UNODC OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DRUGS, POLITICS IN IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 002598

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2016
TAGS: PGOV SNAR IR SOCI
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DRUGS, POLITICS IN IRAN

REF: A. DUBAI 1452; B. DUBAI 528; C. 5089

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1.(C) Summary: Tehran-based representative of the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Roberto Arbitrio recently discussed with
PolEconChief the work of UNODC in Iran and various aspects of
the drug problem in Iran. UNODC's Tehran office is involved in
projects related to all aspects of the drug problem, including
supply and demand reduction, judicial reform, and police
training, as well as human trafficking. Arbitrio also discussed
his own assessment of the political situation in Iran since
President Ahmadinejad took office. He also said reputable
sources had told him Iran recently gave Iraqi radical cleric
Muqtada Al-Sadr 50 million USD. End summary

2.(C) In an April 6 meeting -- which included UNODC staff, UNVIE
Deputy Pol/Econ Counselor, and PolEconChief -- Italian UNODC
Iran Field Representative Roberto Arbitrio (please protect)
discussed UNODC's operations in Iran. Its three strategic
objectives are to assist the government in reducing trafficking
in narcotics into, within, and outside the country; to
contribute to the development of effective prevention,
treatment, and rehabilitation measures in drug abuse and
HIV/AIDS; and to promote the rule of law through strengthened
crime prevention measures and the provision of legal assistance,
including in the areas of crime prevention, anti-corruption, and
human trafficking. (Note: This cable focuses primarily on
Arbitrio's assessment of the drug situation; full UNODC
documentation of its programs in Iran is being sent by pouch to
INL. End note)

Supply Reduction
--------------

3.(C) Anti-narcotic forces monitor Iran's borders, particularly
the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. While they are
police in name, they operate with more of a military mentality.
Arbitrio, who has visited sections of Iran's borders, reports
that much of the border is heavily fortified, but that there are
problems monitoring mountainous regions. Furthermore, the
smugglers are heavily armed and willing to shoot. He said the
heads of smuggling groups factor into their operations that a
percentage of smugglers will be killed and a percentage of the
drugs confiscated. Iranian soldiers die regularly in
interdiction efforts, in part because the smugglers often are
better armed. Iran raised once with UNODC its wish list of
high-tech equipment for drug interdiction operations, such as
drones and satellite phones, but now seems to understand UNODC
will not play a role in any such acquisitions. (Note: Iran did
not attempt to reintroduce a resolution during the most recent
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2006 in Vienna that
would have facilitated access to remote sensing through UNODC.
End note)

4.(C) Most of Iran's interdiction efforts are along the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border. This has frustrated Turkey, which
has accused Iran of doing little to stop the outflow of drugs
into its territory. However, Arbitrio has heard that
Iranian-Turkish cooperation is improving. (Note: During the
October 2005 Paris Pact meeting in Istanbul, Turkey and Iran
were encouraged to increase cross-border law enforcement
cooperation. However, Turkish diplomats in Vienna have told
UNVIE Poloff that there is still little trust between the two
sides. End note]. However, he said, the military forces
controlling both sides of the Iran-Iraq border are doing much to
stop drug smuggling. Arbitrio reported that there appear to be
two routes running through Iraq: one in the north, involving
Kurdish smuggling to Turkey; and one in the south through the
Basra region and then onward to either Jordan or the Gulf.

5.(C) Arbitrio reported it is clearer who controls the drug
trade along the borders than inside the country. Powerful
families in Sistan-va Baluchistan control the input into Iran,
and, as mentioned, to the west Iranian Kurds are helping onward
smuggling into Iraq. There is also evidence of Iranian
involvement in the drug trade in Europe, although he could not
say if these Iranians were from one particular region or ethnic
group. However, he said it is less clear who handles the
internal drug trade in Iran.

6.(C) He also noted that most of the refined opium coming into
Iran is processed in Afghanistan, not in Iran, although he has
heard indications some opium is now being processed after it
enters Iraq, in labs in Basra. Arbitrio said that the head of
the Iranian Drug Control Headquarters, Fada Hossein Maleki, told
him that he believed the Basra route and production facilities
were an increasing problem. Arbitrio said that he has seen
little evidence of production of synthetic drugs in Iran, but
mentioned he had heard of two recent large drug seizures,
including one in Mashhad, of ecstasy.

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7.(C) He acknowledged that his sources on drug issues are for
the most part the Iranian government, and that the UNODC reports
to Iran's Drug Control office. That said, he said he did not
see indications of sanctioned government involvement in the drug
trade, other than isolated cases of bribery of local officials.

Demand Reduction
--------------

8.(C) Arbitrio says the new government wants religion to play a
bigger role in addiction treatment and surmises this could be
one reason for increased budgets for the bonyads. He thought
that one motivating factor for the government to take on the
drug program was the fact that reports of high levels of
addiction hurt the image it wants to project as a religious,
morally superior nation. The government also sees in the issue
an area for positive interaction with other countries,
particularly given that other countries will suffer from Iranian
inactivity against drug traffic.

9.(C) In a discussion of the proposed boot camps to sequester
drug users from the general prison population (Ref A),Arbitrio
said this government initiative was a response to an order from
the president to "do something" about addicts. Drug addiction
treatment is mandatory in these boot camps. According to
Arbitrio, the Ministry of Health and others opposed the concept,
but they downplayed their opposition until the government
shifted its attention. There were supposed to be "thousands" of
these boot camps, a number then revised to "hundreds," and
finally resulting in "dozens" of them.

10.(C) Arbitrio and other foreign representatives have visited
some prisons in Iran. He acknowledged that he cannot speak
about conditions for political prisoners there, but said that
conditions for the general prison population were much better
than what he has seen on prison visits in Central Asian
countries.

11.(U) UNODC has a special anti-addiction program in the city of
Bam, where drug use has skyrocketed after the 2003 earthquake
there.

12.(C) Arbitrio also said that although the Ministry of Health's
drug-related statistics are basically reliable, the new
government is trying to resurrect 1999 numbers of around a
million drug users. Current statistics indicate 4.5 to 6
million drug users.

Rule of Law
--------------

13.(C) In the past, the Iranian government claimed that Iran had
no problem with organized crime, but it is now starting up an
anti-organized crime unit. UNODC is working with the Iranian
government to train officers to conduct investigations, as well
as training judiciary. It also has a program to work against
human trafficking.

Foreign Partners
--------------

14.(C) Foreign contributions - which fund the bulk of UNODC
programs in Iran - have continued, despite the chill in Iran's
international relations. However, UNODC has not received any
foreign funding for one project for increased internal drug
surveillance at airports, train stations, etc.

15.(C) Arbitrio praised US academic institutions' involvement
with drug efforts in Iran, including high-level Iranian
officials participating in US university programs (Ref B and C).
He also praised the US State Department's annual report on
drugs for reflecting Iranian counter-narcotic efforts.

Arbitrio's Assessment of Iranian Politics
--------------

16.(C) According to Arbitrio, the Iranian government continues
to work with UNODC and overall, has made little change to its
drug policies since Ahmadinejad became president. Arbitrio
noted that the biggest change impacting him was increased
surveillance of his activities. He also noted a degree of
crackdown on NGOs accused of acting on behalf of foreign
governments.

17.(C) Arbitrio said there was an ongoing power struggle between
conservative pragmatists and hard-line conservatives, resulting
in mismanagement of the government. He said he had met

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Ahmadinejad at a meeting for foreign ambassadors and
multilateral organization representatives, and had concluded the
new president is a "true believer" in his religious rhetoric.
Ahmadinejad's only message that day to his audience was "bring
back monotheism and study the message of the prophets."
Arbitrio thinks the supreme leader initially thought he could
control Ahmadinejad but has since tried to distance himself from
him. Khamenei empowered Rafsanjani (by giving oversight
responsibility to the Expediency Council, which Rafsanjani
chairs),but Arbitrio said he has seen no follow through action.
He said he has heard - anecdotally - that there have been five
attempts on the president's life, and that the motivation for
these attempts was related to internal power struggles, not
ethnic strife. He mentioned separately the recent attack
targeting provincial officials in Sistan-va Baluchistan and said
he had heard that armed men split the government delegation on
the bus into Sunni and Shia and killed the Shia. He questioned
the assumption that the perpetrators were drug smugglers, asking
why they would deliberately try to stir up trouble in their area
of operation.

18.(C) Arbitrio did not have a high opinion of the intellectual
skills of the new government. He mentioned that Supreme Council
for National Security Chairman Ali Larijani did not have a "high
intellect," and that people he knew from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs were not impressed with the rest of the nuclear
negotiating team.

19.(C) He is hearing rumors that the new Assembly of Experts,
following next November's election, will try to push out Supreme
Leader Khamenei. He doubts that Ahmadinejad will be pushed out
of the scene, saying he is making full use of his presidential
powers but is nonetheless a puppet for the "people in Qom."

20.(C) Finally, Arbitrio said "knowledgeable sources"
(presumably governmental officials) told him Iran gave Iraqi
radical cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr 50 million USD during Sadr's trip
to Iran.

Comment
--------------

21.(C) Arbitrio's comments on the drug situation in Iran
complements what we are hearing from Iranian medical personnel
involved in drug treatment programs (Ref A-C),and Arbitrio
seemed to share their pragmatic attitude toward drug policy. It
is particularly noteworthy that UNODC has included in its
efforts a project on combating human trafficking. Arbitrio's
comments on the political situation are useful, as an outsider
(an Italian) living in Tehran and working with the Iranian
government; however, it is difficult to assess how plugged in he
is. He asked to keep in continued contact but said it was not
advisable to be in direct communication while he is in Tehran.

22.(U) This message was cleared by UNVIE.
DAVIS