Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUBLIN623
2006-05-31 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dublin
Cable title:
PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES “HARD LINE†ON DEADLINE
how-toVZCZCXRO3343 RR RUEHAG DE RUEHDL #0623/01 1511637 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 311637Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7010 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0395 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
Wednesday, 31 May 2006, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES “HARD LINE†ON DEADLINE
FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
REF: DUBLIN 562
DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
Wednesday, 31 May 2006, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES “HARD LINE†ON DEADLINE
FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
REF: DUBLIN 562
DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary: The Irish Government would not agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Assembly to form an Executive, due to the likely distractions of the mid-2007 Irish general elections, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that fleshing out details for the Northern parties on a post-November fallback plan (“Plan Bâ€) would distract their attention from the deadline. (Comment: Whether or not the Irish and British Governments stick to the November 24 deadline, Ahern,s strong remarks are a clear signal to the parties, which the GOI would like the USG to reinforce in discussions with Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).) Ahern believed that Sinn Fein would not endorse joint policing except with the formation of the Executive, though he and Reiss concurred that there had been recent republican progress in interaction with the police. Ahern also expressed disappointment with the DUP,s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, and Reiss noted that DUP leader Ian Paisley was likely to ignore the November deadline in public defiance of the Irish and British Governments. In a separate discussion, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern told Reiss that a single, Southern-hosted investment conference on the North would be preferable to two separate conferences (a view that Northern Secretary Peter Hain accepted in a May 24 phone call with Reiss). In another meeting, Justice Minister Micheal McDowell briefed Reiss and the Ambassador on pending Northern-related legal casesXXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
The November 24 Deadline and Plan B
--------------
2. (C) Under no circumstances would the Irish Government agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Ireland Assembly to form an Executive, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. Ahern explained that, if the deadline were not met, “Plan B†(indefinite suspension of the Assembly and joint UK/Irish stewardship of the Northern political process) would take effect, as the campaign for the expected May 2007 Irish general elections would preclude his continued involvement in Northern negotiations. He added that he had been clear with the British Government on this point and that any effort to establish an Executive after November 24 would fall to the parties. Ahern said he would not be surprised, however, if the parties were to press for a delay beyond the deadline, notwithstanding the long lead-up to November. (Comment: Were the Irish and British Governments to hold the line on the November 24 deadline, they would be showing atypical resolve. We suspect that the decision whether or not to extend the deadline will be taken closer to the date.)
3. (C) While Plan B would help force the parties, feet to the fire, fleshing out Plan B in more detail now would distract the parties from the November 24 deadline, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, who also attended the meeting with Ahern and Reiss. In any case, Plan B has not been drafted, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. He expressed hope that the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) report due in early October would show enough republican progress on criminality to catalyze the negotiations, keeping the focus off Plan B. He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) risked a huge tactical error in believing that a deal might be achievable after November 24, since Sinn Fein might abandon the negotiation process completely after that deadline.
The DUP’s Refusal to Engage
--------------
4. (C) Ahern expressed disappointment with the DUP’s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, particularly “childish†tactics at the Northern Assembly Stormont Buildings like ducking out of elevators carrying Sinn Fein members. He pointed out that there had been over 30 instances of quiet contact between the DUP and Sinn Fein during the December 2004 negotiations. Since the collapse of those talks and the subsequent Northern Bank robbery and McCartney murder, engagement had ceased. Ahern cited Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams’ view that the IRA’s July 2005 decision to decommission weapons should have merited renewed contact with the DUP at some level, not
DUBLIN 00000623 002.2 OF 003
necessarily with DUP leader Ian Paisley. DUP resistance to engagement, he added, was leading the republican community to question Adams’ overall strategy for the peace process. Ahern admitted that he did not know what would make the DUP speak with Sinn Fein, and he hoped that the Northern Assembly’s proposed Restoration Committee might be a vehicle for interaction. (At roughly the same time as Special Envoy Reiss’ meeting with Ahern, Paisley announced that the DUP would not take part in the Committee as a mechanism for negotiations.)
