Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DJIBOUTI43
2006-01-08 12:37:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

DJIBOUTI: 4TH QUARTER STATUS REPORT - OCT, NOV, DEC

Tags:  ASEC DJ KSEO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000043 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC
EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR ESO AND RSO AND EMBASSY ASMARA FOR
RSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC DJ KSEO
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: 4TH QUARTER STATUS REPORT - OCT, NOV, DEC

REF: 05 STATE 228796

--------------------------------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000043 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR ESO AND RSO AND EMBASSY ASMARA FOR RSO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC DJ KSEO SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: 4TH QUARTER STATUS REPORT - OCT, NOV, DEC REF: 05 STATE 228796 -------------- ¶1. Summary of Significant Events -------------- ¶A. Narrative Overview of Significant Events ¶1. (U) This is ARSO Fogarty,s first QSR as Acting RSO. RSO Gary Stoner is on leave until January 12, 2006. During this quarter the RSO continued to focus primarily on physical and procedural security. The reduction of residential security services began before RSO,s arrival and required a lot of attention and time-consuming adaptation. The elimination of residential guards significantly degraded security because the majority of the homes in the mission pool do not meet OSPB standards without guards. The RSO managed the installation of residential security alarms, the connection of a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS) and the implementation of a 24-hour mobil patrol. ¶2. (U) RSO supported the visit of a two-man Chem/Bio training team in September/ October. Training consisted of awareness presentations to the Mission community and response training for the Mission,s First Responders. Over 170 individuals were trained during the visit. The training team supervised a successful comprehensive Chem/Bio drill using the Mission,s First Responders. ¶3. (U) RSO welcomed the visit of Addis SEO Eric Meinhardt and STS Thomas Migliore to Post in December. The team was successful in restoring camera control to Post 1 and repaired the main Chancery door magnetic lock system, which was broken for over a year. Post continues to suffer from equipment failure that is a result of power problems - both outages and surges - , extensive heat and salt-water corrosion. ¶4. (U) ARSO Fogarty handled the various daily tasking of an RSO while still tackling several unforeseen incidents, e.g. Counter intelligence incidents, analysis and deconfliction of threat intelligence, coordinating TDY visits and assisted in the visit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. ¶5. (U) Although RSO has not received any reports of physical attacks on Americans during this quarter, there has been an increase in petty theft and violent crimes within the city. As reported before, RSO and embassy personnel continue to monitor crime trends and RSO continues to work closely with &#
x000A;host nation police to ensure the safety of all personnel. Reports of petty theft, fraud, assault, battery, sexual deviation, and unlawful trade continue to be reported informally. Post has been fortunate so far in that the Embassy has experienced no serious incidents or assaults against its staff although violent crime is on the rise and post no longer has residential security guards. ¶4. (U) RSO is working closely with DS/ATA in coordinating law enforcement training for local security personnel. One ATA course was successfully completed and one more course was offered during the 4th quarter. RSO is currently submitting cost estimates and submitting names for the 5412 - Major Case Management Course. ¶5. (U) RSO supported the visit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace and several other sub CINC visits of military personnel during this quarter. RSO continues to work closely with and support other agencies at post to coordinate visits and security briefings. ¶B. Mission Wide Emergency Action Drills: Post continues to develop and carry out emergency response drills with U.S. Military elements assigned to assist the mission in case of a crisis. Two quick-response drills were coordinated between the RSO and U.S. Military personnel from Camp Lemonier. ¶1. Chancery: (a) WMD Chem./Bio ) 29 September 2005 (b) Fire Drill ) 18 December 2005 (c) Emergency Destruction Drill ) 15 November 2005 (d) Internal Defense ) 8 October 2005 ¶2. Constituent posts: Not applicable. ¶3. MSG activities: Not applicable. -------------- ¶2. Threats and incidents: -------------- ¶A. (SBU) Post has Convened the EAC 2 times during the quarter in response to threat information Post continues to be rated as critical for trans-national terrorism. RSO continues to work closely with host nation security to monitor activity and strengthen the physical security measures surrounding the embassy in response to that activity. (Djibouti 01046 and Djibouti 00996) ¶B. Constituent posts: Not applicable -------------- ¶3. DS initiated investigations: -------------- Number of cases generated by headquarters offices: opened closed pending overdue ¶1. PSS (2) (2) (0) (0) ¶2. VF (0) (0) (1) (0) ¶3. PF (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶4. CIL (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶5. PR (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶6. CI (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶7. PII (0) (0) (0) (0) Number of cases generated by post: ¶1. Post FSN/PSC (18) (15) (3) (0) ¶2. Other Agency RFAS (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶3. Host Govt RFAS (0) (0) (0) (0) ¶4. RSO Criminal (0) (0) (0) (0) -------------- ¶4. Action cables/e-mails not answered by DS: -------------- NONE -------------- ¶5. Summary of separate reports: -------------- ¶A. CIWG report: 12/21/2005 (Djibouti 01248) ¶B. Emergency action plans: completed and distributed by DS on 12/02/2004. Next full revision of the EAP is due 12/07. An update of the EAP will be conducted in early 2006. ¶C. Security surveys: Chancery - 02 March 2003 Warehouse ) 02 March 2003 EMR ) 02 March 2003 ¶D. Procedural security survey: 12/29/05 ¶E. Comprehensive SPE inventory: 04/11/05 (Djibouti 344) ¶F. RSO quarterly travel report: 10/31/05-11/23/05 ARSO TDY coverage to Asmara, Eritrea. ¶G. Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire and OSAC Crime/Safety report: There has been a significant rise in the crime posture of Djibouti since last years report. ¶H. DSS overseas firearms qualification policy: RSO and ARSO conducted familiarization fire in October and November. ¶I. ACEQ - ¶1. (SBU) Crime Mobility - response (c). Comments: Although criminals have easy access to embassy residential areas, there has been one report of attempted theft, burglary or other crimes against Americans in the past six months. The removal of Post,s residential guard coverage creates vulnerability for Embassy personnel arriving and departing from their residences leaving them unprotected as well as irresistible targets for crime. (Djibouti 00021) ¶2. (SBU) Crime Ambience - response (b). Comments: Due to the proximity of the high crime port area, just 1 mile from the embassy residential area, the potential for criminal activity, especially at night, still exists. Physical security measures coupled with the mobile patrol has helped deter would-be burglars. Post has acquired new housing within an area of the city that is farther away from the upper scale district of Heron. The remote location of these residences makes them more susceptible to crimes of opportunity with the absence of residential guards acting as a deterrent. Not enough time has passed to adequately survey the potential for criminal impact to these residences. Should criminal activity begin to surface in this area, RSO will report accordingly. ¶3. (U) Aggressiveness of Criminals - response (b). Comments: Due to the habitual use of the legalized amphetamine, Khat, by the majority of the male populace, the potential for aggressive behavior on behalf of the criminal could be exhibited, but no reports have been submitted that document such behavior. ¶4. (U) Arming of Criminals - response (b). Comments: Violent crimes involving firearms are rare, but the presence of firearms is becoming more prevalent due to the porous borders between Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Knives and sharp objects seem to be the weapon of choice for the would-be assailant. ¶5. (U) Aggregation of Criminals - response (b). Comments: Criminals generally aggregate by ethnic affiliation, clanship or tribalism. Incidents in the past indicate that victims are spared gratuitous violence if they comply with the perpetrators. ¶6. (SBU) Deterrence/Response of Police - response (c). Comments: The national police force is under-trained, under-resourced and under-paid. They lack sufficient and adequate equipment and do not have the budget, experience or knowledge to effectively combat crime. The local criminal sees this and is not deterred by the presence or actions of the police. Embassy officers rely on the RSO and LGF to respond to any incident that may occur at their residences. ¶7. (SBU) Training/Professionalism of Police ) response (d). Comments: It has been three years since the attempted, but failed, coup was carried out against the current president. The police forces have appeared to bounce back and are in the daily process of carrying out their duties. RSO works closely with senior level police and believes that a concerted effort to change the past is being made. The lower levels of police officers still suffer from low salaries, virtually no benefits, poor equipment and inadequate training. In FY-05, DS/ATA provided the government of Djibouti with a series of courses that are designed to enhance the law enforcement capabilities of their security services. The ATA program continues to evolve for Djibouti in FY-06. ¶J. OSAC/CSR - ¶1. (U) Overall crime and safety situation: The State Department,s Bureau of Diplomatic Security rates Djibouti as a high crime threat post. Endemic poverty, widespread unemployment and a growing refugee population have led to an increase in criminal activity over the past several years. Most reported incidents are crimes of opportunity for immediate gain such as pick-pocketing and petty theft. Violent crimes committed at knifepoint are also reported but not common. There have been burglary attempts against expatriate residences, but perpetrators generally lack the sophistication required to overcome home alarm systems and security guards. The large number of unemployed males loitering downtown and in other areas frequented by expatriates allows criminals to roam undetected. The port, bus terminal and downtown areas of Djibouti are considered at greatest risk for street crime. Criminal activity is exacerbated by the widespread abuse of Khat, an amphetamine that tends to increase aggressiveness among users. ¶2. (U) Political violence: The government and community leaders have stated publicly their strong support for the U.S. and coalition efforts in the Global War on Terrorism and although anti U.S. demonstrations broke out at the beginning of the Iraqi conflict, the focus of the demonstrations was aimed at the war and not Americans overall. The demonstrations lasted approximately 5 days, but there have been no signs since of anti-American sentiment. 