JAMA'ATUL MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH'S "THREE TIERS OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DHAKA 000768

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FROM RSO FOR DS/IP/NEA-SCA ATTN SCOTT GALLO
DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/CC, DS/DSS/ITA ATTN DREW DAVIS
DEPT FOR SA/PB AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2031
TAGS: PTER KISL ASEC BG BG
SUBJECT: JAMA'ATUL MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH'S "THREE TIERS OF
THREAT"

REF: A. 05 DHAKA 00815

B. 05 DHAKA 04090

C. 05 DHAKA 04981

D. 05 DHAKA 05594

E. 05 DHAKA 05837

F. 05 DHAKA 05853

G. 05 DHAKA 05040

H. 05 DHAKA 05963

I. 05 DHAKA 06122

J. 05 DHAKA 06350

K. DHAKA 00462

Classified By: A/DCM DUNDAS MCCULLOUGH FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) AND (D)


1. (C/NF) Summary. This telegram reviews Jama'atul
Mujahideen Bangladesh's (JMB) target selection and the
evolution of its tactics since the August 17 bomb blasts. It
also lays out JMB,s &Three Tiers of Threat8 as articulated
to us by two senior Bangladeshi police officials, and
highlights Embassy security counter-measures in response to
these threats. End Summary.

JMB'S THREE TIERS OF THREAT
--------------


2. (SBU) The BDG banned JMB, and Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB),in February 2005 for its apparent
involvement in a spate of attacks on "cultural" targets and
two prominent Bangladeshi NGOs (ref A). Long considered
disorganized and a relatively low threat, JMB surprised the
BDG and others with the coordinated organization and audacity
of its nearly 500 bomb blasts on August 17 in 63 of
Bangladesh's 64 districts. After apparently pausing for
Ramadan in September, JMB in October began an accelerating
campaign of terror against the BDG and then ordinary
Bangladeshis.


3. (C/NF) Deputy Commissioner of the Detective Branch (DCDB)
of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Mohammed Shohidul Islam
characterized to RSO JMB,s evolving tactics and target
selection as "Three Tiers of Threat": 1) the judicial system
and the government; 2) Political leftists and NGOs seen as
un-Islamic because of their work to empower women; and 3)
diplomats and other foreigners.


4. (C/NF) Additional Inspector General of Police, Recruiting
Maintenance & Training Mohammed Shohidullah Khan articulated
the same three-tier framework in a separate meeting with RSO.
He noted JMB had already breached the first two tiers, but
that an attack on a foreigner would cross a major threshold
with significant international implications.


5. (SBU) August 17 and the sequence of subsequent events
track with this framework. Leaflets found at many of the
August 17 blast sites called for Sharia (Islamic) law in
Bangladesh, urged judges and security personnel to join JMB's
cause, and warned "anti-Islamic" NGOs, "non-believers," and
all "oppressors," including President Bush and UK Prime
Minister Blair, to "stop their repression" of Muslims or face
attacks. (See ref B for a full account of the leaflet.)


6. (SBU) After August 17, the judicial system bore the brunt
of JMB attacks:

- October 3: Five coordinated blasts target four judges in
their courtrooms in Chittagong, Chandpur, and Laxmipur in
southeast Bangladesh (ref C);
- October 18: An attacker throws an IED at a judge exiting
his vehicle at his residence in Sylhet, northeast of Dhaka;
- November 14: An attacker throws an IED into a vehicle
carrying two judges to the district courthouse, killing both
of them, in Jhalokhati District, 290 km south of Dhaka. This
was the first inkling of a suicide bomber since the attacker,
once in police custody, reportedly attempted to detonate an
IED strapped to his leg (ref D);
- November 29: Two suicide bomber attacks within 45 minutes
kill two police at a courthouse security checkpoint in
Chittagong and five lawyers in a courthouse waiting room at
the Deputy Commissioner of Administration's Office in
Gazipur, 32 km north of Dhaka (ref E);
- December 1: A suicide bomber kills one police officer and
injures as many as 30 others at a security checkpoint in a
second attack on the same government complex in Gazipur (ref
F).


