DAS JOHN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GUSMAO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/3/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR PREL KJUS KCRM KAWC ID TT SUBJECT: DAS JOHN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GUSMAO REF: A) DILI 194 B) DILI 135 DILI 00000203 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, Embassy Dili, State. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) Summary: EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John, along with Ambassador Rees and Emboffs, met with President Xanana Gusmao May 2 to discuss U.S. priorities and concerns in East Timor. The major focus of the discussion was the riots on Friday, April 28 and the subsequent intervention of the armed forces (F-FDTL) to quell the violence. DAS John expressed the great importance the U.S. places on the development of stable democracy in East Timor. He emphasized the connection between encouraging respect for law and order and addressing accountability for the serious crimes committed in Timor in ¶1999. President Gusmao expressed great concern regarding Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's decision to call in the F-FDTL to quell the disturbances, the actions of F-FDTL during these operations, and the potential long-term implications. He also reiterated his overarching criticism of the Government's handling of the original complaints of the ex-soldiers whose demonstrations last week led up to the riot. The President appeared extremely sad, apparently in large part because of his disappointment in his former comrades-in-arms who now make up F-FDTL. On the issue of accountability for the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999, the President again highlighted the need for good relations with Indonesia and expressed his understanding for the fragile political environment in Jakarta. He assured DAS John that he is watching the work of the bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission closely and will not accept an outcome that does not lead to a genuine disclosure of the truth. The President did not object to reinstatement of the investigative component of the UN Serious Crimes Unit to complete the unfinished investigations into 1999 atrocities. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a May 2 meeting with DAS John and Ambassador Rees, President Gusmao talked at some length regarding his disappointment with recent developments and how they have been handled. He stated that he "never expected" the violent turn of events, and that it demonstrates that Government and military leaders were either unwilling or unable to solve the problems when they were small and then took the wrong approach when they became large. He said that "we didn't take care of our people, we didn't listen to their voices, we just added to the problems." He expressed particular surprise and disappointment at the attitude of F-FDTL leadership, citing statements on the part of some military leaders to the effect that the dismissed soldiers were their "enemies". When asked about the accord that had seemed on the verge of being finalized when the riots broke out, see Ref A, President Gusmao acknowledged that the situation had appeared near resolution at that point, but that this progress had come too late. Reporting on his meeting on Friday, April 28 --- a couple of hours before the riot broke out --- with Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the petitioners, he said Salsinha had been ready to move forward with the accord but had told the President he could no longer control the "youths" (i.e., non-petitioners) who had joined the demonstrations and were increasingly agitating for greater confrontation. ¶3. (S) President Gusmao was extremely critical of the decision to call in the F-FDTL on Friday afternoon. His described his discussion with Prime Minister Alkatiri, which directly preceded the meeting with DAS John. He reported that Alkatiri had said Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato, who exercises ultimate control over the PNTL, did not take the necessary actions to keep order. Moreover, the President (please strictly protect) said Alkatiri believes that Lobato may have allowed the situation to get out of control on purpose, and perhaps that Lobato may even have instigated the riot in order to create chaos that would justify an authoritarian response. In the President's view, Alkatiri is using Lobato and PNTL Commissioner Paulo Martins as scapegoats to justify his decision to call on the F-FDTL, noting that the relationship between Alkatiri and Lobato is now extremely negative, although he did not specify whether the Alkatiri-Lobato split preceded or was caused by Friday's events. Moreover, he believes this is part of a trend toward the army being more closely identified with the ruling Fretilin party. (Comment: It is interesting that the President focused all his criticism regarding the handling of the riots on the Prime Minister and his decision to call in the F-FDTL, and DILI 00000203 002.2 OF 004 had no direct criticism of police handling of the rioting or of Lobato's role in the events. Many Timorese and international observers, even if they disapprove of the decision to call in the army, agree with the Prime Minister's view that the PNTL were at best inept in their response and at worst purposefully negligent of their duties. End Comment.) ¶4. (C) Gusmao's main concern regarding accountability for the weekend's events is focused on the F-FDTL and the need to fully investigate their actions in the areas they controlled Friday evening through much of Saturday. Regarding the rumors of 60 unreported deaths at the hands of soldiers in the Tasitolu area of Dili, the President noted that these cannot simply be dismissed. He expressed his fear that the rumors might be true and that the soldiers who took over security operations may have been motivated by revenge. He emphasized the importance of a thorough accounting for army actions, noting that the F-FDTL would lose all credibility if it is seen as perpetrating a cover up. ¶5. (C) In discussing the situation as of yesterday, President Gusmao stated that he does not think there will be further violence in the coming days. However, the key challenge, he noted, will be to quiet the many rumors circulating in Dili about potential attacks or clashes. Regarding the petitioners, many of whose locations are still unknown, he expressed satisfaction that Alkatiri has publicly recognized that the petitioners were not the main culprits in the rioting and that most had not taken part. He also reported that Alkatiri had promised him that petitioners are not to be arrested, but rather sent back to their homes so that they can participate in interviews with the commission being formed to investigate their complaints. The President added that the Prime Minister had asked him to give a speech on television later that afternoon to try to calm the situation and encourage people to return to their homes, and that he had agreed to do so. (Comment: The speech, delivered yesterday evening and rebroadcast today, was short and does not seem to have instilled much more confidence. The President appeared to be tired and sad and rather than being directly reassuring made statements to the effect of "the Prime Minister tells me that the situation