PRESIDENT GUSMAO SAYS HE WILL DISMISS PRIME MINISTER THIS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DILI 000316 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO, S/WCI NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/20/2016 TAGS: PHUM PGOV MOPS KPKO KCRM TT AS SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GUSMAO SAYS HE WILL DISMISS PRIME MINISTER THIS WEEK REF: (A) DILI 239; (B) DILI 275; (C) DILI 287; (D) DILI 294; (E) DILI 303 DILI 00000316 001.2 OF 006 CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) (1) (S/NF) Summary: President Xanana Gusmao told Ambassador Rees this afternoon that he will request Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's resignation tomorrow morning (June 20). Gusmao will present Alkatiri with what he says is detailed evidence of Alkatiri's involvement in serious crimes including murder. See Reftels C-E. If, as the President expects, Alkatiri refuses to resign, he will call a Council of State meeting, probably on Wednesday (June 21). He will then exercise his constitutional power to dismiss the Prime Minister. President Gusmao will ask the ruling Fretilin party to recommend a new Prime Minister, but only after electing new party leadership at a party Congress that complies with the legal requirement that election of party leaders be by secret ballot. President Gusmao says he has spoken with key Fretilin leaders who believe that once Alkatiri is dismissed as Prime Minister, Fretilin would comply with the President's request to hold a new Congress and would recommend an acceptable candidate for caretaker Prime Minister, probably Foreign/Defense Minister Jose Ramos-Horta. The President would then call new parliamentary elections for October and request that the United Nations administer the elections. President Gusmao says he will discuss this plan tomorrow morning with Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, the commander of East Timor's armed forces (FDTL),who he believes will endorse it, and that he has already discussed it several times with senior Australian Defense Force (ADF) officials, who did not object to it. Gusmao said he also discussed his plan this weekend with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is enthusiastic about it and will help explain it to other Asean leaders. Despite the President's apparently firm decision to go forward immediately, and although his plan is fully consistent with East Timor's constitution, Embassy Dili believes he still might decide once again to delay its implementation. This could depend on the reaction from Prime Minister Alkatiri and/or on the President's planned meetings tomorrow morning with General Matan Ruak, with the commander of the ADF-led Joint Task Force (JTF) in East Timor, and with the Australian Embassy. On balance, however, the President's proposed course of action is a positive step --- and probably an essential one --- toward extricating East Timor from the pervasive distrust and fear that is at the heart of the ongoing political and security crisis. End Summary. (2) (S) Ambassador met this afternoon with President Gusmao to discuss reports that the President would act soon to dismiss Prime Minister Alkatiri. The President had previously told Ambassador that he believes he has a moral and legal obligation to dismiss Alkatiri in accordance with article 112 of the Constitution, which provides inter alia that the President may dismiss the Prime Minister "when necessary to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions." Gusmao had indicated that he planned to invoke this power because the Government of East Timor (GOET) has been unable to perform many of its functions for almost two months, because the overwhelming majority of Timorese people believe Alkatiri's resignation or dismissal is an essential element in any plan to restore peace and stability, and because the strong evidence that Alkatiri armed and paid a group of ex-guerrillas to kill his opponents has made it impossible for Alkatiri to regain the trust of the people or of the President himself. See Reftels C-E. However, in previous conversations President Gusmao has said he wanted to wait until the international forces (JTF) had restored order and disarmed civilian armed groups. There were also suggestions that the President might be waiting for an even broader consensus --- perhaps including FDTL leaders and/or Fretilin leaders --- before taking action. As recently as last Wednesday the President's Chief of Staff, Agio Pereira, told Ambassador that "the President thinks it is important for the future of the country that everyone know Alkatiri fell on his own, rather than being pushed." In today's meeting, however, the President said he had decided it was time to act. (3) (S) The President said that tomorrow morning he will send Alkatiri a videotape or DVD of tonight's program on the DILI 00000316 002.2 OF 006 Australian television news program "Four Corners." Gusmao said the program will reveal detailed information linking Alkatiri to a group of ex-guerrilla fighters that has claimed Alkatiri and former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato gave them money, automatic weapons, and other equipment and directed them to kill certain Alkatiri opponents including opposition politicians and some or all of the ex-FDTL "petitioners." (Note: The program did air tonight. It contained more damning evidence against Lobato, who was the principal point of contact, than against Alkatiri, but it also supported the group's claim to have