THE VIEW FROM THE WEST: MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENT MILITARY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000220 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT SUBJECT: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST: MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENT MILITARY LEADERS REF: DILI 218 DILI 00000220 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In addition to the ex-military "petitioners" who led the April demonstration in Dili, there are a number of dissident members of the national police (PNTL) and armed forces (FDTL) who have gone AWOL and are currently located in mountainous areas of western East Timor. Many, although probably not most, of these dissident soldiers and police officers are in one of two fairly small but well-organized groups. The larger group was formed by Major Alfredo Reinado and is located in Aileu. It is comprised primarily of military police (MP) officers, although the MPs appear to be affiliated or at least co-operating with PNTL units in Aileu. The smaller group is headed by Major Marcos Tilman, a regular FDTL officer. Both of these groups believe that Prime Minister Alkatiri lacks the capability and credibility to lead the nation out of the current crisis and are hoping that the President will resolve the situation by dismissing the Prime Minister. On May 9 Emboffs met with Reinado and Tilman as well as with some of their colleagues and supporters. This message explains the origin and nature of these groups as well as what the groups and their leaders told Emboffs about why they left for the mountains and under what circumstances they are willing to return. End Summary. Who's Who Among the Armed Groups -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) The AWOL military and police officers in the western part of the country fall into three categories: Major Reinado's group, Major Tilman's group, and miscellaneous others. --- Reinado's group: Before he left for the mountains a week ago, Major Alfredo Reinado was --- and officially he still is --- the commander of FDTL's military police. He is the leader of a group of approximately 20 MPs and at least 10 PNTL officers. At least 6 of the PNTL officers are from the Police Reserve Unit (PRU),whose original function was to deal with armed groups crossing the border from Indonesia, and at least 4 are from the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR),an "elite" unit charged with responding to civil disturbances and serious violent crimes. The group is armed with M16s, FNC assault rifles and side arms --- apparently these are military and/or police weapons that the individual members carried with them when they went to the mountains --- and they have several military trucks and motorcycles. The group's food and fuel stocks are limited. Reinado told Emboffs that his mission is to protect civilians and that he will not return to Dili until there has been a credible accounting of the "crimes" of April 28 and the criminals have been punished. (Note: Although references to "crimes" during the weekend of April 28-30 are generally construed to mean the mass killings allegedly committed that weekend by FDTL soldiers commanded by Colonel Lere, the deputy commander of FDTL, it appears that Major Reinado has a somewhat different interpretation of this term. See paragraph 8.) Reinado is adamant that his goals are separate and distinct from those of the petitioners. He does not fully trust General Taur Matan Ruak, the commander of FDTL, although he speaks with him frequently by telephone. He does not believe that the current Government (i.e. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri) has the capacity or intent to solve the current crisis, and is placing his hopes on decisive action from the President. Reinado's headquarters is in Aileu, in the mountains about 90 minutes' drive due south of Dili. Everyone in Aileu with whom Emboffs talked was strongly supportive of Major Reinado, characterizing him as "keeping us safe," "protecting us from Colonel Lere," and in similar terms. --- Major Marcos Tilman was the Assistant Operations Officer (J3) in FDTL. He and Major Tara Are leading a small group, which includes at least 4 soldiers armed with M16s and sidearms. The group also has strong linkages with several prominent "veterans" --- i.e., former pro-independence guerrilla fighters who for one reason or another did not become members of the reconstituted FDTL after independence --- from Western DILI 00000220 002.2 OF 004 districts. These include Dequa (Deker),Dudu, and Jili. While Tilman's stated goals are (1) ending discrimination against "loromonu" (people from the western part of East Timor),(2) resolution of the ex-FDTL petitioners' complaints, and (3) bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes allegedly committed in Tasitolu, his primary concern appears to be the security of his family and the ongoing political crisis. Tilman's claims of full independence from the petitioners ring hollow when he discusses their activities and objectives. Tilman's group is based in Gleno, Ermera District, about 90 minutes' drive to the southwest of Dili. --- AWOL Military and Police Officers: It is estimated that there are at least 100 police and an unknown number of soldiers who have gone AWOL and are staying with their families in the districts. Many of these military and police personnel are armed and have made contact with Reinado. In fact, Reinado claims that more than twenty have asked to formally join his group but he has not allowed them to do so because his "orders do not include operations with regular police" (i.e., police officers who are not members of the special units that sometimes conduct joint operations with MPs). More than a dozen PNTL have returned to Dili after being AWOL and have been allowed to return to work as usual. Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato has announced that there will be an investigation at a later date to determine if any PNTL members should be punished. It is not clear how many police officers and soldiers remain AWOL for political reasons and how many are motivated by fear of retribution if they return to Dili. Reinado's Description of April 28 -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Reinado told Emboffs that on April 28, shortly after rioting had begun in Dili and Tasitolu, he accompanied Acting FDTL Commander Colonel Lere to the home of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. Reinado waited outside while Lere went in to meet privately with the Prime Minister. After the meeting, Lere told Reinado that the Prime Minister had ordered him to "destroy them all." Lere repeated this order over the radio and returned to military HQ where he distributed weapons and ammunition to FDTL personnel and, Reinado says, to some civilians. When Reinado asked Lere for rules of engagement and mission objectives, Lere reportedly scoffed at the idea and began to speak in Makassae, a language common in the Baucau district of eastern East Timor, home to Lere and most of the other FDTL members who participated in the operation, but which Reinado and others from Western districts could not understand. In order to avoid participating in an operation that he believed was illegal and ill-considered, Reinado suggested that the MPs should guard the airport. Lere agreed, and Reinado and the other MPs departed. TMR's