7. (SBU) Bangladeshi NGO partners of the U.S.-based and
USAID-funded "Save the Children" received threat letters
purportedly from JMB (ref H). Other Bangladeshi NGOs,
businesses, educational institutions, the media, and civil
society groups reported receiving JMB written or telephonic
threats, although at least some of those were clearly hoaxes
or extortion attempts. On December 8, a JMB attack in front
of the leftist Udichi Cultural Club in Netrokona District,
approximately 150 km northwest of Dhaka, claimed the life of
the club's vice president (ref G).


8. (S/NF) While the JMB has not yet actually attacked a
foreigner, there is compelling evidence that it surveilled
Peace Corps volunteers and a Peace Corps training facility in
Gazipur. On December 20, SIMO reported a threat against
"foreigners" who teach English in Gazipur, and on December 22
an imam in the Gazipur area reportedly told a source that he
overheard two young men and one older man say after prayers
on December 16 that "the foreigners are lucky we missed them.
Maybe there will be a better opportunity to strike again."
This information tracked with a statement to law enforcement
personnel by a detained JMB leader, and alleged bomb maker,
in Gazipur that he had conducted six days of surveillance in
the Gazipur area on foreign English teachers. (Note: All
Peace Corps volunteers in Bangladesh teach English.) The JMB
leadership reportedly ordered him to stand down, however,
because of the impending SAARC summit in Dhaka on November
13-14 (ref J).


9. (SBU) "Amader Shomoy," an independent Bangla newspaper,
ran a front-page story on January 18 entitled, "JMB Planned
to Attack Peace Corps Volunteers." It reported that the JMB
was foiled by the BDG,s massive security blanket for the
SAARC summit, but that several JMB suicide squads had been
deployed to carry out the attacks. The JMB then allegedly
changed its focus to the local government offices (see
November 29 and December 1 attacks above). The article
sourced the information to an arrested JMB militant, and
stated JMB militants remain active in the Gazipur area.


10. (S/NF) Shahjahan Akand Shuva, writer of the story, and a
colleague, Mohammed Shahidul Islam, told RSO on January 23
that they obtained their information from a Special Branch
investigation report, which was passed to them by a paid
informant, a SB transcriber.


11. (S/NF) On January 26, the RSO and Senior Security
Investigator interviewed the JMB militant named in the
article at the Special Branch police office under the
watchful eyes of representatives of the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB),the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and
the police. H. M. Anayatullah, aka Obyed, aka Jewel, DPOB
February 21, 1980, Badshapara, Gopalgonj district,
Bangladesh, stated that he was the Gazipur district chief of
JMB. When asked about any plans to attack foreigners or
Americans, he said he observed five or six foreigners in
September wearing shorts and short-sleeve shirts, and
followed them to the Peace Corps training site in Gazipur.
Between September and October, he surveilled the foreigners
playing volleyball and traveling to the Peace Corps facility
in Anwara Nibash. When he reported his surveillance to the
JMB divisional commander Dhaka/Chittagong, he was told to
wait for further instructions.


12. (S/NF) Anayatullah claimed the operation against the
Peace Corps volunteers never went to the attack phase, and
denied having any responsibility other than observing and
reporting. He said that he had no knowledge of specific or
ongoing JMB plans to attack Peace Corps or any other US or
Western interests in Bangladesh. (For an in depth
description of the events and investigation of the
surveillance of the Peace Corps, see ref K.)

JMB TACTICS
--------------


13. (SBU) AUGUST 17. The IEDs in the August 17 blasts served
as a "wake up" call on JMB capabilities and intentions, but
they were not designed to be lethal. There were only two
deaths in nearly 500 explosions. The IEDs, 35 mm film
canisters packed with explosives, were placed in bags
containing leaflets that flew into the air upon detonation.



14. (C/NF) On September 13, DCDB showed RSO a collection of
explosive materials and bomb components, seized the day
before in Dhaka, for what was assumed to be an imminent wave
of JMB bombings. The seized home-made IEDs were six to eight
times larger (roughly the size of a large coffee cup) and
more powerful than those used on August 17. There were also
470 commercial detonators, capacitors to act as timers, and
various aluminum-based explosives and AMNO3. The IEDs were
fashioned to work like grenades, with a pin as a safety and a
button to arm the device, suggesting that the devices were
intended to be thrown or placed.


