Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DOHA1603
2006-11-02 15:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS;

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA 
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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDO #1603/01 3061507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021507Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5782
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0006
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0003
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1285
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001603 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS;
U.S. DEL DISASSOCIATES FROM DECLARATION

REF: DOHA 1583

Classified By: DCM Michael Ratney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001603 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA SUBJECT: DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS; U.S. DEL DISASSOCIATES FROM DECLARATION REF: DOHA 1583 Classified By: DCM Michael Ratney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The International Conference of New or Restored Democracies did not meet the Qatari hosts' greater expectations and a range of participants felt that international representation was at a low level. The Israeli FM's plans to attend and then cancellation left the conference organizers open to criticism. The Qatari government worked hard for the creation of a follow-on secretariat, but these plans were scaled back amidst SIPDIS criticism from the U.S. and European delegations. The final document contained unfortunate political language critical of Israel; Ambassador exited the conference hall prior to adoption of the document. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Sixth International Conference of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD-6) ended November 1 in Doha with a declaration that creates an eight-person non-resident "Advisory Board" and a five-person "nucleus" secretariat to advise the Conference's Presidency (Qatar, for the next three years). The secretariat's effectiveness will be reviewed after three years. Qatar will fund the secretariat and will staff four of the five positions locally. The fifth position will be an advisor knowledgeable about the workings of international institutions. This outcome reflected a vastly scaled-down version of the secretariat, which, according to the Qatari government, would have drafted reports, facilitated communication, planned seminars, and engaged in ongoing substantive work would would have required a large staff and budget. ¶3. (SBU) Only a few ministers attended the ICNRD-6. Arab states in particular were represented at low levels, in part because of bilateral friction with Qatar in some cases but also in reaction to the expectation that the Israeli foreign minister would attend. (She cancelled at the last minute and sent a delegation headed by by Yacov Hadas-Handelsman, Deputy Director General of the Israeli MFA's Middle East and Peace Process Division.) Only Morocco, Oman, and Algeria from the Arab region sent ministers. There was no official Saudi or Syrian representation. Venezuela did not send a delegation from Caracas, ostensibly over the Israeli issue, although it was rumored to be seeking the next ICNRD presidency. ¶4. (SBU) Press commentary highlighted European and American opposition to the creation of a permanent secretariat for ideological and financial reasons. Commentary also addressed the issue of the Israeli delegation, accusing all sides, including the Palestinians, of "hypocracy" for taking half-measures to show displeasure while attending the same conference but not talking. ¶5. (SBU) Poloff participated in the drafting of the "Doha Declaration" and was successful in de-linking the ICNRD and the UN Democracy Fund in the document. Poloff worked with EU colleagues to limit the size and scope of the secretariat. The Qataris were seriously determined on this point; they ajourned and overnight re-drafted the much more modest proposal. Poloff suceeded in toning down language critical of Israel, which included the term "collective punishment," but did not have sufficient leverage to entirely eliminate language that condemns unspecified foreign occupation, abduction, and destruction of infrastructure because it was not clear that the U.S. would endorse the final document in any case. ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador briefly attended the final session of the conference but exited the hall well before adoption of the "Doha Declaration." Post also issued a press statement disassociating the USG from the conference outcome over concerns regarding the membership of non-democratic regimes and over the politicalization of the issue of democracy-building. These actions built on previous statements to the local and regional press highlighting U.S. concerns over the secretariat. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The conference did not contribute to Qatar's objective, which is to build Doha's "brand" as a world capital and conference destination. Big names did not attend, and there was grumbling by other delegates on aspects of the event's logistics. The conference scaled back the "secretariat," which was aimed at keeping international visitors Doha-bound for the next three years. Finally, there was a certain irony, not lost on many observers here, of a DOHA 00001603 002 OF 002 hereditary monarchy like Qatar staking out a role as an international center for democracy. UNTERMEYER

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