Response -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Reinado said that after Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak (TMR) returned to Dili, he called a meeting of senior FDTL officers. He said that TMR was angry with Colonel Lere and asked him pointedly for his written orders to intervene in a matter that should have been handled by the police. Lere responded that he had received a verbal order. TMR asked how many were dead and who was killed. Lere replied that he did not know and he had not yet investigated the matter. Reinado says TMR looked very sad when he heard this, and that he paused and then said, "If it is already buried, do not dig it up." Reinado and TMR -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Reinado told Emboffs he is in contact with TMR and that TMR initially told him that he had improperly taken FDTL weapons and trucks. Reinado said that he disagreed with TMR's assessment because he was continuing to serve as an MP by "protecting victims" from the military and because he has written, open ended orders from Colonel Lere to conduct joint operations with the police to ensure stability and security. In response, TMR DILI 00000220 003.2 OF 004 reportedly told Reinado to stay calm and control his men. In a subsequent conversation TMR reportedly asked Reinado to return to Dili to collect uniforms and fuel. Reinado declined because he doubted TMR's sincerity and feared a trap by Colonel Lere. TMR, he said, is not aware of everything that is going on in the FDTL. ¶6. (SBU) Reinado claims that when he complained to TMR about civilians allegedly armed by Colonel Maunana and reports of non-uniformed military personnel carrying weapons, TMR issued a written authorization to disarm --- and to kill if necessary --- civilians or non-uniformed members of the military found to be carrying weapons. Reinado claims to have this order and volunteered to give Emboffs a copy, although he did not produce one at the May 9 meeting. Reinado's relationship with the Petitioners -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Reinado was adamant that his cause was completely separate from that of the 595 petitioners. The Petitioners' cause, he said, was weakened by what he saw as a growing linkage to an opposition party intent on politicizing the cause. (Note: This is a probable reference to the Democratic Party (PD),East Timor's largest opposition party, whose President may indeed be co-operating with the petitioners.) Major Reinado says he has received a request from Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the petitioners, to merge his group with Reinado's MPs. Reinado says he has refused because of the fundamental difference in their missions and causes. That said, Reinado does not deny that his group has coordinated with the Petitioners and that at least one member of his group has cooperated with a representative of the Petitioners to raise money in Maliana. Reinado's Motivation -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Reinado claims that his primary objective is to protect the people in Aileu from the Military and that he is carrying out a written order from Colonel Lere to conduct joint patrols with the specialized police units (UIR and PRU) to protect safety and stability. He denies being AWOL but says he will not return to regular service until there has been accountability for the "crimes" committed in Tasitolu. He acknowledges that this could take a long time and hopes that a credible investigation will be carried out, with international participation, if possible. If such an investigation is carried out, he said, he would volunteer to be the first witness. A complete investigation is not enough, he added. The perpretators must be brought to justice before he can return to regular service. Despite the talk of crimes, Reinado was careful not to assert that there were more than a handful of deaths during the April 28 riots. The crimes to which he was referring, he explained to Emboffs, were the execution of an illegal order for the military to intervene in a matter that should have been handled by the police and the way in which it was carried out, including the distribution by Lere of military weapons to civilians. ¶9. (SBU) Major Reinado told Emboffs he is also motivated by a devotion to the military. Implicitly comparing himself to President Gusmao and TMR, he said repeatedly that he wants his "generation to compare with the generation of 1975" and that just as it was the responsibility of the old generation to save the nation in 1975, it was his generation's responsibility to save the nation now. Major Tilman's Group -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Major Tilman says his group has three primary goals: (1) ending discrimination against "loromonu" (East Timorese from the western part of the country); (2) resolution of the ex-FDTL petitioners' complaints; and (3) bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes in Tasitolu. Like Reinado, he claims no personal knowledge of widespread atrocities committed by the security forces in Tasitolu on April 28 and says that there is DILI 00000220 004.2 OF 004 no confirmation that more people died than the five acknowledged by the government. Because of persistent rumors that as many as 70 people were killed, he believes that a transparent investigation should be conducted. ¶11. (SBU) According to Tilman, the government cannot resolve the current crisis because it has a fundamental misunderstanding of the real situation. For example, he said, the government thinks that sacking 591 soldiers - more than one-third of the military - is a small thing. Until the government can admit that view is wrong, he said, it will be incapable of taking the steps needed to heal the rift in Timorese society, and the longer the government ignores these types of problems the worse they will become. The best hope for quick resolution, he said, was for "the President to act decisively." Potential for Violence -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Tilman worries that the current situation could become violent. The most important thing in the near term was to control the increasingly impatient petitioners. While this group does not have arms, he said, they still had the capacity to commit violence. For this reason, he said, he had advised Salsinha to divide the petitioners into smaller groups and to send them to their home districts where they would be easier to control and less likely to become disruptive. He also claims to have persuaded Salsinha to forbid petitioners from joining the recent demonstrations in Gleno that resulted in the death of one police officer and the injury of several more. ¶13. (SBU) Comment: Before the current troubles began, Majors Reinado and Tilman were widely regarded by the FDTL leadership and by informed international observers as among the best and the brightest of East Timor's future military leaders. Those who have talked with them since their recent departure from Dili, including Emboffs, believe that --- whatever the advisability of their actions --- they are doing what they sincerely believe is in the best interests of their country. Emboffs also believe that neither Reinado nor Tilman will engage in military action against the government unless they are attacked or in other extreme circumstances, e.g. an attempted coup d'etat by Lere or someone else. End comment. REES