15. (C/NF) RSO was introduced to a 30-31 year old single male
suspect who was allegedly responsible for making the IED
triggers. He claimed to not know what the device was for or
how it was to be used. Police tracked down others involved
with the bomb-making process and learned that the process was
compartmentalized; designers of various components claimed to
not know what it was they were designing or who else was
working on it. They speculated that the August 17 attack was
also highly compartmentalized. Many arrestees, typically
those who placed the devices, claimed to not know that the
devices were IEDs, but rather that they were told the devices
would simply "distribute leaflets."


16. (S/NF) RSO RESPONSE. RSO shared this information with
SIMO, which arranged to have an explosives expert come to
post to analyze the IED components. The expert's visit
produced a four-page unclassified physical description and
technical analysis of the devices, which was shared with the
police and used to educate security personnel (both Embassy
and host country) about the capabilities of JMB bomb makers.


17. (C/NF) October 3 Attack: Mohammed Alamgir Rahman, SP,
Chandpur District, Mohammed Moin Uddin, OIC Kotwali Station
of the Chittagong Metropolitan Police, and SI Mohammed
Mostafa, Kotwali Station Laxmipur District, told RSO that the
devices used in the October 3 attacks were crude and in a few
cases ineffective. But they were well concealed. Instead of
resembling the easily recognized grenade-type devices
recovered in Dhaka, they looked like books and school pencil
boxes. The attackers carried multiple devices. In some
cases, when the primary device failed to detonate, the
attackers deployed a second device. In other cases,
attackers threw a second device as they fled the site.


18. (SBU) Surveillance of some sort almost certainly preceded
the attacks. Attackers knew the location of the benches
where judges sat in the courtroom, and, in one case, the
location of the bench in relation to an exterior window
through which an IED was thrown. Surveillance would not have
been difficult as the courts are usually filled with the
unscreened public.


19. (SBU) RSO RESPONSE. RSO staff discussed with the
Embassy's Surveillance Detection (SD) Team the evolving JMB
threat and tactics. After congratulating the SD for their
great work in identifying an individual who was thought to be
a suspect in the August 17 blasts, the RSO briefed on JMB,s
tactics to date, stressing the primary role of surveillance.


20. (C/NF) October 18: The Sylhet Superintendent of Police
confirmed to RSO that the attacker threw an IED at a judge in
front of his residence as he exited his vehicle, inflicting
minor leg injuries. While fleeing the scene, the attacker
threw a second advice, but he was overpowered by the public
and held until the police arrived. Later, police officials
discovered a third, unexploded device strapped to his waist.
The IEDs were homemade, but much less powerful than those
used in the October 3 attacks.


21. (SBU) Attacking a target as he exited his vehicle
indicates prior surveillance. The two obvious choke points
for the judge were his residence and place of work. He was
predictable in his time and routes. It was unclear, however,
if the IED strapped to the attacker's waist represented a
suicide option or simply an additional weapon.


22. (SBU) November 14: A 28-year-old man approached a minivan
conveying two judges from their residences to the local
district court. The man attempted to give leaflets to the
judges through an open window, and, when the judges refused,
he threw an IED into the vehicle. The device detonated,
killing both judges. The attacker was injured in the attack
and taken into police custody. On his way to the hospital,
he reportedly tried to detonate a second device attached to
his thigh, but was stopped by police. At the hospital, he
stated that he had joined JMB in 2000 and was a member of a
JMB suicide squad.


23. (SBU) While the press called the attacker a suicide
bomber, the BDG and other observers were less certain. BDG
officials, reluctant to acknowledge Islamic extremism as a
problem in Bangladesh, had always been quick to say that no
Bangladeshi would be a suicide bomber because "it is not in
our culture." If this was indeed a botched suicide attack,
then it represented the crossing of a major psychological and
tactical threshold just three months after the August 17
&wake up8 blasts. Police reacted to the attacks, and
demonstrations by judges and lawyers for security, by placing
armed officers in judges, vehicles and at judges' residences.


