (C) Norman McLean - Chairman of the PSC Subcommittee on Governance and Security, former Commissioner of Police, and former head of the GDF - told donors he believes that the recent paramilitary-style assault in Agricola and Eccles and the theft of thirty-three AK-47s and five Baretta pistols from a storehouse at GDF's headquarters (ref B) was an act of political violence. McLean warned that the stolen weapons are intended for sinister purposes with national security repercussions, rather than "to help criminals rob people". PSC member Kit Nascimento sounded an even more ominous note, saying the assault bore the hallmarks of an insurrection and that the GoG is "on the verge of losing control" as criminal elements can take over the country "whenever they wish". He argued that these criminal elements have now proven their ability to isolate Georgetown by blocking the city's southern approach (the East Bank Highway) at Agricola and its eastern approach (the East Coast Highway) at Buxton. -------------- -------------- Opposition Thinks Election Delay Plays into its Hands -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) PSC vice-chairman Jerry Gouveia, referring to unspecified PSC sources, said that political motives were probably behind the weapons theft and Agricola/Eccles assault. The implication is that the political opposition is willing to let militant factions employ violence to prevent elections. Nascimento said the opposition leaders know they cannot win the national election at this time, but a delay will help them capitalize on the government's increasing difficulty in handling economic and security issues. ¶5. (C) McLean and Gouveia both said opposition leader Robert Corbin felt that the PNC had blundered in its negotiations after the disputed 1997 and 2001 elections. The PNC accepted the victorious PPP party's promise of constitutional reform too hastily in exchange for ending post-election unrest. Constitutional reform then failed because neither the PNC nor the PPP wanted real change. The PNC under Desmond Hoyte thought that it could somehow win an election and so did not want to diminish executive powers. Corbin does not want to make the same mistake again, so he is prepared to create "mayhem" in order to drive the PPP to the negotiating table and extract concessions giving the PNC greater involvement in Guyana's governance. Note: It is hard to imagine the increasingly strident President Jagdeo conceding much executive power. -------------- -------------- GDF's Loyalty in Doubt; Ambassador Meets with Head of GDF -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The PSC leaders doubt that the GDF and GPF are "loyal to the state this time". This long-held theory has gained traction in recent weeks. The PPP government has always viewed the predominantly Afro-Guyanese uniformed services warily. Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon shared this fear with Ambassador as recently as March 3 (ref A). ¶7. (C) Ambassador met with the GDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Edward Collins, before the PSC meeting March 10. Ambassador mentioned that he had heard rumors circulating of a possible coup plan involving former GDF officers. Collins did not reveal any prior knowledge of these rumors, but he did assert the need to "preemptively destroy" any such threats while they are still at an embryonic stage. He stated unequivocally that the GDF is part of the government, suggesting that any coup attempt would have to topple the GDF top brass first before it took on the political leadership. Although Collins expressed his commitment to defending the state, his enthusiasm for President Jagdeo's leadership came across as lukewarm. Collins does not appreciate Jagdeo's overly personal style of running Guyana's affairs. -------------- PSC Plea for Help and Donors' Response -------------- ¶8. (C) After warning the donors how threatening the nexus between crime, violence, and political brinksmanship has become, the PSC leaders called on them to intervene. The donors responded that they are each supporting Guyana's electoral process through bilateral channels. However, the donors explained that they would not broker some sort of compromise between the GoG and the opposition through bilateral channels. Rather, it is primarily the responsibility of the Guyanese people and influential segments of society (like the PSC) to drive changes in the country's ruptured political system. The donors are wary of getting dragged too far into Guyana's political morass, setting themselves up to be scapegoats if the election process fails. ¶9. (SBU) As an alternative solution, the donors raised the idea of appeasing the opposition through an OAS-brokered political pact on a post-election reform agenda - as proposed by OAS A/SYG Ramdin (ref D). The PSC found the concept promising but thought it would require watertight guarantees from the international community to convince the opposition that the pact is not just a rehash of past deals. This would require a credible threat of cutting off multilateral loans, and possibly even bilateral aid, to Guyana if the GoG does not fulfill its obligation under the pact. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) McLean, Nascimento, and Gouveia all had strong ties to the pre-1992 PNC regime. Post is inclined to take their comments seriously because, as Nascimento himself put it, "we know how they think". The PSC highlighted three key forces playing out in Guyana. Heavily armed, well-organized groups are capable of conducting major operations with impunity and without interference from law enforcement. The political opposition mistakenly believes that preventing elections and fueling unrest will help it gain power. The armed criminal groups will take instructions from political interests as long as it suits them. The donors were already aware of these issues to some degree, but hearing Guyana's "wise men" describe them so bluntly underscored how volatile this election year has become. ¶11. (C) Comment continued: Home Affairs Minister Teixeira made a convincing case to Ambassador and DCM the evening of Friday March 10 that the Agricola murders were a targeted operation by "Fine Man"'s criminal organization against the Roger Khan organization, describing connections between the dead (or their family members) and Khan. This does not change the above analysis. A criminal organization was able to cut the link between the capital and the airport for 45 minutes with impunity while conducting a search and destroy mission against an enemy organization. While this may have been a criminal-directed rather than political-directed operation, it is widely perceived to be politically directed and certainly demonstrated to the public the expanding ability of criminal organizations to seize control from the state. END COMMENT. BULLEN