A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000167 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY OAS SUBJECT: A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71 ¶B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 ¶C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271 ¶D. 05 BRIDGETOWN 2394 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin visited Guyana February 13-14. Key takeaways from his visit are: a) Ramdin wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana and will act quickly to form a long-term mission of some sort; b) he wants any OAS electoral observation mission to act in close partnership with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth; and c) he took fully on board donor concerns about Guyana's political climate, stating publicly and forcefully that elections must proceed as constitutionally due by August 4. We believe Ramdin left with a far greater appreciation for the political intransigence, rather than technical problems, that threaten Guyana's ability to hold elections that are free, fair, and without fear of violence. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Ramdin: OAS Wants Strong Engagement in Election Process -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) During his February 13-14 visit, Ramdin met with various stakeholders, including the GoG, opposition parties, the diplomatic community, and CARICOM. He referred to the trip as the first official visit of more to come as he and OAS SYG Insulza are trying to reestablish stronger engagement with OAS members. Ambassador hosted a lunch February 13 for Ramdin and the international donor community (U.S., UK, Canada, EU, UNDP, CARICOM, IDB, IMF). ¶3. (C) At the lunch, donors shared with Ramdin their concerns that Guyana is on course for a political crisis. They stressed the need for OAS to take an "early prevention" approach to Guyana, not only by sending a long-term observer mission for the 2006 elections, but also by establishing a stronger political presence in the country. As an aside, Ramdin half-joked that his job would be easy if the consensus in Washington equaled that around the lunch table. ¶4. (C) Ramdin broadly agreed with donor concerns about the elections, saying that OAS wants to be "engaged strongly in this process". He also stated explicitly and repeatedly that when OAS gets engaged, it wants CARICOM on its side given that organization's "moral authority" in the region. CARICOM 
A/SYG Granderson sounded a cautionary note, reminding the group of CARICOM's extreme prudence regarding its members' internal affairs and that regional heads are not seized by events in Guyana. ¶5. (C) Ramdin accepted the donor view that delaying elections cannot be countenanced as an option and said that OAS would deliver that message clearly to political leaders. -------------- -------------- Ramdin: No Country should be Held Hostage by Politicians -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) Also on February 13, Ramdin and Commonwealth Secretariat Special Envoy to Guyana Sir Paul Reeves were the SIPDIS keynote speakers at the Private Sector Commission's "Elections and Democracy" lecture. Both speakers hammered home the point that elections must proceed as constitutionally due and that any alternative to this would be, in Ramdin's words, "counter-productive, costly, and damaging". ¶7. (U) In his remarks, Ramdin stated that elections are fair if the state provides conditions for a "reasonably level playing field" and that "no country should be held hostage" by the refusal of political parties and their leaders to accept election results. He then spelled out his key steps to a successful election process -- an independent elections commission; timely preparations by the commission; clear deadlines for well-defined activities; proper training for poll workers and robust voter education; a cleaned-up, credible voter list; and a secure environment in which to vote. -------------- Debriefing Donors and OAS' Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (U) Ramdin met again with donors the evening of February ¶14. He shared his reflections on the visit and spelled out what he sees as his plan for Guyana going forward. ¶9. (C) Ramdin reiterated to donors that he wants OAS to partner with CARICOM in Guyana. He said that after meeting with CARICOM, he still did not have a clear understanding of how involved they are willing to get in Guyana's elections. Nevertheless, he will make his Guyana trip report available to them. He also wants to involve St. Lucia PM Anthony, who has the lead on governance and justice within CARICOM. Ramdin plans to visit him to advocate for a stronger CARICOM role in Guyana. ¶10. (C) Ramdin described three key areas in the election process that he felt require far greater attention. First, the political leaders themselves (President Jagdeo and PNC/R opposition leader Robert Corbin in particular) need to establish a dialogue, preferably informal and agenda-free. Second, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) must do more to facilitate ongoing dialogue with the political parties and the public at large, working specifically to settle the dispute over the voter list. Third, civil society must participate more actively in the process, holding more events like the previous evening's "Elections and Democracy" lecture. ¶11. (C) As for OAS' plans, Ramdin will discuss his findings with Insulza and define their position in advance of an Insulza visit. Between Monday noon and Tuesday evening Ramdin changed from saying that he hoped to get Insulza to visit Guyana, to saying that Insulza would visit, hopefully soon. ¶12. (C) Ramdin clearly wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana, concentrating on crisis prevention, and preferably in close cooperation with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth. He envisions the OAS observer as someone who is actively involved in the election process -- the political as well as technical aspects. Ramdin intends to move very quickly on getting a long-term observation mission to Guyana (i.e., by early March, before the March 19 end of continuous registration). This was after getting assurances from President Jagdeo and from the major political parties that they all would welcome a long-term mission. (Note: Post subsequently learned that SYG Insulza had received a letter from the GoG inviting OAS to send long-term observers, about which Ramdin was apparently unaware.) ¶13. (C) Ramdin laid out a range of options for what the OAS observer mission might look like: a) Special Envoy, as in Haiti, although Ramdin felt this was the least likely option; b) Permanent Mission; c) Technical mid-level staff; or d) High-level person from the region who would come to Guyana periodically, although Ramdin said it would take at least two months to prepare this last option. ¶14. (C) Ramdin sounded a little skeptical that the technical preparations for the election are entirely satisfactory. He intends to put someone at OAS to work assessing GECOM's activity timeline and progress to date. Post has e-mailed the Joint International Technical Assessor's monthly reports to Ramdin's advisor to assist. ¶15. (C) The Canadian High Commissioner repeated to Ramdin that his government is willing to fund 2 or 3 long-term observers, but needs to obligate its money quickly before the March 31 end of Canada's fiscal year. He also gave Ramdin a copy of the Terms of Reference they are using for these observers. ¶16. (C) As the meeting wrapped up, Ramdin suggested a bargaining chip that might be used to mollify the opposition -- a pre-election agreement signed between the political parties, and with the international community as a guarantor in some fashion. This agreement would contain an agenda of important issues that the political parties would be committed to discuss and resolve after the elections. This would address one of the opposition's principal grievances -- that the governance reform process agreed to in 1997 is still unrealized. Donors responded favorably to the concept. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Before moving to OAS, Ramdin lived and worked for two years in Georgetown as A/SYG of CARICOM (Granderson's predecessor),including the period of the last election. He is very familiar with the players and issues in Guyana, as well as with the history of OAS' 2001 observation mission. He didn't say anything directly, but did just once allude briefly to "issues" that need to be worked out with the OAS bureaucracy regarding OAS' involvement in Guyana. He also described how he and Insulza are "shaking up" OAS, including by traveling frequently to the field rather than staying in Washington. ¶18. (C) Ramdin seems to be a realist when it comes to elections. He repeatedly alluded to the fact that no election is perfect, but should be the best possible given local circumstances. He referred specifically to his experience observing the December 2005 election in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (ref D). The voter list there contained 91,000 names -- demographically impossible given a general population of 110,000. But Ramdin walked away from that experience confident that the will of the electorate had prevailed. Such common sense does not prevail in Guyana's political opposition, which makes unrealistic demands while discrediting simple solutions like properly using indelible ink on election day. End Comment. BULLEN