PRE-GAERC RESPONSE: IRELAND NOT CONSIDERING BALKAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 000277 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD EUN YI MW SR BK BO IR IZ, SU, CY, TU, EU, EI SUBJECT: PRE-GAERC RESPONSE: IRELAND NOT CONSIDERING BALKAN INCENTIVES OR IRAN SANCTIONS REF: A. STATE 39905 ¶B. STATE 16987 ¶C. YOUNG-MOWREY E-MAIL OF MARCH 13 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jonathan Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 15, Post delivered ref A and B demarche points to Jim Kelly, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU Correspondent. Regarding the Balkans, Kelly said that Member States would respect the electorate's chosen outcome in the Montenegrin referendum, but had not begun to develop incentives for Belgrade and Pristina in support of Kosovo's final status process. On the Doha negotiations, the GOI doubted that the April deadline for defining modalities on manufactured and agricultural goods would be met. Kelly cited the GOI,s continuing difficulties in identifying reconstruction projects to fund in Iraq amid continuing sectarian violence, and he noted that Ireland and Member States were not ready to consider national measures against Iran outside the EU-3 process. Similarly, the GOI had not begun to consider the possibility of UNSC sanctions for Sudan. Kelly was unfamiliar with the Commission's responsibilities for electricity generation in Liberia, but he highlighted Ireland's continuing strong interest in the country, with 430 Irish troops participating in UNMIL. End summary. Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) Member States recognize the central role to be played by the EU in Kosovo after a political settlement, but have not yet begun to develop specific incentives for Belgrade and Pristina in support of the status talks, said Kelly. Planning for the EU presence in Kosovo following the status outcome, he noted, was already underway at the EU Council Secretariat level. Kelly also recounted that UN Special SIPDIS Envoy Ahtisaari had positively assessed the status process at the March 10-11 Gymnich. While Ahtisaari did not underestimate remaining challenges, he underscored that the Contact Group had instilled a sense of realism among the parties involved. Montenegro -------------- ¶3. (C) With parameters now agreed for Montenegro's referendum, the EU is prepared to support any outcome chosen by the electorate, said Kelly. He praised EU High Representative Lajcak's successful "high-wire act" in 
bringing all parties to agreement on the referendum's ground rules. He added that the GOI, like the USG, regarded complaints about the possibility of a "gray zone" vote as counterproductive. Bosnia -------------- ¶4. (C) Kelly recalled that Milosevic's March 11 death, tellingly, had no measurable impact on the Gymnich discussions between EU ministers and Balkan ministers the same day. He observed that whereas five years ago such news would have disrupted the meeting, the Balkan interlocutors on March 11 continued along with discussion of workaday issues, such as visa facilitation. The fact that so little was said about the death at the meeting reflected, for Kelly, the parties, focus on the future and their willingness to consign Milosevic to history. WTO --- ¶5. (C) On the WTO, Kelly referred emboff to Donal Kelly, DFA Deputy Director of EU External Relations, who reiterated familiar GOI comments that agriculture remained a sensitive sector for Ireland. He noted that Ireland was nevertheless not a "one-issue" country and that the GOI hoped to see simultaneous progress on the agriculture, services, and NAMA components of the Doha negotiations. Kelly cited a recent statement by Prime Minister Ahern expressing support for Agriculture Minister Coughlan's approach to the Doha talks. (Per ref C, Ahern's statement called for equal treatment of all forms of farm subsidies, "maximum protection" for Irish agricultural producers and exporters, and maintenance of the CAP reform limits.) Kelly added his personal view that the April deadline for defining modalities on manufacture and agricultural goods would not be met, notwithstanding the EU's stated intention of working toward that goal. He also said that the GAERC would probably not issue conclusions on the Doha negotiations. Iran -------------- ¶6. (C) Ireland and Member States wish to continue to address the Iranian nuclear issue through the EU-3 process and are not at the stage of considering national measures against Tehran, according to Kelly. Ireland, he elaborated, was content with current arrangements for the EU-3 to speak for Member States, an approach that proved effective in bringing Iran to the UNSC. Kelly mentioned that Ireland and most Member States, however, favored a broader EU strategic engagement with Iran, to include interaction on Tehran's poor human rights record. He also reiterated previous observations that DFA communication with the Iranian embassy in Dublin was complicated by the recall of the former Iranian ambassador for suspicious personal financial activities. Iraq -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOI is pleased with the EU statement condemning the Samarra mosque bombing and will not make an independent statement, said Kelly. In terms of Irish assistance to Iraq, he cited difficulties in disbursing the remaining half of a euro 3 million commitment to EU reconstruction efforts. Repeating comments in previous GAERC demarches, Kelly explained that continued sectarian violence complicated the GOI,s efforts to identify viable reconstruction projects for funding. He added, however, that the violence underscored the need for long-term international support of the Iraqi government. Sudan -------------- ¶8. (C) The EU has invested heavily in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and hopes to see the mission function effectively on the path to a UN re-hatting, according to Kelly. The GOI understood that AMIS would continue for six months, with a subsequent re-hatting in the context of a settlement among the Abuja parties. Regarding ref A's reference to targeted UNSC sanctions, Kelly said that the GOI had not begun to consider "where sanctions might fit into the process." He predicted that the GAERC conclusions would include strong criticism of the Sudanese Government, but that the ministers, discussions might not encompass the sanctions option. Liberia -------------- ¶9. (C) Kelly said that he was unfamiliar with the Commission's responsibilities on electricity generation in Liberia, but he committed to forward this demarche point to Irish Aid (the new name for Development Cooperation Ireland, the development agency within DFA). Kelly noted that Irish Aid could take up the issue with the European Development Fund Committee, which he believed was the locus of Commission development efforts on Liberia. He pointed out that Ireland had strong interests in Liberia, with 430 Irish troops participating in UNMIL. Regarding UNSYG Annan's recent request for Ireland to extend its participation to June 2007, Kelly pointed out that the mission had been previously extended and that Ireland would have to coordinate with Sweden, a UNMIL partner. He also highlighted the risk of over-stretch, as Ireland was considering a possible UN mission in the Congo. Cyprus -------------- ¶10. (C) The Irish Government has not formed an official view on Turkey's January 24 proposal, besides welcoming the gesture, commented Kelly. He said that Ireland and other Member States were focused on UNSYG Annan's reaction to the proposal, since, as noted in ref B points, the UN offered the most appropriate framework for resolution of the Cyprus dispute. He added that the GOI had long supported Turkey's EU candidacy and now saw the Turkish proposal as the first evidence of the potential of the accession process for Turkish-Cypriot relations. BENTON