LITTLE PROGRESS AND MUCH CONFUSION AND FRUSTRATION \

2006-10-19 13:15:00 06GENEVA2654 US Mission Geneva CONFIDENTIAL 06USMISSIONGENEVA2654 VZCZCXRO4453\ PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV\ DE RUEHGV #2654/01 2921315\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ P 191315Z OCT 06\ FM USMISSION GENEVA\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1433\ INFO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0840\ RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0462\ RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3846\ RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0494\ RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1548\ RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5885\ RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0482\ RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0525\ RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0484\ RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0394\ RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5267\ RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0619\ RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0304\ RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0290\ RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1734\ RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1950\ RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0280\ RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0583\ RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4138\ RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN\ RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2695\ RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2368 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002654 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ IO FOR DAS M. LAGON, DRL FOR DAS E. BARKS-RUGGLES \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 \ TAGS: PHUM UNHRC SUBJECT: LITTLE PROGRESS AND MUCH CONFUSION AND FRUSTRATION \ LEAD TO ADJOURNMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL'S SECOND SESSION \ \ GENEVA 00002654 001.2 OF 004 \ \ \ Classified By: PolCouns Velia M. De Pirro for reasons 12958: 1.4 (b)(d) \ \ \ Summary \ -------------- \ \ ¶1. (C) The Human Rights Council's second session was \ adjourned without achieving much after three weeks. It is to \ resume November 27-28, when it will deal with 44 resolutions \ tabled by members when it became apparent that little of \ substance would be achieved. The Council's failure was due \ in part to growing pains of a new body, but most of the blame \ was laid by members on unpredictable, often obscure, and \ confusing management by HRC President Luis Alfonso de Alba. \ His preference for small group meetings and closed sessions \ of the Council, from which observer States and NGOs were \ excluded, drew criticism from non-members and regional \ groups. De Alba's penchant for setting aside modalities and \ rules without explanation resulted in confusion and \ frustration among delegations. The level of discontent was \ clearly evident on the last day of the session when four \ GRULAC delegations delivered statements condemning the HRC's \ failure to deal with serious situations and criticizing the \ lack of predictability and transparency in the Council. The \ only success was the increased participation by NGOs in the \ inter-active dialogue with Special Procedures despite efforts \ by Cuba, China and Russia to block their involvement. U.S. \ engagement was welcomed by most delegations seeking to build \ a Council better able to address serious situations. \ Planning for the third session is underway among Geneva \ delegations. Success in addressing issues of concern to the \ United States and its partners will depend on early and \ concerted action in capitals. End Summary. \ \ Little Progress \ -------------- \ \ ¶2. (SBU) Expectations for the second regular session of the \ Human Rights Council were mixed and not particularly high. \ The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expected to \ continue its anti-Israel focus and attention on the issue of \ religious intolerance. The Western (WHRG) and the Latin \ American (GRULAC) groups hoped to address at least one urgent \ situation -- Sudan/Darfur. The bulk of the session was to be \ devoted to the reports of the Special Procedures mandate \ holders. This segment was seen by many delegations, \ especially Norway, India, Canada and the Latin American \ members, as successful. This was in large part because NGOs, \ supported by the WHRG and GRULAC, gained ground in being \ allowed to participate in the inter-active dialogue with the \ Special Procedures despite repeated efforts by Cuba, China, \ Russia and Belarus to disallow any participation by civil \ society. The rapporteurs' reports held few surprises since \ their written reports had been publicly available for many \ months. In addition, the rapporteurs, their working methods, \ and biases were well known to States. Consequently, \ interventions by