TAJIKISTAN: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR BETTER ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000995

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ACE, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR BETTER ELECTIONS

REF: A) ARMBRUSTER-MCKANE 05-26-06 EMAIL B) MCKANE-ARMBRUSTER 05-27-06 EMAIL,
C) DUSHANBE 0620 D) DUSHANBE 0696

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Although we can predict six months before
Tajikistan's presidential election that it will not fully meet
international standards, we have the opportunity to ensure that
the election is conducted significantly better than any previous
election in Tajikistan's short independent history. To put U.S.
resources into this election is not to fund a "bad election."
Rather, it is to have faith in the power of transformational
diplomacy. Transformational diplomacy is a long-term process -
it does not happen overnight, or in one election. We should not
allow our natural desire for perfection to impede the
possibility of real progress in the November election. Thus, we
renew our request for $300,000 in election funds, as previously
foreseen in our jointly agreed presidential election strategy.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In Refs A, C, and D, Post requested $300,000, as
foreseen in the previously agreed USAID-EUR/ACE-Embassy Dushanbe
presidential election strategy. Ref B responded EUR/ACE would
review the request and stated, "We aren't interested in simply
help[ing] the Tajiks make a bad election look better from the
technical perspective. We should be interested in real changes
to the way Tajiks do business, primarily in the pre-election
period."

INTENSIVE WORK UNDER WAY TO IMPROVE THE ELECTION


3. (SBU) The Tajik Government has already committed to an
historically large number of changes in how this election will
be conducted, including in the pre-election period. This is
thanks to intensive work with the government by the
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES),fully
supported from the beginning by the United Nations Tajikistan
Office for Peace-building (UNTOP),and more recently by the OSCE.


4. (SBU) IFES, in conjunction with the Central Commission for
Elections and Referenda and the President's Strategic Research
Center, has used the OSCE Election Observers' report from the
February 2005 parliamentary election to create a matrix of the
shortcomings in that previous election, and has also drawn from
Tajikistan's election laws and the CIS election-standards
document (Ref C). The Government of Tajikistan has bought into
the entire matrix, and has undertaken to fix each identified
problem, including making provision for civil society local
election observers.


5. (C) Realistically, there is no time before the early
November presidential election to revise the Law on Presidential
Elections and to put it out for national discussion and
international analysis. However, President Rahmonov has agreed
to issue a presidential decree mandating the changes. This is
already a significant step forward.

EQUAL MEDIA ACCESS


6. (C) Although we continue to press at every opportunity,
extracting a promise to guarantee equal air time on state
broadcast media for all parties and candidates is more
problematic. While there may be improvements in this area that
at least meet the current law, they will unlikely meet our
standards. However, the Avesta Internet News Agency, one of the
two most important independent Internet news sources in
Tajikistan, has begun to publish an independent newspaper in
Russian, "Commentaries and Facts." It was launched this Spring
with a small grant from the British Embassy. To continue
publishing until the end of this calendar year, including
through the presidential election period, the Avesta founder and
editor has asked Embassy Dushanbe for $30,000, and has
guaranteed his paper will provide equal access for all parties
and candidates. We would like our requested $300,000 for
election activities to include this grant. The Central
Commission for Elections and Referenda has also identified the
need for televised debates as a step toward meeting
international standards and has requested funding from donors.
Up to $30,000 of our request would also be used to sponsor
debates or produce election-related talk shows.

THE PARTIES

DUSHANBE 00000995 002 OF 002




7. (C) In fact, equal media access, including on state
broadcast media, for all parties and candidates, will not make
much difference in the outcome of this election. The three
miniscule "democratic" parties - the Democratic Party of
Tajikistan, the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the
Socialist Party of Tajikistan - consistently poll in the single
digits in reliable but unpublished public opinion polls and are
based largely on personalities, not distinctive party platforms.
Further, they have already made clear that they have no
intention of putting forward a joint candidate. The Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan polls in the mid to high teens,
and has already announced it will nominate a candidate. The
Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) is barely distinguishable
from the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT),
although it gets its back up once in a while and criticizes the
PDPT on one specific issue or another. If the CPT nominates a
candidate, it would be only for symbolic purposes. The two new
pocket parties - the Party of Economic Reform and the Agrarian
Party - may well nominate candidates, but we would not be overly
shocked if those candidates threw their support to President
Rahmonov just before the election.


8. (C) The bottom line is that the PDPT will nominate President
Rahmonov, and he will win the election. Further, although we
will work intensively with Rahmonov and his closest advisers to
ask him to prevent it, some of the district election commission
results may be falsified. If so, that would be more by
ex-Soviet force of habit than from need. President Rahmonov can
legitimately win this election with a walloping 75% or more. He
doesn't need Ministry of Security minions over-fulfilling the
plan to give him 95%, and we will tell him so.


9. (U) UNTOP has also invited all political parties to take
part in the election reform process and in moving forward the
recommendations in the matrix. UNTOP's initiative has generally
met with enthusiasm from the parties, and will help to further
institutionalize good governance and transparency.

THE LONG-TERM POWER OF TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY


10. (C) We can predict six months before the presidential
election that it will not fully meet international standards.
But we have the opportunity to ensure that the election is
conducted significantly better than any previous election in
Tajikistan's short independent history. We belie targeted U.S.
funds could prove the power of transformational diplomacy. By
setting new standards for the conduct of this election, we will
have laid the foundation for future elections, when we can press
for even more fundamental changes. Transformational diplomacy
is a long-term process - it does not happen overnight, or in one
election. We should not allow our natural desire for perfection
to impede the possibility of real progress in the November
presidential election in Tajikistan. Having the United States
in a lead role in election reform will bolster our long-term
goals, and out credibility with the people of Tajikistan.


11. (C) We renew our request for $300,000 in additional funds
to support the election process in Tajikistan.
HOAGLAND