65 percent of Djiboutians are ethnic Somalis, and the rest are Afar or foreigners. Domestic political violence is a less significant threat than during the civil war (1990-1996),but rivalry persists between Djibouti,s Somali and Afar ethnic groups. Since the May 2001 signing of a peace accord, many former rebels have been integrated into the National Police and Defense Forces. Demonstrations, often protesting against the Government,s nonpayment of salaries, sometimes take place and police occasionally use non-lethal force to disperse unauthorized demonstrators. Civil unrest could also result if the daily air delivery of Khat from neighboring countries were disrupted or delayed for any reason. Visitors are advised to avoid political gatherings and large crowds. Djibouti lies at the crossroads between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa and hosts a substantial population of refugees from throughout the region. The governments of Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Russia, China, France, The United States and other nations maintain diplomatic or honorary representation in Djibouti. Djibouti,s proximity to a number of conflict-torn states and the governments limited capacity to monitor border controls has raised concerns over the possibility of cross-border terrorist acts. ¶3. (U) Post-specific safety concerns: Road travel to the north of the country is considered unsafe due to poorly constructed roads and the lack of service or emergency stations. A significant percentage of Djiboutian males are under the influence of Khat on a daily basis. The drug's affects may escalate what would otherwise be a casual interaction (such as a bumped elbow) into a confrontation. Djibouti is an Islamic country; visitors should dress conservatively and observe local customs. ¶4. (U) Police response: The Djiboutian National Police Force is severely under-resourced. The police lack transportation, fuel, and communications equipment, which severely affects Police responsiveness. The government is generally 3-6 months in arrears for payment of police salaries. Visitors requiring police assistance are advised to appear in person at the commissariat of police, located across from the general post office on the Boulevard de la Republique. The central police telephone number is 352-343. Private security guards for residences and facilities are generally hired on an ad-hoc basis. There are few security guard companies, none that are capable of providing patrol response services. ¶5. (U) Medical emergencies: Local medical facilities do not generally offer standards of care available in western countries, although there are a few French-trained doctors who cater to the expatriate community. Depending on the medical care required and on the availability of space visitors with medical problems are advised to contact the hospital Bouffard (French Military hospital) at 351-351 ext.53015. Falciparum-type malaria (chloroquine-resistant) is widespread in Djibouti; prophylaxis is advised. HIV/AIDS is also a serious concern, especially among the urban population; approximately 3 percent of all Djiboutians are infected. ¶6. (U) Tips to avoid being a victim: a) Street Safety: Visitors to Djibouti should remain vigilant at all times and maintain a high security awareness while on the streets. Additional caution should be exercised around the port, bus terminal, central market (Quartiers 2 and 3) and downtown, especially after dark. Panhandlers and street children target foreigners for petty theft by creating distractions. Visitors should avoid isolated areas, particularly along the urban coastline. b) Traffic Safety: Road conditions are poor throughout Djibouti. Drivers should beware of potholes, unskilled drivers, and the presence of non-roadworthy vehicles on urban and rural roads. Pedestrians and livestock often appear on roadways without warning. Reports indicate that nomads in rural areas place rocks on the roads to stop vehicles and demand water and/or transportation. The theft of high-value items from stopped vehicles has been reported. Drivers should keep their windows up and doors locked and be especially vigilant at intersections. Unattended vehicles should always be locked, with valuables secured in an inconspicuous location. Visitors who are involved in traffic accidents should attempt to exchange insurance information with the other party and summon a traffic policeman if one is nearby. It is inadvisable to make restitution at the scene, especially if livestock or pedestrians are involved. Drivers should be wary of crowds gathering at the scene of an accident and should depart immediately if they perceive a threat to their safety. c) Hotel Safety: US Government personnel on temporary assignment to Djibouti are advised to stay in one of four hotels: The Sheraton, The Plen Cielle, The Bellevue and The Europa. Other hotels are considered inadequate. Visitors have reported incidents of robbery and aggressive solicitation by prostitutes. Visitors are advised to lock their doors and admit only expected visitors into hotel rooms. ¶7. (U) Further information: There is no OSAC country council in Djibouti. American citizens are encouraged to register with the embassy by appearing in person at the Consular section. The embassy is located on Avenue Marechal Joffre at the Plateau du Serpent (near the Sheraton hotel). Business hours are 08:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. Telephone numbers are (253) 353-995. Americans are welcome to visit the Consular section any time during business hours or to telephone the embassy 24 hours a day in case of an emergency. -------------- -------------- ¶6. POC is Acting RSO Michael Fogarty at 253-35-39-95 ext 2307. -------------- -------------- RAGSDALE

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