INTER-PARTY DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 006110

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2011
TAGS: KDEM PHUM BG
SUBJECT: INTER-PARTY DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD

REF: DHAKA 6091

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia T. Butenis for reason para 1.4 d.


1. (C) Summary. After several false starts, the secretaries
general of the two main parties are poised to meet in
parliament to talk about talks on the upcoming election.
There is little hope of a breakthrough as both parties remain
wedded to hard-line positions, but the breathless press
coverage of dialogue prospects the past week reflects broad
Bangladeshi hopes for political reconciliation and a way out
from feared high-levels of violence during the caretaker
government. USG efforts to promote dialogue are generally
welcomed as positive and bipartisan. End Summary.


2. (C) For the past week, Bangladesh media have featured
Ambassador's efforts to encourage Mannan Bhuiyan, Secretary
General of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and his
opposition Awami League counterpart, Abdul Jalil, to talk and
explore dialogue on obstacles to a successful election,
including Awami League participation. Ambassador spoke and
met on numerous occasions with Bhuiyan and Jalil, as well as
senior figures in both parties, including Home Minister of
State Babar for the BNP and Presidium member Kazi Zafarullah
for the AL, to urge them forward.


3. (C) During a two-hour session on September 27 (reftel),AL
president Sheikh Hasina asked Ambassador to host the two
secretaries general to tea at the CMR as an alternative to

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the downtown Dhaka state guest house as originally proposed
by the BNP and accepted by Jalil. Ambassador agreed, and the
event was scheduled to follow her previously scheduled iftar
dinner at the CMR, to which both secretaries general were
invited, on October 3.


4. (C) Late October 2, however, Jalil, coming out of a
meeting with senior party officials, informed the media of
the CMR tea. At a special press conference called to give
his response, Bhuiyan announced he would not attend the tea,
objected that the AL was trying to "blackmail" the BNP by
suggesting Bhuiyan must go to the CMR if the BNP wanted
dialogue, and stated that although the U.S. is a great friend
of Bangladesh, its help is not needed for political party
dialogue. He added, though, that the BNP's offer of dialogue
remained open and could take place at the state guest house
or at parliament.


5. (C) The AL's Kazi Zafarullah told the Ambassador that one
positive development of this latest series of events was the
BNP had now proposed parliament as a venue for talks,
implying that this would be acceptable to the AL. On October
4, newspapers headlined the probability of AL-BNP talks at
parliament, most likely after the current parliamentary
session wraps up this evening.


6. (C) Senior figures of both parties have downplayed to us
the likelihood of substantive talks, in some cases even
characterizing them as mere political theater. The pending
travel of the two party leaders, Hasina to the U.S. and PM
Zia to Saudi Arabia, adds to the perception that no
breakthroughs are in the offing.


7. (C) Although Foreign Minister Khan -- not a key
decision-maker for the BNP -- has again publicly complained
about foreign interference in Bangladeshi domestic affairs,
public reaction to U.S. efforts to promote dialogue has been
generally positive. "We're all scared about the security
situation during the caretaker regime if there's not some
kind of political settlement," a Bangladeshi academic guest
noted at the Ambassador's iftar dinner. "Because you're
showing yourselves to be neutral and that your interest is in
the political process, people will support what you are
doing."


8. (C) Comment: Both parties assure us they are open to
dialogue and do not want their party to be seen as
obstructionist. Thus far, though, the BNP has been a bit
more proactive and less fixated on protocol to get something
started, in part because it is prepared to pay a price --
probably the removal of the controversial chief election
commissioner -- if the AL drops its other demands for
electoral changes. But PM Zia and most of her key advisers
are averse to public or formal negotiation with the AL

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because that would be seen, they say, as a sign of political
weakness. Moreover, they believe, the Awami League is
already boxed in by its own rhetoric and the daunting
electoral arithmetic in favor of the ruling coalition. The
AL, for its part, is wary of undercutting its central plank
that only far-reaching electoral changes can undo massive BNP
rigging and justify AL participation in the election.
Leaking the CMR tea to the press was, the AL must have known,
guaranteed to force the BNP to back out since the optics of
international mediation of AL-BNP contacts are unacceptable
to the ruling party. Trying to "internationalize" issues
(such as the Kibria murder investigation) is a long-standing
AL pressure and debating tactic against the BNP.


9. (C) The British High Commissioner has also been promoting
inter-party dialogue and in early 2006 began a "back-channel"
exchange between two senior figures from each party.
However, it has taken the media, and the looming arrival of
the caretaker government, to generate a public sense of
urgency. While there is no reason to believe either party is
ready for substantive negotiation, the hope is widespread
that something positive -- even just a reduction of the
rhetoric -- might emerge and that a mechanism for dialogue
would be ready in case it is suddenly needed.
BUTENIS