Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE327
2006-02-21 11:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:
TAJIK HYDROPOWER 201: ADVANCED GAME THEORY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000327
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV ENRG ECON PREL TI AF
SUBJECT: TAJIK HYDROPOWER 201: ADVANCED GAME THEORY
REF: A) DUSHANBE 326; B) DUSHANBE 63; C) DUSHANBE 90; D) 05 DUSHANBE 2094; E)
05 DUSHANBE 2013
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000327
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV ENRG ECON PREL TI AF
SUBJECT: TAJIK HYDROPOWER 201: ADVANCED GAME THEORY
REF: A) DUSHANBE 326; B) DUSHANBE 63; C) DUSHANBE 90; D) 05 DUSHANBE 2094; E)
05 DUSHANBE 2013
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) In Tajik hydropower, a new conventional wisdom is
emerging. If we want the Central Asian Infrastructure
Initiative to succeed in Tajikistan, we need to consider the
following:
2. (C) The United States is behind the curve on hydropower.
Russia is building Sangtuda I and has first grabs on Rogun
(Reftel A). Iran broke ground for Sangtuda II February 20. The
Chinese have been in quiet but serious negotiations to build a
hydropower station (HPS) and high-voltage transmission lines
(Reftel B). The U.S. firm AES has been gently pushed out of
Sangtuda, and possibly Rogun, and is scrambling to find a
generation project. The United States has funded some
feasibility studies, but they were slow to get off the ground
and may already be overtaken by events. Deputy Energy Minister
Silantev and others have indicated that the Chinese have
completed a feasibility of the same Varzob Cascade and Kairrakum
HPS project the USTDA has given $400,000 to Eurasialink to
evaluate. Silantev on several occasions has told PolOff, "You
Americans talk, but so far, nothing concrete."
3. (C) The Tajiks do not understand how U.S. investment works.
Other countries -Russia, Iran, China - offer direct government
investment as a carrot and can tell their companies what to do.
The Embassy is frequently asked how much the U.S. government
will support or guarantee AES's bids for Rogun or power lines.
Because a private U.S. firm like AES will only invest when the
conditions are right and IFI financing is independently secured,
the United States is seen as overly cautious or slow. The fact
that we are building a $27 million bridge at Nizhniy Pyanzh
further confuses claims that the U.S. government does not
directly invest in infrastructure projects. On the other hand,
the Russian parliament earmarked millions for RAO UES to build
Sangtuda, and the Iranians promised $180 million for Sangtuda
II.
4. (C) The Tajiks do not take the U.S. seriously in hydropower.
Others in the government energy sector have echoed Silantev's
comments that Americans talk about investments, but have failed
to invest, or even come close to negotiations. Other countries
have sent cabinet-level ministers to engage the Tajiks directly
on economic issues and show their serious intent. The
Tajik-Iranian presidential meeting in Tehran January 16-17
focused almost exclusively on economic issues, including the
deal for Sangtuda II. The Tajik, Iranian and Afghan energy
ministers met in Dushanbe February 20. Tajikistan sees U.S.
efforts going into Afghanistan-including debt relief-and could
draw the conclusion that the U.S. has bigger obligations and
interests.
5. (C) The Tajiks are open to whomever comes with funding
first. Nowhere is President Rahmonov's "open door" foreign
policy more evident than in economic development. As Foreign
Minister Nazarov told the Ambassador, "All money smells the
same." Several Deputy Energy Ministers have marveled at how
swiftly the Chinese dove into several projects, guaranteeing
their investments. Despite skepticism about U.S. intent in
hydropower, key power players continue to welcome U.S.
companies. Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov told the DCM he hoped
AES would have a role in future projects, particularly
transmission lines. Energy Minister Nurmamatov said simply,
"Without the U.S., Rogun will not be built" (Reftel D).
6. (C) The United States still has an opportunity to play a
role in Tajik hydropower, but we run the risk of being
DUSHANBE 00000327 002 OF 002
marginalized by more determined and decisive regional-power
investors. The USTDA regional conference in Istanbul in June
could be an excellent opportunity to reengage the Tajiks, but it
may be a hard sell to convince them that it is not an auction to
sell cows that have already left the barn. Some of the most
significant Tajik power projects will have already been claimed
by others by the time the U.S. investors and businesses meet in
Istanbul to "talk" some more.