been in direct contact with Alkatiri. For instance, the program showed a message from Alkatiri's cell phone asking "Where are you?" sent in early June, a few days after the group reported they had cut off contact with Lobato.) The President will also tell Alkatiri, either by letter or by phone, that although he does not wish to prejudge Alkatiri's guilt or innocence pending the outcome of judicial proceedings, there is enough evidence that "I can no longer have confidence in you." He will therefore ask that Alkatiri immediately resign as Prime Minister. (4) (S) If, as the President expects, Alkatiri refuses to resign, the President will call a Council of State meeting, probably for Wednesday (June 21). Article 112 of the East Timorese Constitution requires the President to consult with the Council of State before exercising his authority to dismiss the Prime Minister. See paragraph 13. Although the President believes the members of the Council will be about evenly divided --- with Alkatiri himself and four or five close associates on one side and a coalition of Presidential allies, opposition representatives, and disaffected Fretilin members on the other --- he pointed out that the Constitution requires only that the President consult with the Council, not that a vote be taken or that the President follow the Council's advice. (5) (S) After the Council meeting, probably on Wednesday afternoon or evening, the President will announce the dismissal of the Prime Minister in a televised address to the nation. He will present in detail the evidence of Alkatiri's alleged crimes --- including not only the provision of arms and a "hit list" to the group featured on the Four Corners program, but also similar acts involving other armed groups whose members the President says have given him sworn statements and other evidence --- and will also set forth the constitutional justification for his dismissal of the Prime Minister. See paragraph 13. (6) (S) The President said that in his public address to the nation he will reach out to members and leaders of the Fretilin Party, as he said he has already done privately. He told Ambassador he believes Fretilin still has an important role to play in East Timor, "except for those guys who committed these crimes." Contrary to some early reports on the President's probable course of action, he will not dissolve Parliament, which has a large (55 out of 88) Fretilin majority. Rather, he will ask Fretilin to propose a new Prime Minister to replace Alkatiri as the head of an interim government until it is possible to organize national elections. First, however, he will request that Fretilin hold an "extraordinary Congress," preferably next week. The purpose of this Congress will be to elect new leaders under procedures consistent with the Law on Political Parties, Law 3 of 2004, section 18(c),which requires that leaders of political parties be elected by secret ballot. The Fretilin Congress held in May, which resoundingly elected Alkatiri as Secretary-General of the party, did so only after the congress adopted a controversial rule requiring a show of hands for election of party officials. Many observers believed that if the congress had followed the rules requiring a secret ballot, Alkatiri would have been defeated. See Ref A. President Gusmao maintains that the election of Alkatiri and other party offices was therefore illegitimate. He said he has discussed this with key Fretilin leaders and he believes that if Alkatiri were no longer Prime Minister the party would comply with the President's request to hold a new party congress, elect new leaders, and present an acceptable candidate for Prime DILI 00000316 003.2 OF 006 Minister. (The President added that "the Fretilin people have no doubt that Alkatiri is guilty. Unlike us --- at first we could not believe he would do this. But they knew it all along.") (7) (S) President Gusmao said he believed Foreign/Defense Minister Jose Ramos-Horta would emerge as the reconstituted Fretilin Party's choice for Prime Minister. He said he believes Ramos-Horta is an inspirational leader but not a good manager, so he will quietly suggest that a Deputy Prime Minister be appointed, perhaps highly-regarded Minister of Health Rui de Araujo. Asked whether he had considered simply asking the extremely popular Ramos-Horta to attempt to form a government --- a procedure that would require him either to get the support of Fretilin's parliamentary majority or to form a new parliamentary majority consisting of some Fretilin deputies (at least 12) and some deputies from opposition parties --- the President said "I cannot," because he does not want to be seen as imposing a candidate on Fretilin or on Parliament. (8) (S) When asked what he would do if Fretilin refused to hold a new Congress, and/or simply presented Alkatiri or some close Alkatiri ally as the party's candidate for Prime Minister, the President said he would not accept such a candidate. He pointed out that Article 106 of the Constitution empowers the majority party or majority coalition in parliament to nominate a Prime Minister, but gives the President the power to appoint. Indeed, the article makes it clear that the President's appointment power is more than just a ministerial duty to appoint whomever the majority party prefers: it explicitly requires that he "consult with the political parties sitting in the National Parliament" before making an appointment, presumably in order to consider arguments that the majority party nominee is inappropriate and