EMERGING LEADERS IN BANGLADESH (C-NE6-01896)

S E C R E T DHAKA 006738 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 TAGS: PINR PGOV BG SUBJECT: EMERGING LEADERS IN BANGLADESH (C-NE6-01896) REF: STATE 187574 Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 c. (S) The following is pegged to reftel questions: A) WHO IN EACH POLITICAL PARTY PARTICIPATING IN THE 2007 ELECTION WILL DRIVE MAJOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNS THAT COULD RECEIVE NATIONWIDE ATTENTION? ARE THEY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEMSELVES OR FOR OTHER PARTY MEMBERS? WHAT STRATEGIES DO THEY INTEND TO USE IN THEIR CAMPAIGNS -- FOR EXAMPLE, BUYING VOTES, GOING ON "LISTENING" TOURS, FOCUSING ON THE GRASSROOTS? WHAT WAS THEIR ROLE IN THE 2001 ELECTION, IF ANY? HOW WILL EMERGING LEADERS UTILIZE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THEIR POLITICAL PARTIES? With the partial exception of Jamaat Islami, the campaigns of all parties have two levels, local and national. Especially for the 80 percent of the country that is rural, swing voters make their choice based on local issues and the reputation of the local candidates. So long as candidates bring to the table their assessed financial contribution to party coffers and include in their campaign posters pictures of the party founder and heir, they have great discretion in the content of their campaigning. National leaders travel the country to encourage local party activists and denounce their opponents but historically their "coat tails" have limited impact. Candidates of both the BNP and the AL can be expected to engage in whatever form of cheating they can get away with; as the de facto incumbent, BNP should have greater opportunities this election for cheating. While the Awami League still has the stronger nationwide grassroots organization, this advantage has apparently eroded in recent years. There is no AL equivalent to Tarique Rahman and his Hahwa Bhaban office for systematically monitoring constituency politics and devising nationwide campaign strategies; while many observers believe Tarique's role in the successful 2001 election -- particularly forging the breakthrough alliance with Jamaat Islami -- was overstated, there's no question of his impressive grasp of local issues and leaders in many constituencies. In 2004, Tarique went on a "listening tour" throughout the country which was notable precisely because it was such a rarity. The insight Tarique develops in this process helps him pick and back local winners who then become part of his BNP clique. All parties avoid providing a stage for emerging leaders, especially the AL, unless there is a clear intent, as in the case of the BNP and Tarique, to groom an heir apparent. Thus, it is unlikely that anyone other than familiar national leaders will spearhead either party's national campaign. After the elections, leaders who backed winning candidates should be strengthened within party ranks. By selling minister of state portfolios to a suddenly ballooning cabinet in 2002, Tarique produced a coterie of senior figures who literally owed him their positions while padding his already ample bank accounts. Neither the BNP nor AL is a constituency-based party in the American sense, with interest groups like labor or business exercising key influence in party policy and leadership selection. Instead, party leaders triumph as a result of deals with other party factions, and parties win elections based on deals with other political parties. Both are a reflection of how small a role "issues" play in elections. B) WHAT ARE THE MAIN POLICY VIEWS OF RISING LEADERS? HOW DO THEY VIEW US INTERESTS? HOW DO THEY VIEW BANGLADESHI AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS? WHAT VISIONS DO THEY HAVE FOR THEIR POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOR THE BANGLADESHI GOVERNMENT? As Khondaker Musharraf Hussain, a BNP hard-liner and confidant of party president Khaleda Zia, recently remarked to Ambassador, both parties are now centrist with no important differences on issues. Both proclaim and up to a large point are sympathetic to broad USG interests, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and enhanced foreign trade and investment. Both parties promise to promote development, reduce poverty, improve governance, and attack corruption. The party in opposition can be counted on to be interested in human rights. The one major area of professed difference is the Awami League's assertion that it supports secular values and is against Islamic extremism, but this assertion is rarely reflected by concrete