A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000127 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PREL IR SU SY QA UNSC SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN MINISTER Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. A/S Silverberg met with FM Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) January 21 to discuss UN Security Council issues related to the Darfur conflict in Sudan and Syria's adherence to UNSC 1559. The Foreign Minister said Qatar is keen to cooperate with the United States. But he said he hoped the U.S. would "take into consideration" that Qatar is located in a difficult region. HBJ added that he visited Iran and met with President Ahmedi-Nejad on January 16 and that he is planning a trip to Syria soon. Qatar is concerned about Iran, but HBJ is not optimistic that Iran will stop its nuclear program. End Summary. ¶2. (U) A/S Silverberg, accompanied by Ambassador Untermeyer and P/E Chief, met with Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani January 21. Assistant Minister for Follow-Up Affairs, Mohamed al-Rumaihi, who leads a small committee handling the UN portfolio; Sheikh Jabor, HBJ's office director; and Acting American and European Affairs Director Abdullah Jabor were also present. -------------- Qatar's Seat on the UNSC -------------- ¶3. (C) A/S Silverberg congratulated Qatar on assuming its position on the UNSC and said that it was a good opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties by cooperating on UN Security Council issues. HBJ called it "not a good time" to join the Council, which faces a long list of Middle East problems including the Iranian nuclear issue. We're keen to cooperate, he said, while hoping the U.S. will take into consideration that Qatar is in a difficult region. Qatar values consensus within the Council, he said. Qatar welcomes timely information from the U.S. and does not want to be "surprised" to find out the two countries hold different positions on a given topic late in the game. A/S Silverberg replied that while the U.S. respects Qatar's regional role, every member of the Council should act to protect the strength and credibility of the Council above regional interests. A/S Silverberg noted that U.S.-Qatari relations were off to a rough start on the Council due to disagreements over Syria and Sudan. ¶4. (C) Syria. HBJ said the Syrian president had visited Qatar at the beginning of the week. They had "frank" discussions. The Qataris emphasized that cooperation with the international community "is a must." We're not for changing regimes, he said: We fear chaos. If President Assad is not in power, the Syrian border with Israel will become unstable, and the Muslim Brotherhood will take over. This will put the region in great difficulty. This doesn't mean the Hariri murderer should get off, HBJ said. He reported that President Assad said he's ready to cooperate but fears he's being targeted directly. "Our view is to work with Syria for gradual change," HBJ concluded. ¶5. (C) Secretary Rice has said that we are looking for change in behavior, noted Silverberg. Key actions are controlling the border with Iraq, allowing for political opening domestically, ending support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, and fully implementing UNSCR 1559. Central to 1559 is the need to disarm and disband. ¶6. (C) HBJ said that Qatar wants two things: to get to the truth about the Hariri assassination and to normalize relations between Syria and Lebanon. He said that issues such as disarming militias were difficult, can't be done immediately, and that Syria cannot be responsible for disarming the militias. A/S Silverberg said that the latest Larsen report was clear that Lebanon had taken steps to control the border while Syria had not, and that the PRST should "call on" Syria to take these steps. HBJ compromised on the matter of trafficking arms across the Lebanese border, saying it is something they can work on and that it is "no problem" to name Syria specifically. He asked, Can we do something to get the two countries to talk? He might go to Syria to discuss matters within 10 days. (He confirmed to the Ambassador that the Amir did not visit Damascus over the weekend and currently has no plans to travel there.) A/S Silverberg answered that UNSCR 1559 calls for "normalization" of diplomatic relations but that a predicate was mutual respect for national sovereignty. She advised HBJ to carry the message that Syria should "fully comply" with its UN Security Council obligations. ¶7. (C) Sudan. A/S Silverberg said that the U.S. does not support modifying an independent report by a Panel of Experts before it is submitted to the Security Council. Accepting modifications to a report will lead others to do so in the future, harming the objectivity of such reports. She added that there would be intensive discussions before any sanctions or other action is taken after the submission of the report. HBJ agreed that "we have to maintain pressure on the Sudanese" but that necessary checks must be made first. He promised to talk to the Qatari permrep about the issue. ¶8. (C) HBJ mentioned that he will visit Iran January 23. We are very concerned, he said. The Iranians are committed to their nuclear weapons program, in his opinion. The Bushehr nuclear plant is close and, weapons activity aside, an accident would impact Qatar more than Iran itself. Also, Iran shares Qatar's natural gas field. He said he will tell the Iranians that they must work out the nuclear impasse with the EU and the international community. He committed to tell them not to rely on Qatar in the Security Council; we won't be the member "singing alone." But I'm not hopeful, he said. ¶9. (C) HBJ said he has not trusted Iranians since the time of Khomeini. In the late 1990s, he had a dispute with President Khatami over Iranian accusations that Qatar was too close militarily to Israel and the U.S. HBJ said Ahmedi-Nejad is "more serious" and "doesn't lie." UNTERMEYER