Policing and Sinn Fein
--------------
5. (C) The Northern policing issue would not be resolved until the formation of the Executive, said Ahern. He elaborated that Sinn Fein tacticians would not want to “hand over their last card†with a commitment to joint policing before November, since the DUP would then discount that card in the negotiations. Ahern doubted that the DUP even wanted the devolution of policing at this point. He added that there was therefore little sense in making Sinn Fein endorsement for joint policing a precondition in the Northern negotiations. He added, however, that the republican community was increasingly amenable to such an endorsement.
2006: Good Progress and Next Steps
--------------
6. (C) On the whole, 2006 has been a very positive year, particularly in terms of progress in the republican community, Ahern observed. He noted that there was increasing engagement on the ground between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and republican areas of Belfast. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Irish and British Governments were pleasantly surprised by the public’s and parties’ reactions to the April 6 statement that the Assembly would reconvene. The only negative republican occurrences during the year, said Ahern, had been the April 4 murder of Denis Donaldson (the former IRA official who was out-ed as a British informant),the robbery of a liquor truck by alleged IRA members, and the discovery of a 250 lb. fertilizer bomb in Lurgan. Ahern maintained that these incidents were the work of IRA breakaway groups who were not connected with Sinn Fein leadership. He added that Sinn Fein seemed surprised and shaken by the Donaldson murder and, ironically, had supported the April 6 statement calling for reestablishment of Stormont even more strongly as a result.
7. (C) In terms of next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Prime Ministers Ahern and Blair planned to meet with all parties on June 26. In the expectation that there would be no progress by that point, the goal of the late June consultations would be to map out the agenda for the period remaining before late November. The Governments, added XXXXXXXXXXXX, would then “bed down for the summer.†He explained that the Irish Government would continue to listen carefully to the parties’ rhetoric in order to gauge their seriousness about making the Good Friday Agreement work.
Reiss: No Urgency among Parties
--------------
8. (C) In his discussion with the Taoiseach (and in separate meetings, per paras below),Special Envoy Reiss reported from his May 19 discussions at Stormont that he sensed no urgency among the parties, particularly the DUP, to commence work on an Executive deal. He noted that DUP was likely to ignore the November 24 deadline in public defiance of the British and Irish Governments. The DUP also appeared confident that it could achieve in the first few months after November any deal that was achievable by November 24. Reiss elaborated that DUP leaders indicated no intention of engaging Sinn Fein, partly out of fear that negotiations with Gerry Adams would see the unionist community “lose its shirt.â€
9. (C) Sinn Fein leaders, by contrast, were relaxed in their discussions with Reiss, with Gerry Adams focused on USG permission for fund-raising activities in the United States in the fall. Reiss believed that Adams was prepared to endorse joint policing, not only to avoid blame if the November 24 deadline passed, but also to project a positive political image for Sinn Fein in the South’s 2007 general elections. Adams also suggested that a Sinn Fein Executive Council decision, rather than a full party conference, might be sufficient to endorse policing. Reiss agreed with the Taoiseach that there had been progress in the republican community, as was evident from friendly interaction with the PSNI that would have been impossible six months ago.
DUBLIN 00000623 003.2 OF 003
FM Ahern Opposes Proposals for Two Investment Conferences
-------------- --------------
10. (C) In a separate discussion that reviewed most of the issues raised in the Taoiseach’s meeting, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern said that there was no point in having two Northern Ireland investment conferences in the fall that would be sponsored by the North and South, respectively. He remarked that whereas plans for the proposed Northern-sponsored conference lacked focus and details, the South’s conference would work and would proceed regardless. Reiss agreed that a single conference would be better, and he asked for the opportunity to speak first to the British Government about this preference. (Comment: On May 24, Reiss discussed the conference proposal with Northern Secretary Peter Hain, who agreed to put off the Northern-sponsored conference until 2007.)
