GOI THOUGHTS ON PEACE PROCESS AND SAINT PATRICK'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000149

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR EI NIPP
SUBJECT: GOI THOUGHTS ON PEACE PROCESS AND SAINT PATRICK'S
DAY

Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Begin Summary. On January 30, the Taoiseach, the
ministers of foreign affairs and justice, and other senior
Irish officials told Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss that the
GOI would like to see the Northern Ireland institutions
restored in 2006 on the basis of the Good Friday Agreement.
The foreign ministry painted the rosiest picture; the
Taoiseach was more realistic about the challenges. He said
he did not expect major breakthroughs until after the April
IMC report, since the February IMC report did not give a
clean bill of health to Sinn Fein and the IRA. The
Taoiseach noted that the White House Saint Patrick's Day
events were significant. He said that his meeting with the
President is what the Irish government most values, but that
there would also need to be a Northern Ireland dimension. In
the Taoiseach's view, the most effective tactic would be to
invite all the parties as members of a large reception, but
not to do a special event for them and not to pick a Northern
Ireland-based theme, as in recent years. The Taoiseach felt
that excluding the parties would simply give them an excuse
to play the martyr card; including them in a larger reception
would give the President an opportunity to deliver a clear
message to all parties. At a private luncheon, President
McAleese and Dr. McAleese suggested that more involvement by
the U.S. with loyalist militias (specifically, a meeting with
the Special Envoy) would help move these groups to
decommission. End Summary

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Taoiseach, Collins Discuss the Peace Process and the DUP
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2. (C) Michael Collins, Secretary General and senior Foreign
Affairs advisor to the Taoiseach, reviewed the Taoiseach's
meeting with PM Blair several days previous. He said that
the two agreed that the institutions should be back up within
the year but decided against setting a public deadline. He
noted that there was discussion of publicly saying that the
institutions should be up before the marching season begins,
but that the risks of not meeting a precise deadline were too
high. He said the two prime ministers also had agreed "to
churn the process" in order to keep Ian Paisely's DUP party
on edge. The regular meetings between FM Ahern, Northern
Secretary Hain and the parties are designed to keep the

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pressure on the DUP, as are efforts to strengthen North-South
cooperation. Asked how far down the road the GOI would take
North-South cooperation, Collins indicated that the Irish
government would be prepared to have the GOI and HMG make
more decisions together on administering Northern Ireland but
is uncertain how far the UK is prepared to go. The Taoiseach
joined the meeting at this point, and said that the Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) would oppose joint Irish-British
decision making and that to date, "Number Ten does not deal
with the micro issues" of governing northern Ireland.


3. (C) Discussion about DUP intentions followed, with
Collins repeating the view that it is hard to read Ian
Paisley, that one moment he seems to want to see the
institutions up so that he can be First Minister and the next
moment, he seems to want to end his days the way he has lived
them: railing against nationalists and refusing to share
power with Sinn Fein. Practically, Collins agreed, there is
not much incentive for DUP to engage now. DUP believes that
a post-Blair British government would be more in its
interests and it is not facing any pressure from its
constituents to stand the institutions up.


4. (C) The Taoiseach said there are two ways of moving the
DUP. One way is to publicly blame the DUP for lack of
movement, but that is not the best move tactically. The
other way is re-engagement on North-South elements of the
Good Friday Agreement, including more ministerial meetings
and using the North-South and East-West bodies to take
substantive decisions in areas such as fire fighting,
establishing an all-island register of pedophiles, and
coordinating infrastructure spending, such as on roads,
electricity and telecommunications. Collins added that while
the GOI was considering points of leverage on the DUP, it was
not planning to use them until after the talks among FM
Ahern, Northern Secretary Hain and the parties had gotten
underway.

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A Deal in 2006?
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5.(C) We asked Collins and the Taoiseach to clarify the
difference between the GOI's determination in public and at
the DFA to see the institutions up this year and their own
seemingly more pessimistic view of bringing DUP along.
Collins said that they are watching to see if the ongoing
talks with the parties create a momentum and show the DUP
that the ship is turning, thereby encouraging them to engage.


6. (C) The Taoiseach said that at this moment, the DUP wants
to drag talks out until elections in Ireland and the UK, both
likely in 2007. He said that the GOI will keep talking with
the DUP but that the GOI "can only play along so long. We
need to make political decisions at some point. We also need
to see what nationalists do, especially as they protest lack
of reciprocity from the DUP." After the April IMC report,
the Taoiseach said, "no one will have patience with DUP."
"Never in their life have the DUP made a positive decision,"
said the Taoiseach.


7. (C) The Taoiseach said that if the DUP did not engage in
the process, he would consider giving a speech in which he
reminded people that the Republic of Ireland had changed its
constitution to relinquish its claim to Northern Ireland only
on the basis of the promise of the Good Friday Agreement. If
that promise is not met, he said, he would indicate that
Ireland could consider changing its constitution again.
Comment: that Ireland relinquished its constitutional claim
to Northern Ireland was a major change and a cornerstone of
the Good Friday Agreement. The Taoiseach's comment that he
would consider suggesting Ireland could go back on that is
stunning. He confided that he has already mentioned this
scenario to Blair. While it is unlikely that Ireland would
revisit the constitutional issue, a speech from the Taoiseach
even hinting that they might would have major repercussions.
Given that 2007 is an election year for the Taoiseach, it is
certainly possible that the Taoiseach would give such a
speech, strengthening his nationalist credentials before
voters go to the polls. End Comment.

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Saint Patrick's Day
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8. (C) The Taoiseach opened discussion of Saint Patrick's
Day events in Washington by saying that he could "see the
dilemma" the U.S. might be facing in trying to decide whether
or not to invite the parties. He repeated that the most
important aspect of the day was his meeting with the
President and an emphasis on the bilateral relationship. At
the same time, he said, the best way to handle the parties
was to invite them all, cut out any special Northern
Ireland-focused ceremony and simply include them in a low-key
way in the general reception. The President, he said, could
address the parties collectively, in an even-handed way. He
could offer credit where credit was due, such as on
decommissioning, but could also send a clear message to the
parties, including on policing. In this way, the USG could
give an impetus to talks to restore the institutions. On the
other hand, excluding the parties would simply give them the
martyr card they both like to play. "It's always an
advantage to northern parties to be excluded" he said.

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President and Dr. McAleese Discuss Loyalists
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9. (C) Over lunch, President McAleese expressed the view
that the DUP would not move without pressure, and that the
"gradual greening of the north" is likely to be the most
effective pressure. London's approach, she said, has always
been appeasement. Martin McAleese briefed Ambassador Reiss
on his contacts with loyalist militias, the desire of many
within this group to play a more positive role, and their
frustration at being isolated, by the DUP as much as by the
NIO. Dr. McAleese broached the idea that a meeting between
some of the loyalist leaders and the U.S. Special Envoy for
Northern Ireland could help move the loyalists toward
decommissioning.
BENTON