DRL DAS BARKS-RUGGLES' GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 002169

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/RHS, DRL/MLA, L/HRR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016
TAGS: PHUM UNHRC
SUBJECT: DRL DAS BARKS-RUGGLES' GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS
BILATERALS

Classified By: Political Counselor Velia M. De Pirro. For reasons E.O.
12958, 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (U) DRL DAS Erica Barks-Ruggles held a series of bilateral
meetings in Geneva August 31 and September 1 with select
missions to discuss the upcoming Human Rights Council (HRC)
session. The meetings are summarized below.

United Kingdom
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2. (C) DAS Barks-Ruggles discussed with Ambassador Nick
Thorne the growing skepticism of the USG about the ability of
the HRC to change the track record of the Commission on Human
Rights. The intense focus on Israel and the Middle East thus
far, to the exclusion of all other human rights situations
globally, threatened to undermine the HRC's credibility. The
upcoming HRC session and the November session would be
critical from the U.S. perspective, in terms of seeing if the
Council could take action to address serious human rights
situations on the ground in, for example, North Korea, Burma
Sudan/Darfur. Thorne agreed that the Council was flawed, and
suggested fixing a deadline by which it would be assumed that
if the HRC could not be turned around, London and Washington
should move into "damage limitation mode." Thorne said that
the Europeans were not operating as effectively as they
could, and mildly criticized the effectiveness of the Finnish
team in Geneva. Thorne noted that HRC President de Alba was
ambitious and wanted the HRC to succeed, but was worried that
GRULAC was splitting on Middle East issues.


3. (C) Thorne cautioned that the "condemnatory resolutions"
sought by the USG simply would not happen. The term, Thorne
commented, was "a red flag to a bull." When asked he
suggested calling such resolutions &Expressions of Concern8
or &Condemnation of Lack of Cooperation by xxxx member
state.8 DAS Barks-Ruggles noted that whatever they are
called, condemnatory resolutions remain an essential tool the
UNHRC must be able to use. She raised DPRK and Burma, noting
that at least a condemnatory resolution must be passed on the
DPRK or it would be clear that the HRC could accomplish
nothing. Thorne agreed, but noted that Burma was in ASEAN
and since it was being addressed in the Security Council,
there might be limits on what the HRC could accomplish.


3. (C) Thorne raised Sri Lanka (as had the Finns in previous
consultations with the EU in Helsinki),and Barks-Ruggles
noted that strategies for addressing the situation in the HRC
would have to have support from the Norwegians, who would
soon be the sole Scandinavian forces there. Thorne said the
Dutch wanted to
see a special session on Sri Lanka, but the British had
rejected the idea. Thorne planned to speak to the Indian
government to seek its views on a Sri Lanka resolution.
Barks-Ruggles commented that she had no instructions, but the
USG would likely follow the European lead on Sri Lanka. In
Thorne's view, both Sri Lanka and Darfur had to be addressed
in the Council; he would like to raise both to the Africa
group and get their agreement to a Darfur resolution. Thorne
added that High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour
had raised Darfur with both HRC President de Alba and with
him; Thorne had agreed that Darfur should be raised, but also
rejected the idea of a Darfur condemnatory resolution.
Thorne planned to raise Darfur with some of the non-Arab
African countries, and had already broached the issue with
Jordan and Bahrain, both of whom were willing to address the
issue but highlighted inevitable OIC opposition. The UK
would seek a Chairman's statement as the outcome of a Darfur
session, and possibly an increased human rights component to
whatever product the UNSC Sudan session produced.


5. (C) In suggesting alternative mechanisms to condemnatory
resolutions, Thorne also noted that the Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) process might achieve some of the progress on
country situations sought by the USG. Without a strong UPR
mechanism, the HRC would be weaker than the CHR had been.


6. (C) Thorne told Barks-Ruggles that, although the decision
had yet to be formalized, London had decided that the UK
would run again for a second term on the HRC in 2008. The UK
would like to see the U.S. run next year for two reasons:
the first is that a second decision by the U.S. not to run
would be seen as a confirmation of a &vote of no
confidence8 in the HRC. Second, the UK did not want to run
against the U.S. in 2008 should the USG hold off one more
year.

Saudi Arabia
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6. (C) Saudi Ambassador Abdulwahab Attar and DAS
Barks-Ruggles agreed on the importance of a universal system
of peer review with a consistent periodicity for all UN
members. Barks-Ruggles outlined the USG proposal for a
five-year periodicity, considering approximately 40 countries
a year, with intersessional meetings, and the preparation
work done by a subset of the Council, with perhaps two
representatives per region. The goal would be a
non-condemnatory dialogue. Attar appreciated that UPR was
intended to improve the situation on the ground, and noted
that it was critical that the process be constructive, not
condemnatory. Barks-Ruggles pressed for Saudi diplomacy on
ensuring the Council focuses on serious human rights issues
outside of the Middle East. Attar assured her that Saudi
Arabia understands the problem with a singular focus and has
been a &moderating voice8 within the discussions on these
efforts. He demurred when pressed to play a stronger role in
this regard.

