SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL TO QATAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 001288 SIPDIS FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES FROM AMBASSADOR UNTERMEYER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP QA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL TO QATAR Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Mr. Attorney General: Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you to Qatar. Yours is the highest-ranking visit by a U.S. official to Qatar since the President himself came in June 2003, and the first cabinet-level visit to Qatar since Energy Secretary Bodman came in April 2006. The Qataris appreciate this visit, as Qatar's leadership often feels undervalued as a U.S. ally, particularly in its support of military operations on Iraq and Afghanistan and its counterterorrism efforts. The often vitriolic coverage on Al-Jazeera notwithstanding, Qatar is actually doing a lot of things right that align with the President's freedom agenda: democratization, human rights, educational reform, among others. 2.(C) There are several important issues that you could address with Qatari officials during your visit: -- Recognize Qatar as an important strategic ally. We have been able to count on Qatar's military cooperation in ways that we cannot anywhere else in the region. Qatar's support has been indispensible. -- Recognize Qatar's help on the war on terrorism, in intelligence cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, and political and social reform. Qatar is making a difference in the region. -- Thank Qatar for its humanitarian assistance to Lebanon, which is ongoing and totals more than $11 million to date. Immediate and robust security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces is vitally important to the maintenance of a ceasefire, reconstruction of the nation, and the ultimate success of UNSCR 1701. -- Urge a balanced and professional approach to regional coverage on Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera's coverage of Iraq and of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict has not met the standards of professional journalism. On this and other issues, the channel appears to be hardening around a political agenda. It needs to return to its professional principles. -- Urge signing of an Article 98 agreement on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ),whom you will meet in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister, has insisted on Qatar's being declared a "major non-NATO ally" before delivering an Article 98 Agreement. Your visit is an opportunity to express our continued desire to conclude such an agreement. -- Urge responsible action at the UN Security Council. Under HBJ, Qatar has staked out an independent path on Iran and Syria, which has had troublesome consequences on the Council. Qatar sees itself as holding the Arab/Muslim "seat" on the Council, but they should be reminded that on issues of such importance as Iran's nuclear program, building and maintaining an international consensus is vital. -- Express hope for a rescheduled visit by the Amir of Qatar to Washington. The Amir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, turned down a White House invitation in May for health reasons (a procedure at the Mayo Clinic); he would appreciate such a meeting if it can be scheduled, but he and his advisors would expect to be treated as an ally and regional partner. We are not in a position to extend an invitation at this time, because NSC (and the President himself) are upset at Qatar's voting on the most recent UNSC resolution on Iran. ¶3. (C) You met Qatar's Attorney General, Dr. Ali bin Mohsen al-Marri, in Washington in March 2006, when he sought your support for an Attorneys General initiative for the Middle East. Since that time, his idea has taken more concrete shape: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Attorneys General will gather in Doha or Riyadh in early November. Dr. al-Marri prefers to make progress on a more limited scope than suffer the delays a Middle East-wide project would be subject to. -------------- LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Our law enforcement relationship with Qatar is cooperative, but not extensive. Qatar expelled two individuals wanted by U.S. law enforcement, in 2003 and in ¶2005. The latter case came at the personal request of Fran Townsend. The Qataris had been eager for the FBI to open an office in Doha, and a legal attache was assigned to the Embassy in 2005. -------------- COUNTER-TERRORISM -------------- ¶5. (U) Qatari security services have an adequate legal structure in place to pursue terrorists. In March 2004, Qatar passed the Combating Terrorism Law. The law defines terrorism and terrorist acts, lists specific punishments for terrorist crimes (including the death penalty),provides measures against terrorist financing or fundraising activities, and gives the Government authority to take action against terrorist crimes and activities. The law incorporates existing laws such as Qatar's penal code, criminal procedure code, judicial law, a law on weapons, ammunitions and explosives, and an anti-money laundering statute. -------------- COUNTER-TERRORISM FINANCE -------------- ¶6. (U) The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, which monitors all domestic and international charitable activities, increased its resources and capabilities during ¶2005. The Secretary General of the Authority approves international fund transfers by the charities. The Authority has primary responsibility for monitoring overseas charitable, developmental, and humanitarian projects, and reports annually to Government ministries on the status of all projects. The Authority is developing measures to exert further control over domestic charity collection. -------------- U.S.-QATARI MILITARY RELATIONS -------------- ¶7. (S) Bilateral military relations between the U.S. and Qatar continue to be excellent, and the GOQ continues to demonstrate unwavering support for U.S. military operations. Currently Qatar hosts approximately 8,000 U.S. forces based at Camp As Sayliyah and Al Udeid Air Base. Some 86 U.S. and Coalition fighter and support aircraft operate from Al Udeid and represent the largest Air Expeditionary Wing in the CENTCOM AOR. Qatar also hosts both the USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center for theater-wide command and control. Al Udeid Air Base itself continues to undergo a surge of both GOQ and U.S. funded construction to support U.S. operational and logistical requirements. -------------- ARTICLE 98 -------------- ¶8. (C) The State Department raised signing an Article 98 Agreement with MFA officials during a visit in February. The MFA said the matter is primarily handled on the military side and that the GOQ is reviewing the matter. In prior discussions, HBJ indicated that Qatar would sign an Article 98 agreement right after the U.S. declares Qatar a Major Non-NATO