BANGLADESH RMG SECTOR LABOR UNREST - CAUSES AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 004412 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ETRD ECON PHUM BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH RMG SECTOR LABOR UNREST - CAUSES AND PREDICTIONS REF: A. DHAKA 3258 ¶B. DHAKA 3132 ¶C. DHAKA 3053 ¶D. DHAKA 3002 ¶E. DHAKA 2089 ¶F. DHAKA 1740 ¶1. Nearly two months after labor unrest exploded into violence outside of Dhaka, the ready-made garment (RMG) industry has largely returned to normal. Agreements negotiated between industry and labor groups must still be implemented, with a decision on the most contentious issue -- raising the statutory minimum wage -- due by mid-September. Small incidents, sometimes wholly unrelated to the industry, continue to spark occasional conflict at individual factories. All factories within the Dhaka Export Processing Zone (DEPZ) have resumed operation, although investors remain concerned about security. International buyers' representatives continue to monitor developments closely, while resisting sellers' pleas for higher prices to offset expected wage increases. End summary. ¶2. On May 22, simmering disputes at the Universal Sweater Factory in Savar, northwest of Dhaka, erupted into violence, quickly spreading to nearby factories and ultimately spilling into the DEPZ, roughly a mile away (Ref D). The violence continued the following day, spreading to factories in and around Dhaka, before finally being brought under control late on May 23. Sporadic outbreaks of violence continued over the next few weeks, at one point prompting investors to completely suspend their operations in the DEPZ. Underlying Causes -------------- ¶3. There were many theories about the causes of the violence, some plausible, some farfetched (Ref C). Two dominant explanations have emerged, supported by several underlying factors. ¶4. First, worker frustration over wage issues finally erupted. Although government's failure to raise the legal minimum wage became the rallying cry for labor organizations, for many workers the issue was not so much the amount of wages as the failure of many factory owners to pay wages on time and to pay required overtime rates. In the knitwear sector, where most workers are paid by the piece, workers protested the practice of some factories of announcing the piece rate only at the time of payment, rather than in advance. Piece rate workers were also frustrated by the lack of an "overtime" mechanism to reflect long hours during production surges. These piece rate issues were at the root of the dispute at Universal Sweater (Ref B). ¶5. The second factor that has emerged is the role of Zahedul Islam Zahed, a leader of BNP's labor wing. Known to some as the "Mafia leader of Savar," he has a rough reputation as an illegal toll collector and labor agitator who plays both sides of the fence, stirring worker unrest then collecting bribes from factory owners to restore labor peace. Many now believe that he and other "musclemen" and extortionists took advantage of the May 22 protests to generate continued worker agitation over the following weeks. Zahed's role became conspicuous after he led several violent labor demonstrations in and around the DEPZ. He was arrested June 20 and remains in custody pending a formal charge sheet. Coincidentally, calm returned to the area not long after his arrest. ¶6. Other factors created conditions that allowed an otherwise routine factory dispute to turn violent. May is traditionally a high volume month in the industry as companies rush to meet seasonal buying trends. As a result, many factories were requiring significant overtime, in many cases operating seven days a week. Workers understand that pressures on the industry during this period give them more leverage for pressing any demands. ¶7. Increased problems in the power sector also played a role. Rolling blackouts (known locally as "load shedding") interrupted production at many factories, creating further DHAKA 00004412 002 OF 004 pressures on delivery schedules. Load shedding also affected workers and their families in their homes, adding to general irritation and anxiety. (Note: Lack of power had already triggered violence elsewhere, in Kanshat (Ref E),prompting concessions from government officials. End note.) ¶8. Workers also felt under pressure from rising prices for everyday essentials as annualized inflation approached seven percent. Although average wages are more than double the legal minimum wage, workers clearly felt rising prices were significantly undermining their standard of living. ¶9. Workers had also become increasingly concerned about working conditions in their factories, especially after several workers died in two factory fires (Ref F). The collapse of a former factory undergoing renovation, reminiscent of the collapse of a garment factory a year earlier in Savar, further heightened worker concerns about the safety of their factories and frustrated over lax enforcement of workplace safety codes. ¶10. Rapid