the concerned States were predictable, \ focused on the shortcomings of the reports or the working \ methods of the rapporteurs. The only exceptions were \ virulent personal attacks by the Cuban and Belarussian \ delegations on the rapporteurs dealing with their countries, \ and the report on the Israel-Lebanon war which drew fire from \ all sides. \ \ \ GENEVA 00002654 002.2 OF 004 \ \ \ Much Frustration with the President and the Process \ -------------- -------------- \ \ ¶3. (SBU) While the inter-active dialogue was seen as \ generally successful, HRC President Luis Alfonso de Alba's \ management of the Council drew criticism. His unpredictable \ wavering between strictly applying or completely setting \ aside agreed modalities for the meeting caused confusion and \ grumbling from delegations. Discussions with the Council \ Secretariat revealed equal uncertainty among staff charged \ \ SIPDIS \ with supporting the Council. Dissatisfaction with de Alba \ increased over the course of the session as he insisted on a \ "substantive" consensus omnibus resolution on the reports and \ recommendations of the Special Procedures, but failed to \ provide adequate guidance or information on how he planned to \ arrive at a text. Most delegations tried to work with de \ Alba to avoid the Commission's practice of over 100 \ individual resolutions on the reports. It was, however, \ apparent from the start that consensus on the recommendations \ was impossible given States' objections to those that applied \ to them. Nonetheless, De Alba insisted on an omnibus \ resolution and even broadened it to include new initiatives. \ In pursuit of agreement to his plan, de Alba held small group \ meetings and closed sessions of the Council, excluding \ observer States and NGOs. His preference for working behind \ closed doors and the resulting lack of transparency quickly \ drew the ire of delegations, including the United States. In \ meetings with Ambassador Tichenor, De Alba rationalized his \ actions by saying that he needed flexibility to operate. \ Distrust increased, however, as regional groups felt excluded \ from the process and de Alba began to consult with the EU \ presidency, the NAM (presently chaired by Cuba) and the OIC. \ Unhappiness with the HRC President and growing doubt that the \ Council would yield concrete results, led delegations to \ table 44 resolutions by the last week of the Council. A \ U.S.-led draft resolution on democracy was ruled to be too \ late to be accepted in the unpredictable swings of de Alba's \ gavel. \ \ Consensus or Nothing \ -------------- \ \ ¶4. (SBU) De Alba called for a consensus resolution covering \ new initiatives, but excluding those that in his view were \ covered by an almost agreed "generic" text on the Special \ Procedures reports. Poorly managed negotiations, lack of \ transparency and general confusion on how de Alba would deal \ with 44 resolutions basically led to an impasse. In an \ apparent effort to have something concrete to point to, de \ Alba proposed a consensus presidential statement on 4-5 of \ the key issues and transferal of other resolutions to the \ November session of the Council. The first draft circulated \ by de Alba was not so much a consensus text as a compilation \ of issues of interest to certain delegations or groups. \ Three items drew on OIC language dealing with religious \ intolerance (without mention of religious freedom),Israeli \ settlements and construction of the wall, and the situation \ in Lebanon. The Sudan/Darfur language was drawn from the EU \ resolution, and the paragraph on right to development was \ taken from Cuba's resolution on behalf of the NAM. Aware \ that the text would not gain consensus, de Alba chaired an \ abbreviated morning session during which a generic text on \ the inter-active dialogue was adopted. He also announced that \ follow up to previous Council resolutions would be part of \ \ GENEVA 00002654 003.2 OF 004 \ \ \ the agenda of the third session. Comment: The latter was a \ sop to the OIC, which had threatened to call a vote against \ transferring the tabled resolutions to the November session \ unless its resolutions focused on Israel were addressed. End \ comment. In a meeting with de Alba, Ambassador Tichenor and \ IO DAS Mark Lagon raised U.S. opposition to the lack of \ balance in the statement's treatment of Middle East issues \ and religious intolerance. They also called on de Alba to \ exercise greater transparency and predictability in his \ consultations and management of the Council. \ \ ¶5. (SBU) The second draft included only changes requested by \ the OIC to toughen sections of concern to its members. It \ also included a new item on humanitarian law at the request \ of the Swiss delegation, which had already indicated its \ intention to support the text. Reaction in the Western Group \ to both texts was mixed and showed once again the group's \ inability to act in concert. Non-members United States, \ Australia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand opposed the texts \ and warned against making consensus the goal of the Council \ rather than protecting and promoting human rights. Canada, a \ member of the Council, also made clear its opposition to the \ text. The Canadian delegation, obviously uncomfortable, was \ under instructions from Ottawa to break consensus on its own \ if necessary. The EU was engaged in an internal struggle \ between opposition to the text and fearing censure if it or \ the Western Group were blamed for the Council's failure. In \ the end, "nothing is better than a bad text" became the motto \ for all groups. In the closing session the President \ announced that consensus had failed and that all tabled \ resolutions would be taken up at the resumption of the second \ session of the Council November 27-28, and that the third \ session would begin two days late on November 29. \ \ GRULAC Challenges President \ -------------- \ \ ¶6. (SBU) In a surprising move that drew comment from all \ delegations, at the conclusion of the session the delegations \ of Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina made statements \ condemning the Council's failure to address the crisis \ situation in Sudan/Darfur and criticizing the lack of \ transparency and predictability in the Council's operations \ -- a direct hit at de Alba's management of the Council. \ While Peru's statement could reflect the Peruvian PermRep \ Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros' resentment at having had to step \ aside in June so de Alba could take the presidency, \ interventions by usually more reserved GRULAC members \ highlighted the level of discontent in the Council with de \ Alba's presidency. Similar statements noting the Council's \ failure to deal with serious human rights situations were \ made by Ambassador Tichenor and India. The Finnish \ Presidency had a statement and was on the list of speakers, \ but opted not to deliver a statement. A Finnish delegate \ claimed that they changed their minds not to encourage the \ OIC to speak. Since no one from the OIC was on the speakers' \ list and the session was drawing to a close, the Finnish \ excuse rings hollow. \ \ Comment: U.S. Role \ -------------- \ \ ¶7. (C) The United States delegation, headed by Ambassador \ Tichenor and supported by Washington-based staff, including \ \ GENEVA 00002654 004.2 OF 004 \ \ \ IO DAS Mark Lagon, actively engaged during the three-week \ session. In an effort to demonstrate U.S. support for \ country- specific mandates as well as the thematic mandates \ focused on civil and political rights, USdel delivered \ statements and participated in the interactive dialogue with \ rapporteurs. (Statements are accessible on Mission Geneva's \ website.) The United States' engagement in the session was \ welcomed by most delegations as a sign that the USG was \ serious in trying to help shape the Council into a more \ effective body than the Commission. U.S. leadership in the \ Western Group was particularly welcomed by non-EU partners \ frustrated by the EU's inability to arrive a strong unified \ positions and its penchant for delivering often weak general \ statements. Media interest was tamer during this session in \ part because this session did not produce much in the way of \ drama or reportable news, but also because reporters and \ their editors are starting to see the Council as little \ better than the Commission. As the AP bureau chief put it, \ "The Council is making itself marginal." That being said, \ U.S. statements received good coverage in the wires. USG \ views were thereby well-disseminated. \ \ ¶8. (C) Planning for the third session of the Council is \ underway within regional and other groups. Ambassador \ Tichenor hosted Community of Democracy Convening Group \ ambassadors October 13 (septel) and hosted select African \ Group ambassadors October 17. JUSCANZ has commenced a series \ of weekly meetings to assure that it is not hampered in \ achieving shared goals by the EU's cumbersome coordination \ process. These preparations only address, however, issues \ from the perspective of Geneva-based delegations -- 44 \ pending resolutions, the need for more predictable and \ transparent working methods for the Council, and the \ importance of reaching across regional lines to assure that \ the Council can respond to concerns beyond those of the OIC. \ Progress on the Council's foundations and working methods as \ well as concrete actions that address emerging or serious \ human rights situations will require action in capitals \ either separately or jointly with like-minded partners. \ While this message has focused on the difficulties resulting \ from HRC President de Alba's imprecise and often ambiguous \ management of the Council, it is important to keep in mind \ that determined and coordinated action by the United States \ and its partners can positively influence the work of the \ Council. It requires, however, early planning on focused \ objectives. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ TICHENOR \