Nigeria
--------------


7. (C) Nigerian Ambassador Joseph Ayalogu minimized USG
concerns about the negative trends that have been established
by the first HRC session and the two Israel-focused Special
Sessions, noting that the process was new and the situation
in the region had been bad timing for the Council. Ayalogu
supported the USG idea for UPR, but was unsure what the
African Group view would be. He agreed, however, that UPR
should not be an accusatory process. On mandate review,
Ayalogu noted that mandates that seemed unimportant or
misplaced to developed countries, like that on toxic waste,
were actually important to countries like Nigeria. Nigeria
had no problem with the idea of trimming mandates, so long as
it was done in a broadly cooperative manner. He was
surprised to hear that the Sub-Commission cost as much as it
had and promised to pass to capital our concerns about that
body, noting that Nigeria could probably support a group of
&virtual8 experts available to be called upon by the
Council without them actually being in Geneva. On possible
action by the Council to address serious human rights abuses,
Ayalogu noted that the African group would want assistance
for those places ) like Liberia and DROC ) that merited it.
He implied that positive action would help prove to the
African Group the Council,s engagement on issues of concern
to them, and possibly lead to greater cooperation. He noted
that any action on Burma or Sudan/Darfur would need to be
coordinated with action in the UNSC. He stated his
&personal belief8 that action on the DPRKwas beyond the
HRC. (Note: Ayalogu also hinted that Nigeria,s main
concern is that it not be a target of negative attention by
the HRC itself. End Note)

Ghana
--------------


8. (C) Charge Paul King Aryene, a close contact of Mission
Geneva, said that Ghana could support any measure intended to
correct human rights violations anywhere in the world. Some
level of politicization in the HRC was inevitable, but
efforts should be made to minimize it to the extent possible.
Barks-Ruggles noted that the USG wanted to see the HRC
succeed, but was concerned that if the HRC remained seized by
Israel only, Washington would want little to do with the
body. Aryene noted that there was great concern about
"shaming" in the developing world. Much of the Third World,
Aryene said, believed that developed countries used human
rights as a way to undermine the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of developing countries. Resolutions stressing
technical cooperation and assistance were likelier to succeed
than condemnatory ones. In response to Barks-Ruggles'
question as to whether an African resolution might be
welcomed for certain countries, Aryene said yes, that any
country coming out of civil war would need technical
assistance and capacity building.


9. (C) Aryene noted that the fact that the OIC had allowed
no consultations on its draft Lebanon resolution during the
special session augured badly. He recommended that the USG
ask its European partners to talk to the OIC about being more
cooperative. On UPR, Aryene noted that Ghana opposed the
proposal for different levels of periodicity for different
countries, and noted that there was greater consensus on UPR
than on any other HRC issue. Civil society must be allowed
some input into the UPR process, and perhaps could e allowed
to speak during the UPR sessions. Aryene supported the
participation of civil society in providing input on
countries to the review board, but thought NGO involvement in

the actual review would be problematic. He also agreed on
the need to preserve country-specific mandates in the review
process.

Finland
--------------


10. (C) Charge Satu Mattila and PolCouns Katri Silfverberg
were pleased to hear of Barks-Ruggles' just finished trip to
Helsinki (septel) and upcoming trip to Cairo and Riyadh.
Reaching out to the important OIC players would be critical
to getting more cooperation in the HRC. Mattila thought a
special session on Sri Lanka was a possibility. (Note: She
had clearly not gotten the message that the British were
unclear about support for such a session. End note.) They
noted that while the EU COHOM meeting would be held shortly
in Brussels, it was unlikely that the EU would agree to run
any condemnatory resolutions in the September session of the
HRC. Finland forwarded the idea of pushing Council
Statements rather than resolutions, as a more cooperative
and less confrontational HRC product.


11. (C) Barks-Ruggles noted that the DPRK situation must be
addressed, but that Japan might not want to support it in
September as that would coincide with the upcoming change of
government in Japan. Burma and Sudan/Darfur were other
issues that might be raised in the Council, but timing would
be important, as the UNSC just addressed Darfur August 31 and
the USG would want to seek African Group support for a
Darfur resolution. Mattila noted that the HRC fact-finding
mission to Lebanon was just named August 31, but that it
remained unfunded. Barks-Ruggles emphasized that those
countries that supported its creation should be responsible
for funding it. Barks-Ruggles also noted that, in general,
Brazil was playing an unhelpful role, and suggested that the
EU speak to Brazil to try to seek its cooperation. Finally,
Barks-Ruggles noted that the USG would have to make a
decision on whether to run for Council membership by the end
of this year. It would be important for the USG not to lose
the mandates of the country rapporteurs, especially the SR on
Cuba. If the Cuba mandate were eliminated, it would have a
very negative impact on USG views on the Council.

JUSCANZ
--------------


12. (C) DCM hosted a dinner with JUSCANZ colleagues to allow
Barks-Ruggles an opportunity to seek their views on the
Council. All agreed that the direction the Human Rights
Council was headed in was unhelpful, and Barks-Ruggles made
clear that if the Council continued to focus on Israel to the
exclusion of all other human rights issues, the USG would
take a dim view of its future. JUSCANZ members also
discussed whether the upcoming HRC session would be the
appropriate venue for action on Darfur, the DPRK, or Burma.
They also raised the possibility of action on Sri Lanka
and/or Nepal. The Australians were clearly the most
energetic and committed of the group. Unhelpful comments by
the Canadian representative were, we believe, not
representative of his government,s position. Japanese
representatives reiterated concerns about the effect of the
change in Japan,s government "expected in the middle of the
UNHRC session" would have on their ability to push for action
on specific countries or issues. The Swiss clearly brought a
different view to the table, but understand our concerns.

Comment:


13. (C) It was clear from these consultations that there is
frustration with the lack of information from the UNHRC
President about the agenda for the upcoming session, but also
that the EU in particular is using that as an excuse to not
lay any groundwork for country-specific actions. Our clear
call for their leadership will need to be repeated often and
at high levels in order to spur them to take unpopular and
tough actions that will help change the course of the UNHRC.


14. (C) Comment continued: Several interlocutors also
expressed concern about the Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan nexus.
They believe that Cuba will try to attack the Cuba SR soon
and that Egypt will continue to play a strongly negative role
even though it is not on the Council.

This cable has been cleared by DRL/DAS Erica Barks-Ruggles


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