is calm." End comment.) ¶6. (SBU) The President also said that he would try to call Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the petitioners, to enlist his help to calm the situation. We have no further information today on whether he was able to have this conversation. (Note: in interviews with media outlets in the last few days, Salsinha was more confrontational than in previous statements. He said he only trusted the President, not the Government or the F-FDTL, because "they have lied and they have killed." Salsinha said he believed the rumors that FDTL had killed an additional 60 people in Tasitolu and hidden the bodies. End note.) ¶7. (SBU) DAS John shifted the conversation away from recent events to accountability by asserting that the issue remains one of the US Government's top priorities in our bilateral relations with both Indonesia and East Timor. He cited the reformist efforts of Indonesia's current Government, especially in regard to corruption, as the grounds for reestablishing military to military relations with Indonesia. DAS John stated that true reform in Indonesia requires the TNI be held accountable for its action in East Timor, but made clear that accountability does not necessarily require punishment. Rather, a measure of accountability can be achieved by revealing the whole truth about the 1999 crimes, including the names of the perpetrators. He stated that the Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) is the best vehicle to achieve this, and it should include international participation. DAS John added that its term should be extended for an additional year. (Note: The TFC's original mandate of one year will expire in August.) ¶8. (C) President Gusmao provided his assessment of the political environment within which the bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) is operating. Describing Indonesian President Yudhoyono as a "good friend", Gusmao expressed his appreciation for the significant transformation taking place in Indonesian politics and also noted that the crimes committed in East Timor by Indonesians were the acts of a previous regime. The President stated that pushing Indonesia too far in seeking punishment of those involved in the 1999 atrocities could be DILI 00000203 003.2 OF 004 detrimental to bilateral relations. He did note a positive progression in President Yuhoyono's thinking on the issue of accountability. When the TFC was first proposed in early 2005, President Gusmao said it was clear that the Commission was largely intended by the Indonesian side to be a quick exercise aimed at improving Indonesia's image with the international community. Since that time, the Indonesian President has become more committed to the bilateral project and agrees with President Gusmao that an assessment of the current process and a one-year extension of the TFC's mandate should be approved by both governments. While admittedly sympathetic to the challenges President Yudhoyono faces, President Gusmao stated that East Timor will not continue participating in the TFC if the Commission's work is diverted from genuine truth-seeking activities. ¶9. (C) Referring to a bilateral summit between the two Presidents that took place in January, President Gusmao mentioned a discussion with then-TNI Chief of Staff Sutarto in which the General stated that he recognizes the TNI's actions in East Timor were wrong, but reminded the President that the TNI was then operating under the Soeharto-era doctrine of maintaining national integrity at any cost. The General continued by stating that the TNI needs to develop a new doctrine in line with the current needs of the country, but has not yet done so. President Gusmao reported that he informed Sutarto that the "TNI needs to say these lessons [learned in East Timor] were bad." Gusmao later asserted that the entire government of Indonesia must recognize what took place in East Timor. ¶10. (S) The President played down the importance of the TFC's ability to recommend amnesty by stating that outsiders need to understand the entire TFC process in context rather than focusing on any one aspect. Gusmao said it had been necessary to include the possibility of recommending amnesty in order to secure Indonesia's commitment to the Commission. He noted, however, that the Timorese parliament would have to approve any such recommendation for amnesty, a step that is highly unlikely given the fact that an amnesty bill for minor crimes was rejected in 2002. President Gusmao said he recently expressed this view to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbor, in hopes of securing some form of UN assistance for the TFC. The President posed no objection to DAS John's suggestion that the investigative component of the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) should be revived in order to complete unfinished investigations into the murders and other grave crimes committed into 1999, in part so that the TFC would have a complete evidentiary record from which to draw its conclusions. ¶11. (C) President Gusmao concluded the portion of the meeting on accountability by stating that the recent events in Dili have highlighted the necessity that the Timorese people must also learn from the various accountability processes that the lessons learned during the 24 year occupation were wrong and cannot not be repeated among Timorese. The recent CAVR report revealed a significant amount of Timorese-on-Timorese violent acts committed during the Indonesian era. In order for democracy to mature in East Timor, President Gusmao stated that such internal violence must be prevented. ¶12. (S) Comment: During the meeting President Gusmao appeared to be doing his best to be his usual self: calm, thoughtful, and candid, with a tendency to find the humorous or ironic side of serious matters. Yet his mood throughout the discussion was one of deep sadness. Once or twice during the meeting he paused to wipe away tears. At one point, having discussed what he regarded as the misbehavior of F-FDTL and his own failure to convince them to take a forgiving attitude toward their ex-colleagues who had led the demonstration, he said slowly and quietly, "I have lost my guerrillas." ¶12. (S) Comment continued: What remains of F-FDTL is indeed now far more closely aligned with the Prime Minister, who backed up the military leadership's decision to dismiss the 595 petitioners, than with the President, who opposed the decision. It would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that the President has now lost his authority within Timorese society. This authority was never based on the probability that men with guns would follow his orders. Rather, his immense popularity DILI 00000203 004.2 OF 004 and moral authority is based on his personal qualities and on his long history as the undisputed leader of the independence movement. Recent events have almost certainly solidified the President's standing with the people of East Timor and further weakened the popularity of the Alkatiri government. It is worth noting that Prime Minister Alkatiri --- an effective public speaker with a healthy self-regard who in his own way is doing his best to stabilize the situation --- asked President Gusmao to give an address to calm the nation rather than giving the address himself. End comment. ¶13. (U) DAS John has cleared this message. REES