DOJ Update on Legal Cases
--------------
11. (C) Special Envoy Reiss and the Ambassador also met with Minister of Justice and Equality Michael McDowell. Irish Department of Justice (DOJ)officialsXXXXXXXXXXXX who made the following points about Northern Ireland-related legal cases:
XXXXXXXXXXXX
B) Money Launderers. Before November, the Irish Government would bring charges against several individuals connected to the police seizure of several million pound sterling in February 2005, believed to be from the 2004 Northern Bank robbery.XXXXXXXXXXXX
E) Denis Donaldson. McDowell believed that the out-ing of Denis Donaldson as an informant was a clear message from the British Government that it had another, more valuable, source of information within the republican leadership. He reiterated the Taoiseach’s point, however, that Sinn Fein leaders appeared to have had no connection to Donaldson’s murder. KENNY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES “HARD LINE†ON DEADLINE
FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
REF: DUBLIN 562
DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary: The Irish Government would not agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Assembly to form an Executive, due to the likely distractions of the mid-2007 Irish general elections, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that fleshing out details for the Northern parties on a post-November fallback plan (“Plan Bâ€) would distract their attention from the deadline. (Comment: Whether or not the Irish and British Governments stick to the November 24 deadline, Ahern,s strong remarks are a clear signal to the parties, which the GOI would like the USG to reinforce in discussions with Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).) Ahern believed that Sinn Fein would not endorse joint policing except with the formation of the Executive, though he and Reiss concurred that there had been recent republican progress in interaction with the police. Ahern also expressed disappointment with the DUP,s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, and Reiss noted that DUP leader Ian Paisley was likely to ignore the November deadline in public defiance of the Irish and British Governments. In a separate discussion, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern told Reiss that a single, Southern-hosted investment conference on the North would be preferable to two separate conferences (a view that Northern Secretary Peter Hain accepted in a May 24 phone call with Reiss). In another meeting, Justice Minister Micheal McDowell briefed Reiss and the Ambassador on pending Northern-related legal casesXXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
The November 24 Deadline and Plan B
--------------
2. (C) Under no circumstances would the Irish Government agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Ireland Assembly to form an Executive, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. Ahern explained that, if the deadline were not met, “Plan B†(indefinite suspension of the Assembly and joint UK/Irish stewardship of the Northern political process) would take effect, as the campaign for the expected May 2007 Irish general elections would preclude his continued involvement in Northern negotiations. He added that he had been clear with the British Government on this point and that any effort to establish an Executive after November 24 would fall to the parties. Ahern said he would not be surprised, however, if the parties were to press for a delay beyond the deadline, notwithstanding the long lead-up to November. (Comment: Were the Irish and British Governments to hold the line on the November 24 deadline, they would be showing atypical resolve. We suspect that the decision whether or not to extend the deadline will be taken closer to the date.)
3. (C) While Plan B would help force the parties, feet to the fire, fleshing out Plan B in more detail now would distract the parties from the November 24 deadline, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, who also attended the meeting with Ahern and Reiss. In any case, Plan B has not been drafted, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. He expressed hope that the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) report due in early October would show enough republican progress on criminality to catalyze the negotiations, keeping the focus off Plan B. He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) risked a huge tactical error in believing that a deal might be achievable after November 24, since Sinn Fein might abandon the negotiation process completely after that deadline.
The DUP’s Refusal to Engage
--------------
4. (C) Ahern expressed disappointment with the DUP’s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, particularly “childish†tactics at the Northern Assembly Stormont Buildings like ducking out of elevators carrying Sinn Fein members. He pointed out that there had been over 30 instances of quiet contact between the DUP and Sinn Fein during the December 2004 negotiations. Since the collapse of those talks and the subsequent Northern Bank robbery and McCartney murder, engagement had ceased. Ahern cited Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams’ view that the IRA’s July 2005 decision to decommission weapons should have merited renewed contact with the DUP at some level, not
DUBLIN 00000623 002.2 OF 003
necessarily with DUP leader Ian Paisley. DUP resistance to engagement, he added, was leading the republican community to question Adams’ overall strategy for the peace process. Ahern admitted that he did not know what would make the DUP speak with Sinn Fein, and he hoped that the Northern Assembly’s proposed Restoration Committee might be a vehicle for interaction. (At roughly the same time as Special Envoy Reiss’ meeting with Ahern, Paisley announced that the DUP would not take part in the Committee as a mechanism for negotiations.)
Policing and Sinn Fein
--------------
5. (C) The Northern policing issue would not be resolved until the formation of the Executive, said Ahern. He elaborated that Sinn Fein tacticians would not want to “hand over their last card†with a commitment to joint policing before November, since the DUP would then discount that card in the negotiations. Ahern doubted that the DUP even wanted the devolution of policing at this point. He added that there was therefore little sense in making Sinn Fein endorsement for joint policing a precondition in the Northern negotiations. He added, however, that the republican community was increasingly amenable to such an endorsement.
