TAJIKISTAN: HOW TO IMPROVE THE NOVEMBER 2006 ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000546

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: HOW TO IMPROVE THE NOVEMBER 2006 ELECTION

REF: A) DUSHANBE 0322 B) HOAGLAND-HILLMEYER, ET. AL., E-MAIL DTD 03-16-06 C) DUSHANBE 0283

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (SBU) Although it is getting late in the game, we still have
an opportunity, if we begin work now, to influence the
Government of Tajikistan to take steps forward toward meeting
international standards in the November 2006 presidential
election. If we can achieve this modest goal, we will have made
incremental progress toward building real democracy in
Tajikistan.


2. (SBU) Two critical steps could help: 1) high-level
Washington messages to key insiders, specifically first-family
members who are known to have reformers in their inner circles,
and 2) specific "contract-like" agreements with the Central
Commission for Elections and Referenda (CCER) and with the
Center for Strategic Research (CSR) Under the President of
Tajikistan, the government's influential internal think-tank, to
improve specific areas that the OSCE/ODHIR report criticized in
the 2005 parliamentary elections. These two steps would be in
addition to and compliment the existing election strategy for
Tajikistan.

CONSTRAINTS


3. (SBU) Tajikistan will not conduct a 2006 presidential
election that meets international standards - if we take a
maximalist stance, we set ourselves and Tajikistan up for
failure. But the Tajik Government can indeed take steps forward
with our attentive, timely, and committed help.


4. (C) The November election will not fully meet international
standards because the powerful and predominant post-Soviet
political culture evident throughout the CIS, aided and abetted
by Russian intelligence agencies, still condones manipulation of
elections by administrative means (which could be called the
power of incumbency if it weren't so ham-fisted and blatant),as
well as by outright falsification of results, and because no
real opposition candidate is likely to come forth in a climate
where any credible opposition to the power structure is
intimidated, silenced, or bought off.


5. (C) A full-court press by neo-Soviet forces in Moscow
ensures the status quo by overwhelmingly electing "friends of
the Kremlin." Further, Moscow has used its near total
domination of the CIS information space for nearly two years to
drum-beat the propaganda that democracy equals anarchy, and that
the Western goal of democratic elections is really code for
"color revolutions that overthrow Moscow's friends, who
guarantee stability, in order to install pro-Western puppets who
then do nothing to improve the lives of the people."

POSSIBILITIES

WORKING THE INSIDERS


6. (SBU) We have already proposed (refs A and B) meetings in
Washington in April, during the annual World Bank and IMF
meetings, for key insiders who could pass the following message
directly to President Rahmonov: the President can afford to
conduct elections that come closer to meeting international
standards because we acknowledge that he will be re-elected. It
is to his advantage to do so because it would help him maintain
international credibility and his balance-the-powers, open-door
foreign policy, which appears to be his ultimate goal to
preserve Tajikistan's sovereignty.


7. (C) The two most important insiders are both family members
who would get the message to Rahmonov unmediated: Presidential
Economic Adviser Matlubhon Davlatov and Orion Bank Chairman
Hasan Sadulloyev. Also to be included would be Chairman of the
State Savings Bank and real, Western-oriented reformer
Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, and Chairman of the National Bank
Murodali Alimardonov, who has credibly promoted banking and
finance reform, even though he himself is an insider oligarch.


8. (SBU) The optimum time for high-level talks with these
insiders would be on the margins of the mid-April World Bank and
IMF meetings. If Washington is willing to risk taking this
concrete action to promote further steps toward democracy in
Tajikistan, we and the Tajik insiders involved need to know by
March 31, simply for logistics purposes.


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WORKING THE SYSTEM


9. (U) It is not enough to tell the Tajik Government what to do
and then sit back and wait; we need to help them do it. Rolling
up the sleeves and getting the hands dirty tends to be more
effective than soap-boxing and then criticizing.


10. (SBU) At the Ambassador's request, the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in Dushanbe (the only
U.S. democracy NGO that has not experienced post-"color
revolution" harassment),has been working very closely in recent
weeks, on its own time so as not to conflict with USAID
contracts, with key members of the CCER and CRS (ref C). Using
OSCE/ODHIR's post-parliamentary-election report, they have
together identified specific steps that the government could
take to correct problems from previous elections. Both the
Embassy and IFES have found officials of good will who are eager
to achieve a next election that comes closer to meeting
international standards. Understanding that U.S. finances will
be limited, the Ambassador is already working with IFES-Dushanbe
to identify international donors who may be willing to support
this concretely achievable project. We will also soon submit a
funding request to the Department for this project.

TAKING THE RISK TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY


11. (SBU) Some say that the U.S. Government is expert at
rhetoric and process, but falls short when it comes to working
in the trenches to achieve real, even if incremental, results.
Embassy Dushanbe wants to prove the nay-sayers wrong. We
believe that we have identified concrete steps that can improve
the November 2006 presidential election without overly annoying
the negative forces in the Kremlin. We firmly believe that
working the insiders and working the system are the best steps
we can take to move Tajikistan toward the U.S. long-term goal of
promoting democracy in a post-Soviet out-post like Tajikistan.
We request concurrence and support - both funds and political
will - for our two-part strategy outlined above. Please advise.
HOAGLAND