Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE1296
2006-07-12 11:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

RUMSFELD VISIT AND RUSSIA - WHO'S ON THE SIDE OF THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR TI 
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VZCZCXRO6417
PP RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV
DE RUEHDBU #1296/01 1931135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121135Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8032
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1705
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1692
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1663
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0038
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1676
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1630
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1598
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0064
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0318
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1603
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNOSC/OFSCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1473
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0014
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1419
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USEUCOM FMFO BRUSSELS BE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1623
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1670
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1213
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9334
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001296 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR TI
SUBJECT: RUMSFELD VISIT AND RUSSIA - WHO'S ON THE SIDE OF THE
ANGELS?


DUSHANBE 00001296 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001296 SIPDIS SIPDIS SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR TI SUBJECT: RUMSFELD VISIT AND RUSSIA - WHO'S ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS? DUSHANBE 00001296 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Russian Charge Viacheslav Svetlichny was the first diplomat to seek a readout of Secretary Rumsfeld's visit to Tajikistan and his meeting with President Rahmonov. The Ambassador joked with him on July 12 that Svetlichny must surely already have a near-verbatim treatment of the meeting from the Tajik Minister of Security. That elicited a raised eyebrow from the Russian. In fact, nothing the Ambassador said was able to pry from Svetlichny just what Russia is thinking in its apparent goal to strictly limit the role of the United States in Central Asia, especially when counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations are directly in Russia's own interest. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador said he thought for a long time about what he could provide that would help the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship. He said he concluded that he would share as much of his notes as possible. Svetlichny almost spilled his coffee reaching for his notepad. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador outlined the broad themes of stability in Afghanistan, counternarcotics, Central Asian relations, especially at the leadership levels, and Rahmonov's assessment of Iran's Ahmadinejad. The Ambassador said that Rumsfeld did not ask for a military base; in fact, the United States is in the business of closing bases, but the United States continues to need access to facilities in Central Asia to support Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, the United States is interested in search and rescue, refueling and logistical capabilities. While overflight and emergency refueling agreements are already in place between the United States and Tajikistan, there is a need for more space for refueling operations and transiting materiel and personnel. In short, Rahmonov's answer, the Ambassador explained, was that now is not the right time for increased engagement because of the new status quo in Central Asia. "Times have changed since 2001." ¶4. (S) Secretary Rumsfeld said he understood Tajikistan's situation and that each country had to balance its own interests and decide. The United States understands the pressure Tajikistan is under and the decision will not change the U.S.-Tajik relationshi
p or U.S. assistance. ¶5. (S) Svetlichny thanked the Ambassador for the overview and said it provided a "different view." Svetlichny said that considering the closure of Uzbekistan as an option for the United States, it was "logical" that other countries would bear more of the burden of supporting Afghan operations. The Ambassador said it was important to have more than one option, and he described in detail the limitations of the air facility at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, based on his personal tour there with the Commander. The Ambassador said the United States has no intention of "encircling or threatening Russia," but perhaps it was naive to believe that Russia would allow these Central Asian countries to make their own decisions as independent and sovereign nations. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador then pushed further, saying he sincerely hopes for a Central Asia that is stable and prosperous. He said he would like to see Russia find a way to work with the United States to help promote policies that benefit the region and DUSHANBE 00001296 002.2 OF 002 Russia itself in such fields as counternarcotics and terrorism. As an example, he suggested, making clear he was speaking unofficially, that in an ideal world, the United States and Russia should be able to share Ayni Airfield as a visible symbol of their Presidents' desire to cooperate productively. ¶7. (S) Svetlichny sought more information on the U.S. consultations with Tajikistan prior to the meeting. The DCM, taking notes, asked the Russian Charge to first explain Russia's advice to Tajikistan. Svetlichny claimed that the Russian Embassy had received no instructions, but "perhaps" Putin had put the subject to Rahmonov in Sochi or Minsk or Shanghai. ¶8. (S) The Ambassador acknowledged that Tajikistan is bound by its Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other commitments to consult with member nations before entering into new security arrangements, but he blasted Russia's "new best friend" Uzbekistan for flouting their international commitment to the Eurasia Economic Community to demine the Uzbek-Tajik border and allow for visa-free travel with neighboring countries. The Ambassador said that Russia could surely urge Central Asian countries to do the right thing on a number of issues, using its weight in regional fora. This is 2006, the Ambassador said, and important powers should be able to work together in difficult regions like Central Asia and Afghanistan. "I know that is what President Bush wants," the Ambassador said. Svetlichny agreed that President Putin also espouses a cooperative relationship with the United States. The Ambassador concluded that Presidents are not gods, but they have angels and devils working beneath them. He said he hoped his views represented those in both countries who are on the side of the angels. ¶9. (S) COMMENT: The Ambassador's briefing may generate discussion in Moscow. He explicitly said some of his outside-the-box suggestions were unofficial, based on his experience in the region. The Ambassador said that one of the lessons of the Rumsfeld visit was that the United States and Russia have much work to do to come to a common understanding on the way forward in Central Asia. President Putin once said there is "room for everyone in Central Asia." While Tajikistan may welcome a more robust U.S. presence, the reality for now is that the limits of this small country's sovereignty are described in Moscow, not Dushanbe. HOAGLAND

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