action because the AL is averse to being labeled "anti-Muslim" even by Islamic extremists. Thus, Hasina was largely absent in defending Ahmadiyas against Islamic zealots. Moreover, an opposition leader will say anything to attack the government; during the 2003 Iraq war, Hasina blasted the GOB for not standing up to the USG "murder" of Muslims, and in 2006 she alleged the GOB fabricated power shortages to justify buying electricity from India, a traditional supporter of the Awami League. The lack of policy differences, vision, or "national" interest is evident at all levels of both major parties. C) HOW MUCH OF THE DECISION-MAKING IN EACH PARTY IS CONSENSUAL OR CADRE-BASED, AND HOW MUCH IS BASED ON THE PERSONALITIES OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP? HOW WOULD THIS CHANGE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE CURRENT PARTY PRESIDENTS AND CHAIRMEN? Decision-making is determined by Zia and Hasina, respectively, and their coterie of informal advisers. Party leadership councils in both parties sometimes ratify decisions but often are not even consulted. There are factions in both parties, including hard-liners who want to subvert elections to pave the way for sending the "two ladies" into exile to break the glass ceiling blocking their ambitions, but their influence is unclear. In the current Awami League context, a hard-liner is someone who is driven not by principle but by opposition to participating in the elections, for personal or party reason; the difference is more of motivation than actual daylight on key issues. In the BNP, "dissidents" are almost exclusively those disappointed by being relegated to the back benches. Zia listens only to people she trusts based on personal loyalty, but Hasina seems to give surprising consideration to her small, leftist partners to keep them active in her opposition programs. Since both parties are basically family-run entities that derive their legitimacy from dead founders, they would change dramatically and unpredictably if the dynastic hold were broken. Being out of power for more than five years would also put the Awami League's cohesiveness under great strain. The way the AL and BNP came to difficult and in some ways surprising decisions on the recent election commission controversy underscores that the two ladies remain the key actors with limited support from a handful of advisers. D) WHO DO BANGLADESHIS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES BELIEVE WOULD BE THE BEST PERSON TO IMPROVE THE BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY (BNP),AWAMI LEAGUE (AL),OR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)? WHO COULD BEST INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SMALLER PARTIES LIKE THE JATIYA PARTY? WHO COULD INCREASE THE POPULARITY AND ELECTORAL WINS OF THE ISLAMIST PARTIES LIKE JAMAAT ISLAMI (JI) AND THE ISLAMI OIKYE JOTE (IOJ)? WHICH INDIVIDUALS DO BANGLADESHIS VIEW AS BEING THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING THE COUNTRY (NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME AS THE BEST PARTY)? WHY? A major reason Bangladeshis are so frustrated with their political process is the dynastic leadership of both parties and the lack of opportunity for alternative leaders to gain real power. Moreover, for the BNP, the heir apparent is Tarique, who inspires few but unnerves many in and out of BNP. For the Awami League, there is no obvious successor to Hasina, both by design and because of the apparent disinterest of her U.S.-based son, Joy, in the mantle. Thus, if Hasina died in her sleep, the next leader would likely be an interim figure. The Jatiya party is an Ershad vehicle that seems to be in terminal decline; without him, it may well disintegrate. IOJ has basically fallen part -- one faction cynically joined AL because of their shared antipathy to JI and another dissolved -- but JI is a wild card because the next amir will be selected largely democratically by party leaders and activists. One reaction to the dearth of political talent is to focus on so-called civil society options and "clean candidates" campaigns to eliminate illicit money and thuggery from politics. But civil society itself is polarized between the two big parties, and its leaders are generally not very active or politically sophisticated. In the afterglow of his Nobel Peace prize, Muhammad Yunus was mooted as a consensus choice for chief adviser of the caretaker government, but he is virtually the only Bangladeshi with the stature and credibility to compel the respect of both parties. Politicization of the judiciary and the bureaucracy has tainted its senior figures, with negative implications for the viability of the "neutral" caretaker government system after the current election. E) WHAT HAPPENS TO BNP MEMBERS WHO CRITICIZE TARIQUE RAHMAN? ARE THEY PHYSICALLY THREATENED? DO THEY FIND THEMSELVES SIDELINED IN PARTY AFFAIRS? BNP members who are not in Tarique's faction complain about him privately, sometimes citing his corruption and heavy-handed tactics, but what appalls many of them is his youthful arrogance. Some claim to be threatened and surveilled by intelligence services as a result of their anti-Tarique stance. Because almost by definition they are outsiders, they are not vulnerable to further marginalization in party affairs. It takes a party leader of Saifur Rahman's stature as finance minister and a party founder to survive losing challenges to Tarique's influence in party affairs, which was driven only by Saifur's desire to protect the interests of his own notoriously corrupt son, BNP MP Nassir Rahman. F) IS THERE ANY BNP MEMBER WHO COULD CHALLENGE TARIQUE AS KHALEDA ZIA'S SUCCESSOR OR HAVE ENOUGH SUPPORT TO FORM A COMPETING PARTY? In 2004, BNP SYG Mannan Bhuiyan privately talked up around town his availability as an alternative party leader, which got back to the PMO and led to a significant loss of his influence within the party. Nevertheless, either he has partially recovered or his stature as a principled moderate has brought him back to BNP center stage in the recent negotiations with the AL on electoral mechanisms. Bhuiyan, along with former foreign minister Morshed Khan, sits in with Khaleda Zia's meetings as party leader with visiting foreign dignitaries and diplomats. He leads the old-fashioned party liberals most opposed to JI partnership, and in terms of party hierarchy, he would be an obvious choice for party leader if Khaleda Zia died in her sleep. Morshed Khan, one of the country's richest men, could conceivably bankroll his own challenge, but there are no other obvious, well-placed contenders. Morshed's financing of the re-election campaign last year of the Awami League's firebrand mayor of Chittagong, because the BNP candidate was a local party rival, reflects the commanding priority party leaders place on personal interests. When B. Chowdhury defected in 2003, he predicted three dozen BNP MPs would join him; when ultimately only two followed -- his son and a long-time associate, Major Mannan -- he blamed (with some reason) BNP intimidation. Similar predictions for the LDP have also failed to materialize. G) WHAT ROLE DID SAJEB WAZED JOY PLAY IN THE AWAMI LEAGUE CAMPAIGN FOR THE 2001 ELECTIONS? None. H) WHAT ROLE HAS SHEIKH REHANA -- SISTER OF PARTY PRESIDENT SHEIKH HASINA -- PLAYED IN THE AWAMI LEAGUE? HOW WILL SHE PARTICIPATE IN THE 2007 ELECTIONS? DOES SHE HAVE ASPIRATIONS TO BECOME PARTY LEADER OR OTHERWISE MORE INVOLVED IN BANGLADESHI POLITICS? Opinions differ on Rehana's political influence or aspirations, but her public profile is very low, and she has never been a candidate for office. If she took over from Hasina, it would most likely be as an interim figure to preserve party unity. There is no reason to think she has popular appeal. I) TO WHAT EXTENT DOES SABER HOSAIN CHOWDHURY, HASINA'S POLITICAL SECRETARY, HAVE AN INDEPENDENT BASE OF LOYALTY? HOW DO PARTY MEMBERS VIEW HIS PROSPECTS TO SUCCEED HASINA AS PARTY LEADER? Saber's position depends on his level of influence with Hasina. He is not a faction leader. Many senior leaders dislike him because he is young, rich, and smug. When he was injured in a demonstration three months ago, it was notable how many AL mid-level leaders suggested to us his injuries were faked or exaggerated (as had happened before). J) TO WHAT EXTENT DOES AWAMI LEAGUE GENERAL SECRETARY ABDUL JALIL HAVE AN INDEPENDENT BASE OF LOYALTY? HOW DO PARTY MEMBERS VIEW HIS PROSPECTS TO SUCCEED HASINA AS PARTY LEADER? Jalil is too old at 67, too buffoonish and too clearly Hasina's lap dog to inspire much excitement. Again, he could be an interim leader because of his position as party secretary general. His status as a former bank loan SIPDIS defaulter and his penchant for blustering -- most famously for promising to play a hidden "trump card" if the BNP government failed to resign by his April 30, 2004, deadline -- exposed him to ridicule. K) IS THERE ANY PERSON WHO COULD SUCCEED SHEIKH HASINA OR GARNER ENOUGH SUPPORT TO BREAK AWAY FROM THE AWAMI LEAGUE? Perhaps, but no one obvious. However, one key leader worth watching is Presidium Member Kazi Zafarullah, a wealthy industrialist whose personal relationship with Hasina elevated him to the party's senior decision-making body at a relatively young age. Zafarullah is worldly and speaks excellent English, so, along with Saber Hussain Chowdhury, one of his principal duties is to liase with foreign diplomats. Zafarullah has many critics in the party who see him as brash and politically unproven, but his talent and access to money could make him a key player in a succession crisis. To our knowledge, he is the only senior party figure to have commissioned private polling as part of an effort to improve the party's strategic planning. L) WHAT PLANS DO BADRUDOZZA CHOWDHURY AND OIL AHMED HAVE FOR THE LDP IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS? WHERE WILL THEY FOCUS THEIR CAMPAIGN EFFORTS, IN WHICH DISTRICTS, TARGETING WHICH DEMOGRAPHICS? WHAT SOCIETAL AND GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES WILL BE ON THE LDP'S PLATFORM? The LDP is a strained marriage of convenience that may not survive the election. B. Chowdhury needed reinforcements after his Bikalpa Dara Bangladesh party failed to gel, while Col. Oli told us he reconsidered his earlier refusal to join ¶B. Chowdhury because of B. Chowdhury's persistent courting and because he thought they had more money and members than they actually do. He disparages Mahi Chowdhury as a "nobody," while Mahi expressed embarrassment to us after Oli's press conference two days after the BDB-Oli Ahmed faction "merger" in which he threatened an "eye for an eye" response to attacks on the party since such rhetoric was neither democratic nor liberal. Oli's discovery of corruption in the BNP came late in the day, and his emphasis to us on governance and anti-extremism is designed to attract USG support for him as the head of a transitional government to "real" elections. According to Oli and Mahi, and the Awami League, they are discussing "understandings" with the Awami League on certain seats, mostly in the Chittagong Division, but this is still in flux. One area of agreement for them, as old BNP stalwarts, is wariness about the AL. BDB had targeted civil society and professional leaders but with very little success; it is unlikely LDP will fare any better. M) WHAT ROLE WILL MAHI CHOWDHURY PLAY IN THE LDP? HOW DO BANGLADESHIS VIEW HIS PROSPECTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS WHEN COMPARED TO TARIQUE RAHMAN OR SAJEB WAZED JOY? As the party's only MP, Mahi gives LDP much needed credibility. His popularity was genuine and sufficient to win the by-election called after he resigned from the BNP. In part because he was a popular television presenter, Mahi has star power, though he too represents dynastic politics. He gets credit for not being Tarique (who used to be his good friend),and for, unlike Joy, staying in Bangladesh after he got his American degree. Thus, in a straightforward popularity contest, Mahi would do well, but in a political battle he would have no chance against Tarique's party machine, his money, and his cunning. N) WHO FROM THE UPPER RANKS OF THE BNP DEFECTED TO THE LDP? WHY DID THEY SWITCH PARTIES? WHAT OTHER PARTIES LOST MEMBERS TO THE LDP? BNP leaders insist with some reason that, except for the sitting MP's from Oli Ahmed's area, the defectors are all has-beens or MPs who knew their misdeeds or other acts would cost them their party tickets for the next election. The most senior party defector was a state minister of energy who got on the wrong side of Tarique-backed energy interests. Perhaps the most unexpected defector was Alamgir Kabir, a state minister who, with two other senior BNP figures, recruited notorious Islamist vigilante and future JMB terrorist leader Bangla Bhai to fight local adversaries in ¶2004. Kabir and the others were fiercely protected by the PMO during the subsequent JMB investigation because of their perceived political importance to the party, but in October Khaleda Zia downplayed Kabir to Ambassador as a deeply unpopular figure who knew he would not get a BNP ticket for re-election. O) WHO WITHIN THE LDP HAS THE MOST POTENTIAL TO RISE IN POLITICS, AND TO WHAT LEVEL? HOW WILL BEING IN A NEW PARTY HELP OR HINDER THEIR CHANCES? Outside of party president B. Chowdhury, Mahi Chowdhury and Oli Ahmed are easily the party's two biggest names, but their mutual antipathy undermines the party's prospects, and their ability to become national leaders is doubtful. Being a new party is a major liability because local organization, money, and thugs in the streets are what wins elections in Bangladesh; there is very little "new face" value for the LDP, in part because it is still predominantly a party of BNP retreads. BUTENIS