new investment to meet strong market demand following the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement has also contributed to rising worker tensions. Our contacts in the industry tell us that many new factory owners, while successful businessmen generally, have little experience in the garment industry. As a result, they are prone to under price their products and agree to unrealistic delivery terms. This in turn creates financial pressures, leading to late payment of wages, pressure to work uncompensated overtime, and in some cases outright fraud in the accounting of worker hours. Rapid expansion coupled with geographic concentration has also created labor shortages, particularly in the Savar/Dhaka area, driving up wage costs for skilled labor (i.e., workers who have completed their three-month apprenticeship) and prompting some owners to make unrealistic promises in order to attract labor. ¶11. Garment workers were not the only protestors; indeed, most of the protesters on May 22 and 23 were men, even though women make up nearly 80% of the workforce in the garment industry. Spontaneous crowds form easily in Bangladesh, with simple traffic accidents enough to spark an unruly mob. Construction workers, day laborers and bystanders all joined in, swelling crowds and contributing to the violence and property damage. It is also noteworthy that the violence remained localized to the Savar/Dhaka EPZ area, where about 10% of the country's garment factories are located. The DEPZ Difference -------------- ¶12. Although labor unrest affected companies both inside and outside the DEPZ, deliberate agitation and provocation seemed to play a larger role in the EPZ. In one case, workers became violent at one of four Youngone factories in the DEPZ when word spread that a mid-level manager had struck and injured a pregnant worker. The incident never happened and was traced to a deliberate rumor that spread rapidly in the highly charged atmosphere that followed the May 22-23 outbursts. The situation snowballed when Youngone shut the factory to restore order. Workers, who are not paid when the factory is closed, began agitating at the other Youngone plants, eventually forcing all to close for several days. The factories reopened a week later and there has been no further problem. ¶13. The protests led by Zahed were also organized outside the DEPZ, but then led by him to the DEPZ. In a few cases, foreign investors, especially Korean owned firms, seemed to be singled out for agitation. ¶14. A few other plants in the DEPZ also experienced sporadic worker protests and were forced to suspend operations for a few days. These particular factories had a history of worker complaints, and the issues (timeliness of wage payments and questionable behavior of middle management) appeared to have merit. Negotiations between management and the workers resolved these individual disputes within a few days, although the press often sensationalized these disputes as part of a broader upheaval in the DEPZ. Significantly, DHAKA 00004412 003 OF 004 these disputes did not spread to other factories within the EPZ, despite efforts by some workers to enlist support from workers in other factories. ¶15. Wage demands were less of an issue at factories within the EPZ for two reasons. First, the rules governing factories in the EPZs set wages in dollars, which has helped prevent erosion of real wages. Workers did successfully press for the exchange rate to be calculated monthly, rather than yearly, to better account for depreciation of the taka against the dollar. ¶16. The other factor was the 2004 labor law, which provided for a transition to collective bargaining and freedom of association within the EPZs. Under the law, the transitional Workers Rights and Welfare Councils (WRWC) are allowed to negotiate a defined set of issues with management, which do not yet include collective bargaining over wages. Confusion among workers over the scope of their collective bargaining rights within the EPZs, compared to the demands of their colleagues outside the zone, contributed initially to worker unrest within the DEPZ when they felt management was ignoring demands which from management's perspective, were not yet subject to negotiation. Intervention by BEPZA, labor groups and in some cases, members of the WRWCs themselves helped clarify worker rights and keep demands realistic. Outside the DEPZ, Agreements Buy a Respite -------------- ¶17. Within days, leaders of the two major industry groups met with various groups of labor leaders to address worker concerns and restore labor peace. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) signed three separate but substantially similar agreements on June 11, June 12 and June 22 with nine, 39 and 16 labor unions respectively. ¶18. Key points of the agreements were: -- Establishment of a minimum wage board to revise the existing minimum wage and address other wage related issues, including overtime and piecework. The board must complete its work within three months. -- Amnesty for workers picked up in blanket arrests (cases against those actively involved in property damage would not necessarily be dismissed); job reinstatement. -- Immediate reopening of factories; issuance of appointment letters and IDs for all workers. -- Acknowledgment of workers' right to form trade unions. -- Paid maternity benefits. -- At least one day off each week. -- Improved workplace facilities, including improved health clinics; better monitoring and enforcement by BGMEA/BKMEA. ¶19. Although the agreements have bought a temporary respite, unrest could resume if workers decide the agreements are not being implemented in good faith. Already, two worker groups have held public forums to complain that not all workers have been rehired and to demand a taka 3000/per month minimum wage (about $43). ¶20. Clearly the actions of the wage board will be critical to the direction of the industry. Rising consumer prices and the perceived success of their May protests have raised worker expectations for a significant increase in the minimum wage. Disappointment could well trigger further protests. ¶21. While even a 150% increase in the statutory minimum wage would barely bring the statutory minimum in line with the prevailing minimum wage, factory owners fear it would likely have a ripple effect on their entire wage structure, adding to their overall costs. Given the thin margins in the industry, owners worry that they will be unable to pass these DHAKA 00004412 004 OF 004 cost increases through to their buyers. New BEPZA Leadership Engages -------------- ¶22. As the crisis unfolded, the BDG quickly settled on BEPZA as the prime scapegoat, and replaced the executive director (Ref A). In typical government fashion, the new director, Brigadier General Ashraf Abdullah Yousuf, learned of his appointment from television reports at his home in Chittagong. ¶23. Ambassador and EconOff met with BG Yousuf a few weeks after his appointment. Although he has no experience in the industry, he seemed to quickly understand the important role he could play by example. While BEPZA's authority is limited to oversight of the EPZs, the Executive Director is accorded significant respect by the industry associations. Yousuf held a series of meetings with investors, labor groups and members of the WRWCs first to understand each side's concerns and then to facilitate solutions. Unlike his predecessor, who was perceived by labor to be biased in favor of investors, Yousuf seems genuinely to view his role as that of an honest broker. He told Ambassador he would like to reach out to international labor organizations for assistance with training labor representatives and expressed a willingness to meet with AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center when its director returns from leave later this summer. Buyers Help Concentrate Attention on Solutions -------------- - ¶24. Major international buyers were quick to express their concerns over unrest in the industry and the social responsibility and worker welfare issues it highlighted. Buyer concerns were at least a contributing factor in the speed with which the BDG, BGMEA and BKMEA moved to address worker concerns. Buyers did not panic, however. The largest buying groups maintain offices in Bangladesh, and understood the context surrounding worker unrest. For now, at least, no buyer has reduced orders to Bangladesh as a result of the unrest. ¶25. Buyers have also rebuffed industry suggestions that they help support higher wages through higher prices for the products they purchase. At a buyer's conference organized by BKMEA to promote its actions to address worker concerns, buyers representatives were blunt that the industry must confront the core issues affecting its margins and competitiveness: unreliable and inadequate power, roads, ports and other infrastructure, corruption, and political unrest that disrupts production. Comment -------------- ¶26. Bangladesh and its garment industry will remain volatile as the current government's term expires and interest groups and political parties gear up for elections in January 2007. In this context, should government and industry fail to deliver on their promises to labor, especially on the issue of wages, further labor unrest is likely. ¶27. Industry's somewhat naive request for price support from buyers to offset wage increases is understandable, if misplaced. The industry's strong comparative advantage in labor costs, even with wage increases, is substantially undermined by structural weaknesses in the broader business environment over which individual businesses have little control. These structural issues, rather than labor relations, are the bigger threat to the industry in the medium term and will be a significant factor in determining whether Bangladesh can continue to compete globally when safeguards against China are removed by the US and EU in 2008 and if upcoming revisions to the EU's GSP system remove benefits currently enjoyed by Bangladesh. BUTENIS