2006: Good Progress and Next Steps
--------------
6. (C) On the whole, 2006 has been a very positive year, particularly in terms of progress in the republican community, Ahern observed. He noted that there was increasing engagement on the ground between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and republican areas of Belfast. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Irish and British Governments were pleasantly surprised by the public’s and parties’ reactions to the April 6 statement that the Assembly would reconvene. The only negative republican occurrences during the year, said Ahern, had been the April 4 murder of Denis Donaldson (the former IRA official who was out-ed as a British informant),the robbery of a liquor truck by alleged IRA members, and the discovery of a 250 lb. fertilizer bomb in Lurgan. Ahern maintained that these incidents were the work of IRA breakaway groups who were not connected with Sinn Fein leadership. He added that Sinn Fein seemed surprised and shaken by the Donaldson murder and, ironically, had supported the April 6 statement calling for reestablishment of Stormont even more strongly as a result.
7. (C) In terms of next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Prime Ministers Ahern and Blair planned to meet with all parties on June 26. In the expectation that there would be no progress by that point, the goal of the late June consultations would be to map out the agenda for the period remaining before late November. The Governments, added XXXXXXXXXXXX, would then “bed down for the summer.†He explained that the Irish Government would continue to listen carefully to the parties’ rhetoric in order to gauge their seriousness about making the Good Friday Agreement work.
Reiss: No Urgency among Parties
--------------
8. (C) In his discussion with the Taoiseach (and in separate meetings, per paras below),Special Envoy Reiss reported from his May 19 discussions at Stormont that he sensed no urgency among the parties, particularly the DUP, to commence work on an Executive deal. He noted that DUP was likely to ignore the November 24 deadline in public defiance of the British and Irish Governments. The DUP also appeared confident that it could achieve in the first few months after November any deal that was achievable by November 24. Reiss elaborated that DUP leaders indicated no intention of engaging Sinn Fein, partly out of fear that negotiations with Gerry Adams would see the unionist community “lose its shirt.â€
9. (C) Sinn Fein leaders, by contrast, were relaxed in their discussions with Reiss, with Gerry Adams focused on USG permission for fund-raising activities in the United States in the fall. Reiss believed that Adams was prepared to endorse joint policing, not only to avoid blame if the November 24 deadline passed, but also to project a positive political image for Sinn Fein in the South’s 2007 general elections. Adams also suggested that a Sinn Fein Executive Council decision, rather than a full party conference, might be sufficient to endorse policing. Reiss agreed with the Taoiseach that there had been progress in the republican community, as was evident from friendly interaction with the PSNI that would have been impossible six months ago.
DUBLIN 00000623 003.2 OF 003
FM Ahern Opposes Proposals for Two Investment Conferences
-------------- --------------
10. (C) In a separate discussion that reviewed most of the issues raised in the Taoiseach’s meeting, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern said that there was no point in having two Northern Ireland investment conferences in the fall that would be sponsored by the North and South, respectively. He remarked that whereas plans for the proposed Northern-sponsored conference lacked focus and details, the South’s conference would work and would proceed regardless. Reiss agreed that a single conference would be better, and he asked for the opportunity to speak first to the British Government about this preference. (Comment: On May 24, Reiss discussed the conference proposal with Northern Secretary Peter Hain, who agreed to put off the Northern-sponsored conference until 2007.)
DOJ Update on Legal Cases
--------------
11. (C) Special Envoy Reiss and the Ambassador also met with Minister of Justice and Equality Michael McDowell. Irish Department of Justice (DOJ)officialsXXXXXXXXXXXX who made the following points about Northern Ireland-related legal cases:
XXXXXXXXXXXX
B) Money Launderers. Before November, the Irish Government would bring charges against several individuals connected to the police seizure of several million pound sterling in February 2005, believed to be from the 2004 Northern Bank robbery.XXXXXXXXXXXX
E) Denis Donaldson. McDowell believed that the out-ing of Denis Donaldson as an informant was a clear message from the British Government that it had another, more valuable, source of information within the republican leadership. He reiterated the Taoiseach’s point, however, that Sinn Fein leaders appeared to have had no connection to Donaldson’s murder. KENNY