should not be appointed. So until the majority party or coalition comes up with a candidate acceptable to the President there will be no Prime Minister. The President said that he believed this prospect would cause Fretilin --- or at least what he believes to be the pragmatic majority on the party's "permanent political committee" --- to come up quickly with an acceptable candidate. In the meantime, the President himself would continue to direct defense and security affairs (which, under the declaration previously approved by the Council of State, see Ref B, includes not only the military and the police but also other essential government functions such as electricity and humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons) working with members of the Alkatiri's current cabinet. (9) (S) The President said he will also request that Parliament pass an electoral law by the end of July. He will work with Parliament to ensure that the law meets international standards for a free and fair election, and he will then call a parliamentary election for this October, rather than for early next year as Prime Minister Alkatiri had planned. (Note: Article 86 of the Constitution give the President the power to "set dates for presidential and legislative elections in accordance with the Law.") He will ask the United Nations to organize and administer the elections, not only so that they would be recognized as free and fair but also because the Timorese government lacks the technical capacity to hold a national election within the 90-day time frame he has in mind. (10) (S) Asked what would happen if Alkatiri refused to step down after the President dismissed him --- presumably claiming that the President's dismissal was a "coup d'etat" and calling upon FDTL to "defend the constitution and democracy" --- Gusmao said virtually nobody would support Alkatiri. In particular, he said he had had several recent conversations with General Matan Ruak, who now feels betrayed and set up by Alkatiri. He said Matan Ruak now understands that "Alkatiri ordered the [May 23] attack on Tasitolu [the FDTL headquarters] and let Matan Ruak think it was the police". (The President also said this and other armed exercises ordered by Alkatiri during the week after the Fretilin Congress may have been partly an attempt to DILI 00000316 004.2 OF 006 dissipate the public attention that was beginning to focus on the illegal procedures employed at the Congress.) Gusmao will meet again with Matan Ruak tomorrow morning, give him a copy of the Four Corners program, and explain his plan for the dismissal of the Prime Minister and reconstitution of the Government. He is confident Matan Ruak will support the plan. (11) (S/NF) The President said he had discussed briefly with ADF Brigadier General Mick Slater, the JTF commander, the possiblity of dismissing Alkatiri, and that he had had several recent meetings with other senior ADF officers to lay out his plan in detail. These officers had raised no objections to the plan and seemed to understand and accept it. Tomorrow morning the President will meet with General Slater to present the detailed plan including the timetable. (Comment: Although ADF sources have suggested at various times to Emboffs that replacing Alkatiri might be a step toward restoring stability in East Timor, Australia's Foreign Ministry may take a different view. A diplomatic source told Emboffs today that the Australian Foreign Ministry has asked its Charge d'Affaires in Dili to seek a meeting with the President for tomorrow, but has not yet told the Charge the content of what he is to say to the President. Embassy has also received a credible report (please strictly protect) that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer called the Australian Broadcasting Company and made an unsuccessful "demand to see the evidence" that would be presented on "Four Corners" program about Alkatiri and the armed group. End Comment.) (12) (S/NF) President Gusmao said he had discussed the situation in detail during his June 17 meeting in Bali with Indonesian President Yudhoyono. He said Yudhoyono was happy with his plan and had promised to explain it to the leaders of other Asean nations, noting that it would be necessary to use a slightly different explanation for each Asean government. (13) (SBU) Comment: The President's proposed course of action appears to comply fully with East Timor's constitution. Article 112 of the Constitution ("Dismissal of the Government") sets forth seven types of situations in which the Prime Minister and/or his Government may be dismissed. The first six cases are set forth in section 1 of Article 112 and are mandatory: they "require" or "bring about" (implicam) the dismissal of the Government. They include such cases as the beginning of a new legislative term; the resignation, death, or permanent disability of the Prime Minister; and a vote of no confidence by Parliament. The second section is permissive: it provides that the President "may" (pode) dismiss the Prime Minister only in certain specified situations: "in the cases set forth in the previous section [vote of no confidence, beginning of a new session, etc.] and when it is shown to be necessary to assure the regular functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation with (ouvido, "having heard") the Council of State." To the extent Prime Minister Alkatiri's "coup d'etat" talk has any substance, it might rest on a claim that the "functioning of the democratic institutions" language of section 2 of article 