Ally. -------------- IRAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Traditional Qatari regional diplomacy seeks to keep lines open to all neighbors. Qatar has played the Iran issue this way since the beginning of the year, with the Amir meeting the Iranian president in Tehran on May 2. There have been other senior-level bilateral visits. The policy culminated in Qatar's vote breaking UN Security Council consensus on Resolution 1696 in July. When HBJ visited Tehran in January, he described, in a press conference, Qatari-Iranian relations as "good in the gas and oil sectors, especially in terms of the South Pars Field," a reference to the what Qataris call the North Field, the largest single gas field in the world and shared by the two countries. ¶10. (C) Qatari officials are nevertheless extremely concerned about the role of Iran in the region and about its nuclear weapons ambitions. In his meeting with Counselor to the Department of State, Philip Zelikow, on March 20, HBJ agreed strongly with the U.S. analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals, noting Iran's active support for subversive elements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and eastern Saudi Arabia. But he believes that Iran's nuclear program is nearly unstoppable. Qatar is likely to continue trying to balance its U.S. military cooperation - its ultimate strategic defense - with diplomatic efforts that seek to avoid antagonizing Iran. -------------- IRAQ -------------- ¶11. (S) Qatar has been a pillar of support for our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue, for instance, to fly unimpeded combat missions out of Al-Udeid Air Base. The Amir shares our view that restoration of order and a successful democratic transition are of paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region. However, there is some feeling that Qatar's efforts over the past three years are not fully appreciated in Washington. While the Foreign Minister has expressed concerns of civil war in Iraq, he has stated publicly that the coalition needs to stay in the country to establish wider security. The GOQ also points to the importance of establishing a power structure in Baghdad that is fully inclusive of the Sunni bloc. HBJ called new Iraqi PM al-Maliki "a very good guy" and expressed readiness to receive him in Doha, but the GOQ is not prepared to open an embassy in Baghdad until the security situation improves dramatically. -------------- AL-JAZEERA -------------- ¶12. (S) Al Jazeera remains a thorn not just in our side, but in the side of nearly every government in the region. In response to our repeated protests and appeals about biased coverage and sloppy fact-checking, Al-Jazeera's management claims to have reduced the air time given to Al-Qaida and kidnappers' videos and have made efforts to moderate its reporting from Iraq. Although their coverage was extremely inflammatory during the recent Israel-Hizballah conflict, the channel has stressed to us its coverage of pro-democracy movements in Lebanon and Egypt as well as broader coverage of Middle Eastern politics. The Al Jazeera managing director told the Ambassador, "If the Americans want to find a proper partner in its effort to get democracy and reform, they won't find a better one than Al Jazeera." -------------- POLITICAL REFORM -------------- ¶13. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir after he assumed power in 1995, took a significant step forward last June when its first constitution came into force. The constitution calls for a two-thirds elected national legislature. These elections are expected to take place sometime in early 2007, and Qatari women will have the right to vote and will be encouraged by the government to run for office. In municipal elections in 1999 and 2003, women here were the first in the Gulf region to cast votes, and one woman was elected to the Council. -------------- EDUCATION CITY -------------- ¶14. (U) Education City is an example of Qatar's efforts to not just adopt, but actually import, the U.S. model of higher education. Located on a 2500-acre campus on the outskirts of Doha, it is managed by Qatar Foundation, the umbrella organization chaired by Sheikha Mozah, the Amir's consort. Five U.S. branch campuses are currently represented at Education City: Virginia Commonwealth University (fashion design, interior design, graphic design); Weill Cornell Medical College (medicine); Carnegie-Mellon University (business, computer science); Texas A&M University (engineering); and Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Some 800 students are currently enrolled, the majority Qatari. About two-thirds of the students are women, since the Education City campuses allow them to live at home with their families. -------------- ECONOMY -------------- ¶15. (U) At USD 61,540, Qatar's per capita income is ranked fifth in the world and ahead of the U.S. The country's vast wealth has resulted from the successful development of its natural gas resources over the past 10 years with plans for even greater expansion over the next decade. Qatar Petroleum is maximizing use of Qatar's natural resources to diversify the economy and provide business and employment opportunities to Qataris. Qatar is extremely friendly to U.S. energy companies: Since 1999, there has been $60 billion in foreign investment in Qatar's energy sector with the majority - about $40 billion - coming from the U.S. firms. Qatar plans to invest $70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next seven years. ¶16. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves are at 27 billion barrels. Qatar's daily average production is currently estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60 years, depending on estimates. Qatar's goal is to increase overall production capacity to over one million bpd by 2006. Occidental and Anadarko are the two U.S. companies operating in this sector. ¶17. (U) The majority of Qatar's current energy development is focused on natural gas. Qatar's North Field contains 15.3% of world natural gas reserves, third behind Russia and Iran. It is the largest non-associated gas field in the world, and is expected to support planned production for over 200 years. -------------- TRADE AND INVESTMENT -------------- ¶18. (U) Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework agreement with the U.S. in March 2004, but progress toward a Free Trade Agreement is moving slowly at best. Achieving a FTA will require Qatar to remove such obstacles as mandatory majority Qatari ownership of most businesses, the government telecom monopoly, restrictions on foreign investment in the financial services sector, labor issues, and transparency in government procurement. -------------- BIO NOTES -------------- ¶19. (C) Dr. al-Marri was educated in France (international public law),and therefore French is his second language. He speaks English but can misunderstand some points in English if they are conveyed too quickly. He has a quiet but determined demeanor. UNTERMEYER