24. (SBU) November 29: If there were doubts about the
November 14 attacker, they disappeared after two young men
with devices strapped to their backs blew themselves up
within 45 minutes of each other at a police checkpoint near
the Chittagong district courthouse and in a lawyers, waiting
room in the Gazipur courthouse.


25. (SBU) With these attacks, JMB,s focus broadened from
judges to others who participate in the judicial process. In
addition, they adapted to police coverage at judges,
residences and of judges, commuter vans by finding new
targets. The Chittagong attacker is believed to have had a
different target than the police checkpoint, whose security
may have prevented him and a colleague from reaching their
intended target. Alternatively, it might have spooked them
into detonating their IEDs prematurely. The Gazipur attacker
dressed in the same clothes as his victims, in a lawyer,s
gown, to gain access to the attack site, perhaps after having
previously observed the ease with which &lawyers8 moved
through checkpoints.


26. (SBU) RSO RESPONSE. The RSO pushed back visitor
screening to the Embassy property line, and realigned local
guard resources to ensure that sufficient personnel were in
position to conduct pat down searches as visitors approached
the Embassy. SD assets were briefed of the emergence of
suicide bombers and repositioned to observe the visa line,
public affairs patrons, and other areas where a suicide
bomber may focus their attention. The MSG detachment ran a
series of react drills around a suicide bomber scenario.


27. (C/NF) December 1: Just two days later, the government
offices in Gazipur were hit again, this time at a security
checkpoint before the main administrative building. The
Deputy Inspector General (DIG) for Dhaka told RSO that police
had been instructed to pat down visitors, so when the
27-year-old attacker approached carrying a tea dispenser, he
was stopped by the police for screening. The attacker then
detonated a device that this time was not strapped to his
body but hidden inside the tea dispenser. Again, this
indicates prior JMB surveillance of the target.


28. (SBU) December 8: Alerted that there was an IED in the
street in front of the Udichi Cultural Club, police detonated
the device, causing a curious crowd to gather. Several
minutes later, two suicide bombers in the crowd detonated
themselves. With the hardening of security at courthouses
and recent JMB attackers not having apparently reached their
intended targets, the JMB branched out to attack
indiscriminately what it sees as an "anti-Islamic"
organization - a leftist cultural center.

CHANGING TACTICS


29. (SBU) The December 8 attack highlighted JMB's ability to
change tactics to defeat police counter-measures while
remaining consistent with the &three tiers8 threat
philosophy. The timed devices of August 17 evolved into
grenade-like IEDs and then suicide bombs. Targets shifted
from judges in easily accessible courthouses to judges at
home or on the street at pre-determined chokepoints. When
police hardened these targets with armed escorts and
intensified vetting procedures, JMB upped the ante by
concealing its bombs in everyday items like tea dispensers
and then by launching suicide bombers. It broadened its
target selection from judges to lawyers and then cultural
&leftists.8

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE ACTIONS


30. (SBU) The RSO continues to conduct rigorous training and
briefing programs for all Embassy staff on all aspects of
security. Additional steps to upgrade and improve CACs have
begun, including a project supported by the Overseas Building
Office to develop man traps around vehicle screening areas.
Post's EAC has been fully supportive of these security
measures.

CONCLUSION


31. (C/NF). The arrests of several dozen major JMB leaders,
and the recovery of large amounts of bomb-making materials,
have apparently prompted a dramatic end, or at least lull, in
attacks. Many BDG officials claim that they have "broken the
back" of the JMB, while some, like the Home Minister, say "it
is not over." The top two JMB leaders, Sheik Abdur Rahman
and Bangla Bhai, remain at large. Whether the JMB is down
and out or just taking a breather remains to be seen. RSO
continues to work closely with local law enforcement and with
other agencies in the Embassy to monitor and counter the
volatile threat environment.


32. (U) Point of contact is the Regional Security Office,
American Embassy Dhaka. Tel. (880 2) 885-5500 ext 2228.
CHAMMAS