112 merely places an additional limitation on the President's power, rather than setting forth an additional situation in which he may dismiss the Prime Minister. But this interpretation would lead to absurd consequences. The situations set forth in section 1 --- vote of no confidence, beginning of a new legislative term, etc. --- appear sufficient in and of themselves to justify the dismissal of a government, and have been so regarded in other countries with parliamentary systems. Imposing an additional requirement that there be a political or constitutional crisis in order for a government to be dismissed in these situations would make no sense. The most straightforward reading of the "functioning of the democratic insitutions" language is that it adds a seventh situation in which the President may dismiss the Prime Minister: the six mandatory situations set forth in section one "and" when dismissal is necessary to preserve the functioning of the institutions of government. Other steps the President proposes DILI 00000316 005.2 OF 006 to take --- appointing a new Prime Minister only when an acceptable candidate is nominated by the majority party or coalition and only after consultation with the other parties in Parliament, and then setting a date for national elections --- are explicitly authorized by the Constitution. See paragraphs 8 and 9. The Constitution does not explicitly provide for interim governance after the dismissal of a Prime Minister and pending the appointment of a new one, but the President's assumption of power over security and defense, in accordance with a "declaration of crisis" approved by the Council of State and agreed to by Prime Minister Alkatiri in accordance with provisions of law governing such declarations (see Ref B) appears to provide sufficient legal authority in the present situation. (14) (S/NF) Comment continued: Notwithstanding the President's apparent determination to proceed quickly, it is quite possible that he could be persuaded that further delay is necessary or desirable. If, for instance, Prime Minister Alkatiri were to promise to consider carefully the President's request to resign, but to ask for a few days in which to consider it, it is not out of the question that the President would agree. If General Matan Ruak were to object to the President's plan --- and if the President were to conclude that Matan Ruak and/or any significant faction of FDTL might use force to defend the Prime Minister's right to remain in office, the President would probably decide to take more time in an effort to persuade the dissenters, rather than to rely on the international forces to put down a pro-Alkatiri "autogolpe". Even more important, if either General Slater of the JTF or the Government of Australia through its Charge d'Affaires were to make a last-minute appeal for further delay --- perhaps citing the risk of destabilzing violence by small but heavily armed pro-Alkatiri elements --- the President would presumably comply with the request. (15) (S) Comment continued: On balance, Embassy Dili believes the President's proposed course of action is far more likely to bring peace, stability, and even unity to East Timor than the alternative, which is to hope that the spectacularly unpopular and probably criminal incumbent administration can somehow recover its capacity to govern and that it will then hold free and fair elections in 2007. Although the tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have been sleeping in churchyards for the last two months cite a variety of fears in explaining why they will not return to their homes, when asked what it would take to address these fears they invariably reply, "The government must change," or "Xanana must act," or simply "Down with Alkatiri." Although it is difficult to gainsay the risk of further violence by some of the very armed groups that Alkatiri is now in trouble for arming in the first place, this seems an odd argument for leaving him in office. Moreover, it seems wrong to assume that these groups will be less dangerous if they have a sitting Prime Minister on their side than if they do not. Although little is known about these groups --- only three are known to exist, each consisting of 20 to 30 men, and two of these three groups have now switched sides and agreed to turn in their arms --- the original purposes of arming them were said to be to intimidate voters in the 2007 elections, to "eliminate" government critics, and perhaps to retain power by force in the event Fretilin were to lose. Even if there are other such groups, a good argument can be made that they would be less dangerous on the outside than on the inside. (16) (C) Commebnt continued: Even more important, the President's plan is not just to dismiss a bad and unpopular government but to bring about a good and popular one. Assuming Gusmao is right that Fretilin could be persuaded to choose Ramos-Horta as the caretaker Prime Minister, the Timorese people would for the first time in their history have a government controlled by someone of whom they strongly approve. A government led by Ramos-Horta, supported by President Gusmao himself, including moderate elements from the current government such as Minister Araujo, and working closely with the Catholic DILI 00000316 006.2 OF 006 Church and other institutions of civil society to heal the wounds that have emerged during the last few months would not be the whole formula for putting East Timor back on the right track, but it would be a great start. End comment. REES