HOAGLAND
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV ENRG ECON PREL TI AF
SUBJECT: TAJIK HYDROPOWER 201: ADVANCED GAME THEORY
REF: A) DUSHANBE 326; B) DUSHANBE 63; C) DUSHANBE 90; D) 05 DUSHANBE 2094; E)
05 DUSHANBE 2013
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) In Tajik hydropower, a new conventional wisdom is
emerging. If we want the Central Asian Infrastructure
Initiative to succeed in Tajikistan, we need to consider the
following:
2. (C) The United States is behind the curve on hydropower.
Russia is building Sangtuda I and has first grabs on Rogun
(Reftel A). Iran broke ground for Sangtuda II February 20. The
Chinese have been in quiet but serious negotiations to build a
hydropower station (HPS) and high-voltage transmission lines
(Reftel B). The U.S. firm AES has been gently pushed out of
Sangtuda, and possibly Rogun, and is scrambling to find a
generation project. The United States has funded some
feasibility studies, but they were slow to get off the ground
and may already be overtaken by events. Deputy Energy Minister
Silantev and others have indicated that the Chinese have
completed a feasibility of the same Varzob Cascade and Kairrakum
HPS project the USTDA has given $400,000 to Eurasialink to
evaluate. Silantev on several occasions has told PolOff, "You
Americans talk, but so far, nothing concrete."
3. (C) The Tajiks do not understand how U.S. investment works.
Other countries -Russia, Iran, China - offer direct government
investment as a carrot and can tell their companies what to do.
The Embassy is frequently asked how much the U.S. government
will support or guarantee AES's bids for Rogun or power lines.
Because a private U.S. firm like AES will only invest when the
conditions are right and IFI financing is independently secured,
the United States is seen as overly cautious or slow. The fact
that we are building a $27 million bridge at Nizhniy Pyanzh
further confuses claims that the U.S. government does not
directly invest in infrastructure projects. On the other hand,
the Russian parliament earmarked millions for RAO UES to build
Sangtuda, and the Iranians promised $180 million for Sangtuda
II.
4. (C) The Tajiks do not take the U.S. seriously in hydropower.
Others in the government energy sector have echoed Silantev's
comments that Americans talk about investments, but have failed
to invest, or even come close to negotiations. Other countries
have sent cabinet-level ministers to engage the Tajiks directly
on economic issues and show their serious intent. The
Tajik-Iranian presidential meeting in Tehran January 16-17
focused almost exclusively on economic issues, including the
deal for Sangtuda II. The Tajik, Iranian and Afghan energy
ministers met in Dushanbe February 20. Tajikistan sees U.S.
efforts going into Afghanistan-including debt relief-and could
draw the conclusion that the U.S. has bigger obligations and
interests.
5. (C) The Tajiks are open to whomever comes with funding
first. Nowhere is President Rahmonov's "open door" foreign
policy more evident than in economic development. As Foreign
Minister Nazarov told the Ambassador, "All money smells the
same." Several Deputy Energy Ministers have marveled at how
swiftly the Chinese dove into several projects, guaranteeing
their investments. Despite skepticism about U.S. intent in
hydropower, key power players continue to welcome U.S.
companies. Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov told the DCM he hoped
AES would have a role in future projects, particularly
transmission lines. Energy Minister Nurmamatov said simply,
"Without the U.S., Rogun will not be built" (Reftel D).
6. (C) The United States still has an opportunity to play a
role in Tajik hydropower, but we run the risk of being
DUSHANBE 00000327 002 OF 002
marginalized by more determined and decisive regional-power
investors. The USTDA regional conference in Istanbul in June
could be an excellent opportunity to reengage the Tajiks, but it
may be a hard sell to convince them that it is not an auction to
sell cows that have already left the barn. Some of the most
significant Tajik power projects will have already been claimed
by others by the time the U.S. investors and businesses meet in
Istanbul to "talk" some more.
HOAGLAND