FACILITATING POLITICAL DIALOGUE: "PLEASE DO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 005892 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM BG SUBJECT: FACILITATING POLITICAL DIALOGUE: "PLEASE DO SOMETHING!" Classified By: Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis, reason para 1.4 d. ¶1. (S) Summary. As Bangladesh's polarized political parties count down to the arrival of the Caretaker regime in late October, we, with support from our Canadian, British, and Australian colleagues, are working publicly and privately to promote dialogue between the opposition Awami League and the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party. At this point, our two main interlocutors (PLEASE PROTECT) -- Presidium Member Kazi Zafarullah and Home Minister Babar -- are saying and mostly doing the right things, and direct party-to-party contact may start in the near future. ¶2. (S) While it is very much an open question whether either party wants compromise, it is important to test the actual intentions of both sides, especially the boycott-threatening Awami League. In addition, publicly seeking to facilitate dialogue underscores our neutral posture and deflects frequent Bangladeshi appeals to us to sort out "the two ladies" to avert what many fear will be an exceptionally violent and volatile campaign period. There is also a possibility that the two parties will ultimately blink on the boycott issue and need a face-saving mechanism to step back from the brink. End Summary. ¶3. (S) Two weeks ago, the Ambassador began a series of private meetings and telephone calls with Awami League Presidium Member Kazi Zafarullah and Home Minister of State Lutfuzzoman Babar to promote the concept of inter-party dialogue. With Zafarullah, a proven confidant of Awami League president Sheikh Hasina, the Ambassador noted that the Awami League's actions and statements create the perception at home and abroad that it is disinterested in dialogue and committed instead to confrontation and street action in pursuit of a highly-ambitious and risky political agenda. ¶4. (S) Rather than focusing on protocol or on the personalities of a BNP negotiating team (as when PM Zia offered parliamentary dialogue on reforms last May),the Ambassador said, there should be recognition that inherently political problems require political, not legalistic, solutions and that the "two ladies" would be the ultimate arbiters. Zafarullah agreed that this approach was logical. With Babar, who is closely tied to PM Zia and her son Tarique, the Ambassador stressed the importance of reaching out to the opposition, demonstrating a commitment to a level playing field, and acting in a statesman-like manner. ¶5. (S) A proposal for a small dinner at the Ambassador's residence was moving forward when Babar said his party had decided that it wanted first to see the outcome of a parallel proposal for the two parties' secretaries general to talk to each other, an idea recently resuscitated by business leaders exasperated by strikes and uncertainty. However, the Awami League's Abdul Jalil was away in South Korea, and as he returned his BNP counterpart, Mannan Bhuiyan, was being hospitalized with an unknown illness. Thus, the current permutation is for BNP to designate a substitute for Bhuiyan who would then meet with Jalil to explore areas of possible compromise. ¶6. (S) Our contacts with Babar and Zafarullah are closely-held, especially within the Awami League, and have occurred against the backdrop of negative and positive statements from the "two ladies," as well as the Awami League's continuing program of street actions demanding the replacement of the Chief Election Commissioner and the presumptive Chief Caretaker Adviser. On September 17, Hasina charged that Bhuiyan's hospitalization is a ruse to avoid dialogue. PM Zia, while continuing to rail against a "plot" to ruin the election and plunge the country into chaos, has affirmed an openness to dialogue which, revealingly, she says should not be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness in the face of Awami League pressure. ¶7. (S) Comment: The good news is that we have effectively engaged Zia and Hasina on the issue of dialogue and that neither one of them wants to be seen as an obstacle to that effort. At least privately, our interlocutors have accepted the desirability of compromise and that neither side, in Jalil's words, can expect to "get 100 percent." Our British, Canadian, and Australian colleagues have reinforced our points on dialogue with their own senior Awami League and BNP contacts to demonstrate that our concerns have an international dimension. Public reaction to these efforts, reported with varying degrees of accuracy in the press, has been generally receptive since Bangladeshis are desperate for any opening to reduce violence and acrimony during the DHAKA 00005892 002 OF 002 election. The recent NDI assessment team's hard-hitting but balanced conclusions have helped reinforce the USG's credentials as a concerned but non-partisan party. ¶8. (S) The key challenge is to persuade the two parties that it behooves their own interests to step back from confrontation just as the campaign struggle should be starting in earnest and the Awami League shows every sign of escalating its street campaign. It is a very open question whether either party leadership is genuinely interested in dialogue or compromise, the BNP because it thinks that it already occupies a strong electoral position and the Awami League because it is wary of legitimizing an electoral process that, rigged or not, looks more and more foreboding following General Ershad's apparent move to join the BNP. ¶9. (C) In addition to clarifying the Awami League's actual intentions, whether it is bent on confrontation or open to compromise and a democratic outcome, and deflecting Bangladeshi appeals for the USG to sort out "the two ladies," a structure of inter-party dialogue could provide a face-saving mechanism for the two parties to step back from the brink. Ironically, the issue that could scare the two parties into compromise is an opposition boycott: BNP fears a boycott would produce more violence, undermine the outcome's legitimacy, and ensure prolonged instability, while boycott, in the eyes of many AL leaders, would be tantamount to a political poison pill. BUTENIS