TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET: PRO-RUSSIAN OLD GUARD ENSCONCED ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002201

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINL SNAR TI AF
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET: PRO-RUSSIAN OLD GUARD ENSCONCED ON
SECURITY AND BORDER ISSUES

REF: DUSHANBE 2171

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Despite some pre-election hints
that Tajik President Rahmonov planned to clean house in the
Defense and Security Ministries, the old guard remains firmly
ensconced and has consolidated power by incorporating the Border
Guards into the security structure. After winning a solid
victory in the November 6 presidential election, Rahmonov had an
opportunity to replace Soviet-style thinkers with more
progressive officials. Instead, a pro-Russian cohort will
continue to maintain a tight grip on the power ministries.


2. (C) After a period of strong U.S.-Tajik cooperation with
the Border Guards on counternarcotics and counterterrorism, the
transfer of General Zuhurov from the Border Guards to the State
Committee on National Security may mean less U.S. access to
border facilities and programs, and less information sharing and
oversight of U.S. assistance programs. With the reappointment
of General Nazarov to the Drug Control Agency, our strong
partnership will continue to support national and regional
counternarcotics efforts. Overall, the new cabinet means U.S.
border, law enforcement and military assistance will continue on
a working level, but the top-level access so highly valued in
Tajikistan may remain difficult within the Defense and Interior
ministries and the reorganized Security apparatus. END SUMMARY.


3. (U) This is one of four cables examining the impact of
Tajikistan's restructured government and President Rahmonov's
new cabinet on U.S. bilateral and regional security priorities.
(See reftel on November 30 government re-organization and
cabinet appointments.) The other reports look at economic
growth and regional economic integration, democracy and human
rights, and the bigger picture of Tajikistan's future.

THE NEW STATE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY


4. (C) After rumors that Border Guard Head General Zuhurov had
been tapped to lead the new State Committee for National
Security, the reappointment instead of former Minister of
Security Abdurahimov did not bode well for U.S. cooperation on
security issues. As Minister of Security, Abdurahimov
repeatedly refused meetings with the Ambassador and other
visiting officials. By contrast, we had enjoyed a productive,
open relationship with General Zuhurov and relied on his frank
communication and effective leadership to implement many
assistance programs. Zuhurov has now been transferred to head
the Committee for the Protection of State Secrets. Except for
Colonel Tojibaev, head of the Border Guards' International
Department, Zuhurov's deputies have been released from their
positions. Former Deputy Minister of Defense Major General
Sheralisho Mirzoev takes control of the renamed "Main
Directorate of Border Troops" accountable to the State Committee
on National Security under Abdurahimov.


5. (C) Compared with the easy access to General Zuhurov, going
through the State Committee for Security for all border-related
issues might slow communication and create delays in
implementing programs. Several key U. S. programs are at risk
if our ability to provide oversight and conduct frank exchanges
with the Border Guards diminishes as feared under the
reorganization. The State Department's International Law
Enforcement and Narcotics (INL) -funded salary supplement
project, due to begin in 2007, was aimed at revising Border
Guard deployment strategies, placing emphasis on the Afghan
border while improving the morale and quality of officers and
preventing corruption. However, if the new Committee restricts
our oversight or access to top border officials, we may need to
reevaluate. An ongoing INL program with the former Ministry of
Security to renovate training facilities, if it goes as planned,
could provide an indication of the newly reorganized State
Committee on National Security attitude toward USG assistance.


6. (C) One somewhat positive outcome of the consolidation of
the Ministry of Security and Border Guards could be a freer flow
of intelligence information between the Tajik forces, resulting
in a synergy of both entities' enforcement capacity and thus

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better understanding and more aggressive protection of the
border against terrorists, drugs and contraband. However, the
United States would likely not be as active a partner in border
activities as we have been in past years, particularly give
Abdurahimov's pro-Russian leanings, close ties to the Russian
security services, and proven reluctance to share intelligence.


7. (C) Rumors are circulating that Rahmonov had indeed signed a
decree appointing Zuhurov head of the new security committee,
which would explain why initial press reports named Zuhurov to
the post. However, Abdurahimov supposedly appealed to Hasan
Saidulloev, President Rahmonov's brother-in-law, to intervene
and reappoint him. As the president's relative and confidant,
Saidulloev exerts great influence on policy and controls many
key industries and businesses in Tajikistan. If the head of the
State Committee on National Security is beholden to Saidulloev,
the first brother-in-law could use that relationship to his
economic and political advantage.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE


8. (C) Minister of Defense Sherali Khairrulloev retains his
position, despite initial reports that National Guard head
General Rahmonaliev would take his place. Khairrulloev, the
former First Deputy Commander of Ministry of Interior, has been
noticeably out of his league since his appointment as Minister
of Defense in 1995. His focus has been on extracting materiel
resources from international donors to build up the Ministry of
Defense, which inherited no heavy equipment after the break-up
of the Soviet Union. He clearly feels more comfortable as a
Russian client and does not really understand the U.S. focus on
capacity-building rather than "drop and run" equipment supplies.


9. (C) Recently, however, he has made some very limited moves
towards implementing U.S. organizational recommendations and we
can only hope this trend will continue. Retaining Khairrulloev
as Defense Minister may be a mark of presidential confidence,
but it may also be a sign the ministry will continue to be
sidelined, as the State Committee on National Security, Border
Troops and the Ministry of Interior become more important in
national defense.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR


10. (C) Rahmonov appointed his former Chief of Staff Mamadnazar
Salehov to replace outgoing Interior Minister Humdin Sharipov.
Although we had little contact with Sharipov, Salehov is known
as an old-school conservative and an old ally of the president
from Kulob. U.S. projects with the Ministry of Interior work
with specialized units whose command has not changed and we will
continue to support their training and capacity building.
Salehov will probably not object to the training and capacity
building for his forces, but may not be an accessible contact.
We will need to test the waters over the next several weeks to
determine his level of cooperation.

DRUG CONTROL AGENCY


11. (C) Although he had quietly aspired to a higher position
such as Foreign Minister or Defense Minister, General Rustam
Nazarov retained his position as head of the Drug Control
Agency, which continues to report directly to the presidential
administration. The U.S. funds the agency through the UN's
Office of Drugs and Crime and will continue to enjoy good access
and cooperation with Nazarov and his staff.

CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROL


13. (C) Rahmonov's restructuring broke up the Ministry of State
Revenues and Taxes, which previously supervised the Customs
authorities, and created an independent Customs Service that
reports directly to the central government. Gurez Zaripov,
former Deputy Minister of State Revenues and Taxes, will lead
the Customs Service. Zaripov may have the power to implement
much needed customs reform, but the new arrangement may also
mean a more direct stream of revenue to the president's
administration.


14. (C) COMMENT: Regardless of the leadership of certain
ministries, President Rahmonov has repeatedly noted that
Tajikistan shares the U.S. security goals in the region,

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including fighting drug trafficking and terrorism. All of
Tajikistan's forces desperately need equipment, basic
infrastructure and improved training, and our assistance
programs have provided us entree into the Ministries of Security
and Interior that mere diplomatic relations did not. However,
we will greatly miss General Zuhurov's solid partnership and
direct communication as the Border Guards become an arm of the
security service. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON