IRAN'S HOJJATIYEH SOCIETY (C-NES-01487)

S E C R E T DUBAI 001319 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/8/2016 TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM PINR SUBJECT: IRAN'S HOJJATIYEH SOCIETY (C-NES-01487) CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) 1.(C) Summary: Iran's Hojjatiyeh Society is a secretive, anti-Baha'i religious-economic group, reportedly centered in Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tehran. Sheikh Mahmud Halabi founded the group in 1953 and remains its leader, but it is unclear if members view him as a marja-e taqlid (source of emulation). The secrecy surrounding the group makes it very difficult to identify possible members and a precise agenda. There are differing views on whether President Ahmadinejad is an adherent, and on who his "source of emulation" is. End summary. Who They Are -------------- 2.(C) According to a Dubai-based Iranian businessman who claims to have relatives who are members of the group, Iran's Hojjatiyeh Society is a formally organized group with an economic, religious, and political agenda. Society members are very secretive and have no outward symbols, such as rings or medallions, that would publicly identify them as Hojjatiyeh members. The businessman had no additional information on how the group is organized or where or how often it meets. However, he indicated that the key centers for the group are Shiraz (where his family lives),Mashhad, and Tehran. 3.(C) Regarding details of their agenda, the businessman could only speak to their economic goals. He said they share the general desire of bazaaris to open up the economy and reduce the state's role. The businessman estimates -- without indicating the basis of the estimate -- that about ten percent of bazaaris in Iran are members of the Hojjatiyeh Society. He stated that these merchants provide monetary support to the group. He asserted that several years ago he personally witnessed a receipt from a bazaar merchant paying "zakat" (the amount that every Muslim must pay to support the poor) to the group. 4.(C) According to reporting by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),the Hojjatiyeh religious agenda is messianic in nature, maintaining that a "true Islamic government" must await the return of the hidden 12th Imam or Mahdi. Until that time, the group favors collective leadership of the religious community and opposes religious involvement in political affairs. It is widely believed that the group believes that only through chaos will the Twelfth Imam return to the world, and it is willing to contribute to manufacturing that chaos to precipitate his return. 5.(S) The historic anti-Baha'i leanings of the Hojjatiyeh Society are well-documented. An Iranian Baha'i FSN at ConGen Dubai recently told Conoff that the Hojjatiyeh Society retains these anti-Baha'i tendencies. It is not known, however, what role, if any, the group is playing in recent arrests of numerous Baha'is in Iran. According to information provided to post by an American Baha'i group, Iranian government harassment of Baha'is has recently increased, accompanied by a fatwa by clerics in Qom (nfi) that the killing of Baha'is is "a meritorious act" as they are considered apostate and are preventing the return of the 12th Imam. It is unknown if any of these clerics have ties to the group. (Note: According to Encyclopedia Iranica, Hojjatiyeh leaders are committed to a non-violent, persuasive strategy in dealing with Baha'is. The group's founder, Sheikh Halabi, was allegedly distraught by violence against Baha'is and repeatedly warned his followers that violence was not "their" way. End note.) 6.(S) A Jewish leader from Esfahan told PolEconChief that the Hojjatiyeh do not have an anti-Jewish agenda. He also said that he has Baha'i friends in Iran, and that in his view, the overall situation for Baha'is has improved over time. (He did not comment on whether their situation might have worsened in recent weeks or months.) 7.(C) Reports of renewed Hojjatiyeh Society activism began appearing in the Iranian press in 2002. The majority of these reports were anti-Hojjatiyeh. According to an RFE/RL report, Friday prayer leaders throughout Iran warned their congregations in early July 2004 of renewed Hojjatiyeh activities. According to Iranian press reports, an ayatollah in Shahrud in Khorasan province stated that Hojjatiyeh members were recruiting new members in the city's mosques. It is unclear what was new at the time - renewed activities by the group or publicity about the group. Since its resurgence, the Society's anti-Baha'i orientation has reportedly widened to encompass anti-Sunni activities as well, mainly as a means of fomenting chaos in order to bring about the return of the Mahdi. In two commentaries in Iranian newspapers in 2004, Rasul Montajabnia, a prominent member of the Militant Clerics Society - a key reformist clerical group - claimed that Hojjatiyeh members have actually stopped their fight against the Baha'i faith and turned their attention to creating divisions between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. History of the Hojjatiyeh Society -------------- 8.(U) Sheikh Mahmoud Tavallai, popularly known as Sheikh Mahmoud Halabi, founded the Hojjatiyeh Mahdavieh Society in 1953 to rid Iran of the Baha'i faith, according to RFE/RL. According to Encyclopedia Iranica, the group was established in order to defend Shi'a Islam against the "theological challenge" of the Baha'i faith. Sheikh Halabi was a preacher from Mashhad who supported Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. After the coup against Mossadeq later that same year, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi allowed the group to continue its anti-Baha'i activities in exchange for the clerical community's support for his continued rule. The group's anti-Baha'i activities allegedly were non-violent in nature and included the creation of a number of different "teams of operations," including: 1) a "guidance" team which was to debate Baha'i missionaries, persuade Baha'is to return to Islam, and neutralize the effects of Baha'i missionary activity; 2) "instructional" and "authorship" teams which worked together to standardize instructional materials; 3) a "public speaking" team which organized weekly gatherings where they discussed Shia theology; and 4) an "intelligence" team which reportedly operated as a "fifth column" within the Baha'i faith and successfully penetrated the Baha'i leadership - with some "agents" even advancing to the rank of prominent Baha'i missionaries. 9.(U) Hojjatiyeh philosophy opposes the velayat-e faqih, or Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult, as the group opposes mixing religion with politics prior to the return of the Imam. Nonetheless, the group flourished immediately following the Islamic revolution of 1979 because Sheikh Halabi, fearing a communist takeover, urged his followers to vote in favor of the concept of velayat-e faqih in the December 1979 referendum on Iran's new form of government. Some cabinet members and other prominent clerics during this time allegedly had links to the Hojjatiyeh Society, including Ahmad Azari Qomi, Ali Akbar Parvaresh, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Abolqasem Khazali, and former Majles speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri. 10.(C) Within a few years of the revolution, the Iranian leadership grew increasingly concerned about the group's secretiveness and its members' success (presumably political), SIPDIS according to a report by RFE/RL. During a speech in July 1983, Ayatollah Khomeini attacked the group and its conviction that chaos must be created in order to hurry the return of the Mahdi. He called upon the Iranian people to "get rid of this factionalism," and the group announced its dissolution the same day. Both press and contacts report that Khomeini actually banned the group. The group's dissolution, however, did not mean an end to its role in politics, and members reportedly continued to serve in key political positions according to Iranian press. According to the Dubai-based businessman, society members also moved into the Basij and, to some extent, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Hojjatiyeh Divides into Three Groups -------------- 11.(S) Bijan Khajehpour (please protect),an Iranian political and economic analyst, told PolEconchief that after the Hojjatiyeh Society was dissolved, it broke into three separate groups. One group of non-clerics entered the Islamic Coalition Society (Jami'at-e Motalefeh-e Eslami) -- a traditional conservative group linked to the bazaar -- to focus mainly on economic issues. Another group formed the more politically oriented Mahdaviat group and set up camp in Mashhad. (Note: According to Iranian press reports, 30 Mahdaviat members were found guilty of an assassination attempt in 1999 against the chief of Tehran's justice department and plotting against then President Mohammad Khatami, Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, and Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi. At least two of these men were sentenced to death, including Hassan Milani, the grandson of Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Hadi Miliani. End note.) 12.(S) The third group, comprised of clerics, realigned themselves around the Haqqani theological seminary in Qom. The Haqqani seminary was founded in 1963 by four clerics with close ties to Ayatollah Khomeini, including Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who currently heads the Council of Guardians. (Note: The Haqqani seminary was reportedly originally founded to modernize seminary training to equip clerics to deal with present day issues. Khajehpour's theory of the division of the group aside, Iranians still refer to Hojjatiyeh as an entity in Iranian society. For the purpose of our research, we use the term Hojjatiyeh in the sense of one entity.) Is He or Isn't He? -------------- 13.(S) We have heard differing views on whether President Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hojjatiyeh Society. An Iranian Baha'i FSN at ConGen Dubai told Conoff that it is widely believed among Iranians that Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hojjatiyeh Society. The Jewish leader from Esfahan echoed this view. This belief is likely the result of Ahmadinejad's apparently close ties to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, head of the Haqqani seminary. Soon after the first round of Iran's presidential elections in June 2005, an Iranian blogger posted an Internet link to a website that claimed Ahmadinejad was Mesbah Yazdi's son-in-law. (Note: The Iranian government has since blocked this link. End Note.) 14.(S) In contrast, Khajehpour claimed President Ahmadinejad is not a Hojjatiyeh believer, but instead a genuine populist. He said Ahmadinejad's driving force is more social than religious and that the president believes he is on a mission from God to bring social justice to the world. To achieve this, he wants to return the revolution to its ideological roots of revolutionary socialism. His view, Khajehpour said, is at odds with the view of the Mahdaviat, which is prepared to sacrifice society in order to create the necessary chaos to bring back the Imam. 15.(S) Khajehpour claims that Supreme Leader Khamenei, not Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, is Ahmadinejad's source of emulation (marja-e taqlid),and his political model is the populist Mohammad Ali Rajai, prime minister in 1980, elected president in 1981, then assassinated soon after. The Jewish leader from Esfahan, however, echoed the probably more widely held view that Mesbah Yazdi was Ahmadinejad's source of emulation. 16.(S) Khajehpour believes Ahmadinejad aligned with the Haqqani school during the presidential elections for its support, promising it more room to maneuver if he won. Under Khatami, the followers of the Haqqani school were marginalized. For instance, Khajehpour said the Haqqani school produced the first wave of intelligence officials in Iran and its students had held onto the position of intelligence minister until Khatami broke with tradition and appointed Ali Yunesi, who was not a Haqqani graduate. Prior to the elections, Mesbah Yazdi reportedly issued a fatwa calling on basij (Islamic militia) members to vote for Ahmadinejad, according to an Asia Times report. Once elected, Ahmadinejad brought in Haqqani students as both intelligence minister (Hojjatoleslam Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ezhei) and interior minister (Mostafa Pour Mohammadi). Because of this link, the Asia Times report alleges these two are possibly Hojjatiyeh. 17.(C) Ahmadinejad is also suspected of links to the Hojjatiyeh Society because of decisions he undertook both as mayor of Tehran and as president. As mayor, Ahmadinejad reportedly instructed the city council to build a "grand avenue" from Qom to Tehran to prepare for the Mahdi. Since becoming president, he has reportedly begun the construction of a direct rail line between Tehran and Jamkaran - the location of a shrine dedicated to the Mahdi. His cabinet has also allocated $17 million to build a new mosque near the shrine. Whether or not Ahmadinejad is a member of the group, the Iranian government is very touchy about the subject of Hojjatiyeh Society influence. In late November 2005, the Iranian government spokesman vehemently denied any link between the Society and "Ahmadinejad's government," according to Iranian press. The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance also denied rumors in October 2005 that the government had dropped a letter pledging loyalty to the Mahdi down the well at Jamkaran, according to Western press reports. Comment -------------- 18.(S) Although it remains unclear whether Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hojjatiyeh Society, at least some key members of his administration likely are, given their links to the Haqqani seminary. The question of their impact on policymaking remains open. While Iranian contacts with links to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently claimed to Conoff that there has been no distinct shift in Iranian foreign policy since the change of administration (septel),in numerous ways Iran's policy has become more ideological and less pragmatic since Ahmadinejad took office. Perhaps this is a result of increased Hojjatiyeh influence. It is also possible that the up tick in arrests of Baha'is in Iran is the result of increased Hojjatiyeh influence in government. DAVIS